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Foreword  
 
Climate change is an increasingly important issue for policy makers globally, with material impacts on 
Southeast Asian economies and other regions highly vulnerable to climate risks. This report provides a 
timely and very comprehensive assessment of the role played by climate change on sovereign risk. In 
particular, a number of transmission channels through which climate change affects sovereign risk are 
discussed in the report: the fiscal impacts of climate-related natural disasters, the fiscal consequences 
of adaptation and mitigation policies, the macroeconomic impacts of climate change, the impacts of 
climate risk on financial sector stability, the international trade and capital flow dimension, and the 
impact of climate change on political stability. The report provides a thorough examination of how 
these transmission channels apply to the economies of Southeast Asia, and shows that there are 
substantial risks for the majority of Southeast Asia from a macrofinancial stability perspective. As well 
as this, the report provides new empirical estimates on the impact of climate vulnerability on 
sovereign risk, with vulnerability to climate change in the economies of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) being associated with sovereign bond yield premia of around 155 basis points 
on average. Countries with higher exposure to climate risks are shown to incur even higher premia on 
their sovereign borrowing costs. 
The policy implications outlined in this report should be taken seriously. I would urge policy makers in 
Southeast Asia and elsewhere to take particular heed of the recommendations provided in this report 
on how to mitigate and manage climate-related sovereign risks. Without taking appropriate measures 
to address vulnerability to climate risks, the implications for sovereign risk can have substantial 
negative ramifications for financial stability, sovereign financing cost, and, indeed, economic growth. 
With this in mind, I would like to draw attention to three of the policy recommendations in the report. 
First, I fully concur with the importance for economies to carry out comprehensive climate risk 
vulnerability assessments and develop national adaption plans that address macrofinancial risks. This 
report provides valuable insights into the dimensions that should be incorporated into any such 
assessment. Second, I would like to reinforce further that national governments need to consider the 
mainstreaming of climate risk adaptation into their budgetary plans. The scale of the negative 
implications of climate risks for sovereign risk require a full integration of climate risks into the public 
finance architecture. Third, I would like to highlight the importance of central banks and financial 
supervisors in addressing climate-related macrofinancial risks. The report provides a number of 
pertinent policy recommendations related to incorporating climate risks into monetary and 
prudential frameworks and the importance of financial sector policies to scale-up investment in 
climate adaptation. It also highlights the role of international financial institutions in providing 
technical assistance on improving adaptive capacity and macrofinancial resilience. 
Overall, this report makes an important contribution to our understanding of the links between 
climate change and sovereign risk, with concrete recommendations for policy makers on how to deal 
with the sovereign risk implications of climate change. I hope that these recommendations will be 
widely adopted. We urgently need to scale up our collective efforts to climate-proof our economies 
and societies. This report will help us doing so. 
 
 
Aladdin D. Rillo 
Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for ASEAN Economic Community 
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Executive Summary 
 
Climate change can have a material impact on sovereign risk through direct and indirect effects on 
public finances. It raises the cost of capital of climate-vulnerable countries and threatens debt 
sustainability. Governments must climate-proof their economies and public finances or potentially 
face an ever-worsening spiral of climate vulnerability and unsustainable debt burdens. 
This study focuses on the complex nexus between climate change and sovereign risk, identifying and 
scrutinizing six transmission channels through which climate change can amplify sovereign risk and 
worsen a sovereign’s standing:  
1. Fiscal impacts of climate-related natural disasters 
2. Fiscal consequences of adaptation and mitigation policies 
3. Macroeconomic impacts of climate change 
4. Climate-related risks and financial sector stability 
5. Impacts on international trade and capital flows 
6. Impacts on political stability 
The transmission channels are not independent of each other. Climate impacts can magnify the 
transmission of risk through multiple channels. The socioeconomic and fiscal effects of climate 
change are multifaceted and depend on the policies taken or not taken to mitigate and adapt to 
these risks. 
This report illustrates the relevance of the six transmission channels for sovereign risk in Southeast 
Asia, one of the most climate-vulnerable regions of the world. Physical risks are expected to 
significantly impact economic activity, international commerce, employment, and public finances with 
national and regional implications. Transition risks will be prominent as exports and economies 
become affected by international climate policies, technological change, and changing consumption 
patterns. The implications of climate change for macrofinancial stability and sovereign risk are likely 
to be material for most if not all countries in Southeast Asia. 
The report presents new empirical evidence on the relationship between climate vulnerability, 
resilience, and the sovereign cost of capital. Using a sample of 40 developed and emerging 
economies, econometric analysis shows that climate risks and resilience to these risks have significant 
effects on the cost of sovereign borrowing. 
Higher climate risk vulnerability leads to significant rises in the cost of sovereign borrowing. Premia on 
sovereign bond yields amount to around 275 basis points for economies highly exposed to climate 
risk, compared to 155 basis points for Southeast Asian countries, and 113 basis points for emerging 
market economies overall. In contrast, exposure to climate risks is not statistically significant for the 
group of advanced economies. We also find resilience to climate risk to be statistically significant in 
reducing bond yields across all country groups, but with smaller magnitudes. 
Overall, the analysis confirms that climate vulnerability has significant implications for sovereign 
borrowing costs, and that the magnitude of the effect is much larger for countries highly vulnerable 
to climate change. Impulse response analysis suggests that shocks imposed on climate vulnerability 
and resilience have permanent effects on bond yields, and that economies highly exposed to climate 
risks experience larger permanent effects on yields than economies with lower exposure. 
All branches of government will have to address climate-related risks. Monetary and financial 
authorities will have to play crucial roles in analyzing and mitigating macrofinancial risks. We 
recommend five broad policy actions to mitigate and manage climate-related sovereign risk in a 
coordinated manner. 
Executive Summary 
xii 
First, governments need to conduct comprehensive sectoral and national vulnerability assessments 
over multiple timespans to identify climate-related sovereign risk and develop national adaptation 
plans. Systematic, scenario-based assessment of all sources of vulnerability for the macroeconomy, 
the financial system, and public finances is needed, addressing both physical and transition risks. Such 
an assessment could be conducted by a dedicated national climate risk board that should include the 
central bank and supervisor along with the key government departments responsible for finance, 
economy, planning, and agriculture, among others. 
Second, based on vulnerability assessments, financial authorities need to mainstream climate risk 
analysis into public financial management. This should include appropriate disclosure, analysis, and 
management of climate risks to public finances. Budgetary processes need to account for climate risk 
and mainstream climate-relevant policies and laws. Furthermore, finance ministries need to enhance 
public sector funding and debt management strategies, including through debt instruments with risk-
sharing features, and diversification of government revenue streams away from high-risk sectors. 
Third, central banks and financial supervisors need to address climate-related risks in their monetary 
and prudential frameworks and operations. Disclosure of climate and other sustainability risks should 
become mandatory, and climate stress tests of financial institutions should be conducted regularly. 
Climate-related financial risks should be mainstreamed into macro and micro prudential supervision. 
Monetary and prudential measures should be aligned with climate goals. Importantly, supervisors 
should reconsider the prudential treatment of sovereign exposures in financial regulation. 
Fourth, governments and financial authorities should implement financial sector policies to scale-up 
investment in climate adaptation and develop insurance solutions. Monetary and financial authorities 
can play an important role in supporting the development of local currency bond markets and fintech 
solutions for mobilizing domestic savings for financing climate-resilient, sustainable infrastructure  
and other adaptation measures. Developing insurance markets and broadening insurance coverage 
can help to enhance the financial resilience of households and businesses and take the burden off 
public finances. 
Fifth, international financial institutions—including the International Monetary Fund, multilateral 
development banks, and regional financing arrangements—have a special role in supporting 
vulnerable countries to better address climate-related sovereign risks and strengthen adaptive 
capacity and macrofinancial resilience. Building on their respective strengths, they can provide 
technical assistance and training, support surveillance and risk monitoring, provide finance for 
adaptation and resilience investment, help develop insurance solutions, and provide emergency 
lending and crisis support. 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
For large countries with solid tax bases and relatively favorable climates, the socialization of 
climate risk may be manageable. For smaller, highly exposed island nations, it will be 
overwhelming. Before they are physically inundated, their sovereignty will be drowned under 
an economic and financial deluge. 
(Adam Tooze 2019) 
 
Climate change has emerged as one of the mega-challenges of our time. It poses a potentially 
catastrophic threat to humanity. Climate change is threatening livelihoods and will require our 
economies to adapt in profound ways. As Weitzman (2011, 275) pointed out, “[d]eep structural 
uncertainty about the unknown unknowns of what might go very wrong is coupled with essentially 
unlimited downside liability on possible planetary damages.” Even in the most optimistic climate 
mitigation scenarios, the effects of global warming are likely to have a substantial impact on our 
economies. For many countries, climate change poses a significant risk to their macroeconomic and 
financial stability and, as a consequence, threatens to undermine their fiscal and debt sustainability. 
For some countries, there is a real danger that climate change will lead to a “fiscal tsunami” (Farmer 
2019). 
Over the last years, credit rating agencies have started to flag climate change as a potential risk to 
sovereign credit ratings,1 and international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, have acknowledged the macroeconomic and financial risks emanating 
from climate change. Moreover, investors are increasingly “recognising the need for a broader 
understanding of emerging risks in the bond markets” and the “mounting threat of systemic risks 
outside of the financial system, notably environmental risk, which can impact multiple financial 
markets” (UNEP FI and Global Footprint Network 2012, 3). 
A growing body of research has studied the macroeconomic impacts of climate change (e.g. 
Hochrainer 2009; Batten 2018). However, despite the potentially profound implications, little 
systematic analysis has been conducted to date on the nexus between climate change and sovereign 
risk. Furthermore, no meaningful research has focused thus far on how central banks and supervisors 
may integrate the climate–sovereign risk nexus into their operational frameworks to help them 
achieve their mandated goals of maintaining price and financial stability, thus contributing to broader 
macroeconomic stability. Against this backdrop, this report puts forward an analytical framework for 
analyzing the potential impact of climate change on sovereign risk and debt sustainability and 
illustrates the relevance of these risk channels for the countries of Southeast Asia, which is one of the 
regions that is most vulnerable to climate change. The report also assesses the implications from the 
perspective of monetary and financial authorities. While this report focuses on climate risks, we 
should emphasize that climate change is not the only environmental risk that can exert an impact on 
sovereign risk. In particular, research has increasingly acknowledged that the depletion of natural 
capital and biodiversity loss also pose a sovereign risk threat (Pinzón et al. 2020). As the report will 
discuss later, climate change and the depletion of natural capital are closely intertwined. 
  
 
1  Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services describes climate change as “a Global Mega-trend for Sovereign Risk” (S&P 2014a, 1). 
Climate Change and Sovereign Risk 
2 
Sovereign risk is the risk that a government will become unable or unwilling to meet its debt 
obligations.2 It has a direct link to fiscal risks, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2018, 95) 
defines as “factors that may cause fiscal outcomes to deviate from expectations or forecasts,” 
comprising “potential shocks to government revenues, expenditures, assets, or liabilities, which are 
not reflected in the government’s fiscal forecasts or reports.” The analysis of fiscal risk has tended to 
focus on risks that “have a reasonable chance of materializing during a horizon of a few years” to 
“keep the analysis manageable” (Cebotari et al. 2009, 2). Even when adopting a time horizon of a few 
years, climate change is a material risk for many countries. The risks, however, are significantly higher 
when taking a longer-term perspective. Estimates have put the cost of unmitigated climate change at 
23% or more of the global gross domestic product (GDP) by the year 2100 (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 
2015a). This will inevitably have impacts on public finances and debt sustainability. In the absence of 
meaningful mitigation efforts, the world may indeed be at risk of “climate ruin” (Heine and Black 
2019, 3).  
While climate change is affecting the entire globe, global warming and the associated physical 
processes will differ in their manifestation and severity across countries and regions. Poorer countries 
with temperate and hot climates will suffer greater output losses. Indeed, the economic effects of 
climate change are likely to be disproportionally larger in developing countries, which “are most 
vulnerable to extreme events, [and] are projected to experience the strongest increase in 
[temperature] variability” (Bathiany et al. 2018, 1) and sea-level rise (Lincke and Hinkel 2018). Some 
small developing island states may even vanish entirely (IPCC 2019a). Poorer countries tend to be 
economically less diversified and more reliant on sectors that are particularly vulnerable to physical 
risk (including agriculture, fishing, and tourism) and transition risk (such as fossil fuel extraction), 
while limited financial and institutional resources tend to constrain their capacities to adapt to climate 
change. A lack of insurance compounds the risks. A recent study by Moody’s Analytics stated that 
“[e]merging economies, oil producers, and those in warmer climates are most vulnerable” and that 
the “most draconian effects [of climate change will] occur during the second half of this century” 
(Lafakis et al. 2019, 12). As this report will analyze in detail, both physical and transition effects of 
climate change can have profound consequences for fiscal sustainability and affect sovereign credit 
risk in countries with a less diversified economy and climate impacts on key sectors that generate 
high corporate tax revenue and provide large-scale employment. 
Sovereign risk matters. Sovereign debt is the single most important asset class. At the end of 2019, 
the total amount of outstanding government debt stood at US$70 trillion or 28% of total global  
debt (IIF 2020). Government bonds account for 47% of the US$115 trillion global bond market. 
Sovereign debt, which is often treated as a risk-free asset, serves as a benchmark for the pricing of 
corporate debt. A worsening of sovereign risk means that the refinancing of public debt becomes 
more expensive and fiscal space is constrained, limiting the scope for public investment in important 
areas such as infrastructure, health, and education. A worsening sovereign risk profile also has 
implications for corporate risk (Augustin et al. 2018). Recent evidence has shown a link between the 
climate vulnerability of countries and the cost of corporate capital for the firms in these countries 
(Kling et al. 2020). 
  
 
2  As Fitch, the credit rating agency, pointed out, “[c]ountry risk and sovereign credit risk are related but distinct concepts” 
(Fitch 2019, 3). Country risk is related to risks to doing business in a given country, including an unpredictable operating 
environment, feeble property rights, and a weak legal framework, whereas sovereign credit risk is specifically related to a 
government’s payments on its debt obligations. 
Introduction 
3 
The structure of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews how the major credit rating agencies have 
started to analyze climate change as a potential risk for sovereign credit ratings. Chapter 3 dissects 
the ways in which climate change can amplify sovereign risk. Subsequently, and building on this 
conceptual work, Chapter 4 examines the potential impact of climate change on sovereign risk for the 
ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).3 Chapter 5 presents an 
empirical analysis of the effects of climate vulnerability on the price of sovereign debt, using a global 
sample of 40 advanced and emerging economies. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the 
preceding analysis for macro-financial governance. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of 
the main findings and insights of this report and puts forward a set of recommendations for monetary 
and financial authorities to mitigate climate-related sovereign risk. 
 
3  The members of ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
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2. Rating Agencies and Climate Risk 
 
Although rating actions mainly caused by environmental factors are not deemed to increase 
considerably in the short- to medium-term, they may need to be recognized as a big risk factor 
in the long term.  
(Hosoda, Ishiwata, and Nagao 2018, 4) 
 
Ratings agencies are increasingly paying attention to the exposure of sovereigns and local 
governments to climate risk.4 To date, no major credit rating agency has downgraded a sovereign 
based on an explicit attribution to climate risks (Buhr et al. 2018; Tigue 2019). However, when 
Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) downgraded Sint Maarten in June 2019, the explanation 
included “[t]he increase in Sint Maarten’s main debt metrics, resulting from the still-ongoing 
economic and fiscal shock following Hurricane Irma’s landing in 2017” (Moody’s 2019a). Further, 
ratings agencies are considering climate risks more strongly, though indirectly, in their sovereign 
rating methodologies. The agencies’ methodologies of credit analysis themselves still remain vastly 
unchanged, but a trend toward using additional tools for climate risk assessment is becoming clear. A 
stronger consideration of climate change impacts would most likely lead to further downgrading of 
those sovereigns affected the most by climate change, particularly in the global south. 
Standard & Poor’s described climate change as a “global mega-trend for sovereign risk” in 2014 and 
highlighted that “[t]he impact on creditworthiness will probably be felt through various channels, 
including economic growth, external performance, and public finances” (S&P 2014a, 1). It also 
emphasized that “lower-rated sovereigns tend on average to be more vulnerable than higher-rated 
sovereigns” (S&P 2014a, 10) and that “[s]overeigns will probably be unevenly affected by climate 
change, with poorer and lower rated sovereigns typically hit hardest, which could contribute to rising 
global rating inequality” (S&P 2014a, 1). Moody’s (2020a) also recently highlighted sea-level rise as a 
long-term credit threat to several Asian, Middle Eastern, North African, and small island countries.5 
2.1  Climate risks in the current methodologies of the “big three”  
rating agencies 
S&P’s sovereign issuer criteria framework rests on the five pillars of institutional, economic, external, 
fiscal, and monetary assessment (S&P 2017). An ESG Risk Atlas, which comprises a country risk 
component for governance risks and natural disasters and a sector risk component in 34 sectors, 
informs it (S&P 2019). According to S&P, the energy sector and the consumer products sector are the 
most at risk from climate change, for example due to disruptions of supply chains or market 
dislocations (S&P 2014b). S&P’s current sovereign rating methodology considers climate risks only as 
intermediary variables influencing its key measures of economic, fiscal, and external performance 
(S&P 2015b, 2017). It considers natural disasters such as tropical cyclones or floods—as a crucial part 
of climate risks—to be responsible for the biggest single rating impacts. While most disaster events 
are “relatively benign, and do not cause economic damage of a magnitude that would have any 
meaningful repercussions on the credit standing of the sovereigns where they occur,” S&P highlighted 
 
4  More generally, credit rating agencies have started to account for climate change risks across assets. See, for instance, 
Mathiesen (2018). 
5  In 2017, Moody’s was the first rating agency to place a sub-sovereign entity—the city of Cape Town in South Africa—
under review for downgrading on the grounds of climate-related credit repayment risks. 
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that, “in the rare cases when severe natural catastrophes hit densely populated and economically 
developed areas, they bear large economic costs and are more likely to hurt a sovereign’s credit 
standing” (S&P 2015a, 2). Figure 1 summarizes S&P’s sovereign issuer criteria framework. 
Figure 1: S&P’s sovereign issuer criteria framework 
 
Note: ICR stands for issuer credit rating. 
Source: Compiled by authors based on S&P (2017, 2). 
Moody’s bases its assessment of sovereign credit risk on the interplay of four factors: “economic 
strength,” “institutions and governance strength,” “fiscal strength,” and “susceptibility to event risk” 
(Moody’s 2019b). This methodology does mention climate risks briefly. Moody’s (2016b) has 
identified four primary transmission channels through which physical climate change may affect 
sovereign risk: (1) impacts on economic activity, (2) damage to infrastructure, (3) social costs, and (4) 
population shifts (Figure 2). It views the susceptibility to climate risks as a function of exposure and 
resilience. The former includes two dimensions: economic diversification (e.g. the size of the 
economy, the concentration of agriculture as a share of the total output, and employment) and 
geographic location (e.g. the magnitude and frequency of economic disruptive climate events and the 
population density in low-lying areas). Resilience comprises three dimensions: the development level 
(income per capita and adaptive capacity), fiscal flexibility (debt burden and debt affordability), and 
government policies (e.g. insurance or savings funds to mitigate against natural disasters). 
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Figure 2: Moody’s primary transmission channels from physical climate change 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Moody’s (2016b, 4). 
Figure 3: Moody’s environmental considerations for sovereigns 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Moody’s (2018b, 3). 
Moody’s has also laid out how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risks may influence 
sovereign ratings (Moody’s 2018b). Environmental credit risks relate to the current and future 
“physical conditions in which societies operate” (Moody’s 2018b, 3), including the impact of climate 
change and the global transition to less carbon-intensive economic development (Figure 3). Moody’s 
has developed a set of tools to improve the transparency of its climate risk-related rating changes, 
including ESG taxonomies, a global heat map, and sector scorecards (Moody’s 2018a, 2018c). 
Moody’s (2018a) has also published an assessment of the susceptibility of sovereigns’ credit quality to 
climate change. It has identified 36 small, agriculture-reliant countries—17 in Africa and 12 in the Asia 
and the Pacific region—as being the most susceptible to climate change. 
Fitch Ratings bases its assessment of sovereign risk on a “synthesis of quantitative and qualitative 
judgements that capture the willingness as well as the capacity of the sovereign to meet its debt 
obligations” (Fitch 2019b, 1). The analysis comprises four analytical pillars: structural features; 
macroeconomic performance, policies, and prospects; public finances; and external finances 
(Table 1). The rating criteria and the rating model make no explicit reference to climate risks or 
climate-related shocks. However, Fitch has affirmed that climate factors (and other ESG factors) can 
influence each of the four analytical pillars and that increasing climate vulnerabilities could 
undermine sovereign ratings (Fitch 2019a). 
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Table 1: Fitch Ratings’ sovereign rating criteria 
 Analytical pillar Structural features 
Macroeconomic 
performance, 
policies, and 
prospects Public finances External finances 
Input Key criteria factors Governance quality 
Wealth and 
flexibility of the 
economy 
Political stability and 
capacity 
Financial sector risks 
Policy framework 
GDP growth 
Inflation 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
Government debt 
Fiscal balance 
Debt dynamics 
Fiscal policy 
Balance of 
payments 
External balance 
sheet 
External liquidity 
Sovereign 
Rating 
Model 
(SRM) 
Regression-based, 
point-in-time rating 
model based on  
18 key variables 
Governance 
indicators 
GDP per capita 
Share in world GDP 
Years since default 
or restructuring 
event 
Broad money supply 
Real GDP growth 
volatility 
Consumer price 
inflation 
Real GDP growth 
Gross government 
debt/GDP 
General government 
interest (% of 
revenues) 
General government 
fiscal balance/GDP 
Foreign currency 
government 
debt/general 
government debt 
Reserve currency 
flexibility 
Sovereign net 
foreign assets (% of 
GDP) 
Commodity 
dependence 
Foreign exchange 
reserves (months of 
cover of import 
payments) 
External interest 
service (% of current 
external receipts) 
Current account 
balance + FDI (% of 
GDP) 
Qualitative 
Overlay 
(QO) 
Forward-looking 
adjustment 
framework to 
provide a subjective 
assessment of key 
criteria factors that 
are not explicitly 
included in the SRM 
Political stability and 
capacity 
Financial sector risks 
Business 
environment and 
economic flexibility 
Macroeconomic 
policy credibility and 
flexibility 
GDP growth outlook 
(5 years) 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
Fiscal financing 
flexibility 
Public debt 
sustainability 
Fiscal structure 
External financing 
flexibility 
External debt 
sustainability 
Vulnerability to 
shocks 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Fitch (2019b, 2). 
Fitch, in an approach similar to that of S&P, relies on the ESG Relevance Scores in its consideration of 
climate risks for its sovereign rating (Fitch 2019a, Table 2). Interestingly, it considers environmental 
factors to be less impactful on the current ratings than social or governance factors. Only 
two sovereigns have an environmental ESG element scored at “4” (“relevant to rating, a rating 
driver”), while all the other sovereigns have a score of “3” (“relevant, but only impacts sovereign 
rating in combination with other factors”) for at least three out of five environmental risk factors. 
S&P acknowledged that lower-rated sovereigns have greater vulnerability to climate change (S&P 
2015a). The same holds true for Moody’s (Moody’s 2018b), which, as early as 2016, highlighted that 
those countries that are more reliant on agriculture and possess weaker infrastructural and 
institutional quality are more susceptible to climate risks (Moody’s 2016b). 
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Table 2: Fitch Ratings’ environmental relevance score 
General issues Key sovereign issue Sovereign rating criteria references 
Greenhouse gas 
emissions and air quality  
Emissions and air pollution as a 
constraint on GDP growth 
SRM—macroeconomic performance, policies, and 
prospects (macro); macro: real GDP growth; QO—
macro: GDP growth outlook 
Energy management  Management of energy resource 
endowments affecting exports, 
government revenue, and GDP 
SRM—external finances; commodity dependence; 
SRM and QO—indirectly affects other SRM variables 
and QO judgments 
Water resources and 
management  
Water resource availability and 
management as a constraint on GDP 
growth 
SRM—macro: real GDP growth; QO—macro: GDP 
growth outlook 
Biodiversity and natural 
resource management  
Management of natural resource 
endowments affecting exports, 
government revenues, and GDP 
SRM—external finances: commodity dependence; 
SRM and QO—indirectly affects other SRM variables 
and QO judgments 
Natural disasters and 
climate change  
Likelihood of and resilience to shocks SRM—structural features: share in the world GDP; 
macro: GDP volatility; QO—external finances: 
vulnerability to shocks; SRM and QO—potential 
impact on other variables 
Note: SRM stands for sovereign rating model; QO stands for qualitative overlay. 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Fitch (2019a, 5). 
Some of the challenges in anticipating the impact of climate risks on sovereigns’ credit profiles relate 
to the complexity of the relationship between climate change and rating factors, which involves 
widely varying time horizons between increased severity of climate change and impact, the multiple 
dimensions of resilience for sovereigns that ultimately determine the impact of exposure to a given 
risk, and the many other factors that drive a sovereign rating. Whilst all rating agencies have pointed 
out that the impact of climate change on sovereign credit profiles is most likely to grow further over 
time and that can be expected the first changes soon, their projections do not extend beyond 2050. 
S&P, with its focus on natural disasters as one dimension of physical climate change, highlighted that 
they might lead to sudden downgrades by 1.5 notches at once and exacerbate the current negative 
sovereign rating impacts due to climate change by as much as 20% (S&P 2015b). 
In the case of Moody’s, it is necessary to highlight that the outlined transmission channels result from 
the dimensions of climate trends and climate shocks. Hence, phenomena such as sea-level rising can 
affect these transmission channels via one or even both of the dimensions simultaneously (Moody’s 
2016b). Consequently, low-lying and densely populated states, such as Bangladesh, may become 
equally more exposed and less resilient to sea-level rising in general and monsoon-related flooding in 
particular due to worsened credit ratings themselves. 
2.2  Greater awareness of climate risks for sovereigns 
In the meantime, a number of initiatives have taken off. In 2016, the Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI) launched the “ESG in Credit Risk and Ratings Initiative,” which put forward a 
“Statement on ESG in Credit Risk and Ratings” (Box 1), which 20 credit rating agencies, the Big Three, 
and 158 investors signed (as of March 2020). The statement highlighted risks at the sovereign and 
sub-sovereign level related to “natural resource management, public health standards and corruption 
[that] can all affect tax revenues, trade balance and foreign investment” (PRI 2019). In October 2019, 
the World Bank launched an online sovereign ESG data portal to facilitate the analysis of sovereign 
risk (World Bank 2020). 
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Box 1: The PRI Credit Risk and Ratings Initiative’s statement on ESG in credit risk and ratings 
We, the undersigned, recognise that environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors can affect 
borrowers’ cash flows and the likelihood that they will default on their debt obligations. ESG factors are 
therefore important elements in assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers. For corporates, concerns such 
as stranded assets linked to climate change, labour relations challenges or lack of transparency around 
accounting practices can cause unexpected losses, expenditure, inefficiencies, litigation, regulatory pressure 
and reputational impacts. 
At a sovereign level, risks related to, inter alia, natural resource management, public health standards and 
corruption can all affect tax revenues, trade balance and foreign investment. The same is true for local 
governments and special purpose vehicles issuing project bonds. Such events can result in bond price 
volatility, and increase the risk of defaults. 
In order to more fully address major market and idiosyncratic risk in debt capital markets, underwriters, 
credit rating agencies and investors should consider the potential financial materiality of ESG factors in a 
strategic and systematic way. Transparency on which ESG factors are considered, how these are integrated, 
and the extent to which they are deemed material in credit assessments will enable better alignment of key 
stakeholders. 
In doing this the stakeholders should recognise that credit ratings reflect exclusively an assessment of an 
issuer’s creditworthiness. Credit rating agencies must be allowed to maintain full independence in 
determining which criteria may be material to their ratings. While issuer ESG analysis may be considered an 
important part of a credit rating, the two assessments should not be confused or seen as interchangeable. 
With this in mind, we share a common vision to enhance systematic and transparent consideration of ESG 
factors in the assessment of creditworthiness. 
Source: PRI (2019). 
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3. Transmission Channels of Risk 
 
Recent research on the relationship between climate vulnerability, sovereign credit profiles, and the 
cost of capital in climate-vulnerable developing countries has shown that these countries incur a risk 
premium on their sovereign debt, reducing their fiscal capacity for investments in climate adaptation 
and resilience (Buhr et al. 2018; Kling et al. 2018). This raises serious questions regarding the possible 
impacts of climate risk on the sustainability of public finances for climate-vulnerable countries, the 
fiscal health of which is also under threat from potential output losses related to climate hazards and 
disaster recovery costs as well as transition risks that may hit specific sectors or the economy at large. 
To assess and mitigate climate-related sovereign risk properly, it is important to understand the ways 
in which climate change can amplify sovereign risk. In the following, we identify and analyze different 
transmission channels, which Figure 4 displays. We first discuss the importance of natural capital and 
natural services as the very foundation of economic well-being (3.1) before turning to the different 
risk channels that could worsen a sovereign’s standing: the fiscal impacts of climate-related disasters 
(3.2); the fiscal consequences of adaptation and mitigation policies (3.3); the macroeconomic impacts 
of climate change (3.4); climate-related risks and financial sector stability (3.5); the impacts of climate 
change on international trade and capital flows (3.6); and the impacts of climate change on political 
stability (3.7). 
Figure 4: Transmission channels of risk 
 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
3.1  Natural capital as the basis of economic prosperity 
Debrun et al. (2019) emphasized the difficulty of assembling and assessing a government’s balance 
sheet. Like a corporate balance sheet, a government’s balance sheet lists assets and liabilities. 
However, it is not easy to determine the present value of many assets and liabilities. Many items on 
the asset side, such as the present value of future tax income, the revenue from future natural 
resource extraction, or the value of public infrastructure and cultural treasures, are hard to quantify 
as they have no market value and therefore no known price. Likewise, many items on the liability side, 
such as pension obligations and contingent liabilities, are very hard to establish. It is therefore also 
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very difficult to assess a country’s sovereign net worth, which is the difference between its assets and 
its liabilities. The exercise becomes even more complicated when trying to account for a country’s 
natural capital or its depletion. 
All economic activity, and hence a country’s economic and fiscal sustainability, is ultimately 
dependent on natural assets and eco-services.6 Continued depletion of natural capital is clearly not 
sustainable. As Pinzón et al. (2020, 4) pointed out, “[a]griculture and the soft commodity trade are 
heavily linked to natural capital, as drivers of depletion and as processes reliant on a secure stream of 
ecosystem services. The value of sovereign bonds relies in part on the management of natural capital 
by the countries concerned. However, this dependency is still largely ignored or mispriced in 
sovereign bond markets.” While it is difficult, if not impossible, to account for a country’s natural 
capital, any analysis of sovereign risk ought at least to consider how trends in the ecosystem may 
affect a country’s economic prospects and well-being in the future and the government’s ability to 
remain fiscally sustainable.7 
How natural capital underpins economies 
The natural environment provides the foundation for all societies and economies. It does this through 
the provision of natural capital assets and ecosystem services, henceforth “natural capital.”8 Natural 
capital assets are natural resources such as forests and rivers. Ecosystem services derive from these 
assets. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2003) identified four ecosystem services that 
contribute to human well-being: 
• Provisioning services: products that people obtain directly from nature (e.g. wild foods, crops, 
fresh water, and plant-derived medicines). 
• Regulating services: benefits that people obtain from ecosystem processes (e.g. pollutant 
filtration by wetlands, climate regulation through carbon storage, pollination, and disaster 
risk reduction). 
• Cultural services: non-material benefits that people obtain through recreation, spiritual 
experience, and educational development. 
• Supporting services: ecosystem services that are necessary for the production of all other 
ecosystem services (e.g. soil formation, photosynthesis, water cycling, and nutrient cycling). 
Natural capital directly or indirectly underpins all economic productivity, social well-being, and 
ecological sustainability (TEEB 2011). One of the most published depictions of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) is the layer cake, developed by the Stockholm Resilience Centre, with 
biosphere-related SDGs 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), 13 (Climate Action), 14 (Life Under Water), 
and 15 (Life on Land) underpinning those related to society and economy (Figure 5). 
Natural capital can produce benefits in perpetuity if managed sustainably. However, their valuation is 
rarely appropriate and there are major inconsistencies in the way in which stakeholders in decision-
making processes value ecosystem services. This has been a major reason for these resources’ and 
services’ rapid and severe deterioration (TEEB 2011). 
  
 
6  This notion is in line with Arrow et al.’s (2004) conceptualization of sustainability as non-decreasing net wealth  
of a country. 
7  The Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) partnership promoted by the World Bank is an 
example of an attempt to integrate the accounting of natural resources into development planning to promote 
sustainability. 
8  For the purposes of this report, we consider biodiversity as a natural capital asset. 
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Figure 5: Sustainable Development Goals wedding cake 
 
Source: Azote Images for Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University. 
Recently, the Intergovernmental Science–Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services9 
estimated that the annual economic value of the world’s terrestrial ecosystem services approximately 
equals the global annual GDP (IPBES 2019). A recent report estimated the total asset base of the 
ocean to be at least US$24 trillion,10 meaning that, if it were a country, it would be the seventh largest 
in the world in terms of asset value (Hoegh-Guldberg 2015). Academic studies have arrived at similar 
conclusions, with one seminal study estimating that globally nature provides annual assets and 
services worth approximately US$125 trillion, therefore contributing more than twice as much to 
human well-being as the global GDP (Costanza et al. 2014). 
For many countries, some of their most important economic sectors depend directly on ecosystem 
services as inputs into their production or value generation process. These include “nature-
dependent soft commodity” exports resulting from agriculture, aquaculture, and forestry as well as 
others, such as tourism. These activities and others are not only of immediate importance to 
employment but also have deeper macroeconomic importance, with impacts on the balance of 
payments. However, it is important to note that all economic sectors depend on natural capital in one 
way or another; even the power generation sector with coal-fired power plants depends heavily on 
fresh water to function. 
 
9  The Intergovernmental Science–Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services is an intergovernmental 
organization, the establishment of which aimed to improve the interface between science and policy on issues of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
10  This conservative value derives from direct outputs (fishing, aquaculture), services enabled (tourism, education), trade 
and transportation (coastal and oceanic shipping), and adjacent benefits (carbon sequestration, biotechnology). This 
conservative estimate did not include intangible values, such as the ocean’s role in climate regulation, the production  
of oxygen, or the spiritual and cultural services provided. Therefore, the actual value is much higher than the 
reported figure. 
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Fresh water is of paramount importance to economic prosperity and stability as it is a key input into 
many industries, such as agriculture, textiles, mining, energy, transport, and the beverage industry. 
The consequences of climate change will be most apparent through fresh water scarcity. The demand 
for fresh water is increasing annually by 1%, with frequent forecasts of supply shortfalls (Boretti and 
Rosa 2019). Currently, agriculture and meeting the demands of growing populations consume 70% of 
fresh water. Conflict over water usage will increasingly become an issue as the expectation is that, by 
2050, the water demand will increase by 55% and the food demand by 60% and approximately half of 
the global population will live in water stressed areas (Schlosser et al. 2014; Opperman et al. 2018; 
Granzo and Morgan 2019). The management of fresh water is a complicated issue to address as it is 
often a transboundary problem requiring international cooperation (cf. Bernauer and Böhmelt 2020). 
Low-income and otherwise disadvantaged groups, often those in rural areas, depend 
disproportionately on natural capital for their livelihoods and are especially vulnerable to natural 
hazards. Natural capital is of particular importance to wealth generation in low-income and  
lower–middle-income countries (Lange, Wodon, and Carey 2018). 
In addition to being a source of wealth generation, natural capital supports economic stability by 
providing protection against natural hazards. Notable examples are wetlands and floodplains, which, 
if managed sustainably, will reduce the damage from flooding. Natural capital underpins stable 
economies by: 
• Improving the ecosystem’s resilience to disturbances—and thus the likelihood that they will 
persist and support economic activities. 
• Enhancing the protective functions of ecosystems—and thus the degree to which they can 
absorb natural hazards and protect economic activities. 
• Contributing to social resilience—and thus the likelihood that societies can recover and 
continue to function in the face of natural hazards (Monty, Murti, and Furuta 2016). 
Economic systems are causing severe decline in natural capital 
Across the world, economic activity is undermining the natural environment, and the damage is 
accelerating (c.f. TEEB 2011; IPBES 2019). This in turn is causing a severe loss of natural capital assets 
and biodiversity and devastating ecosystems and the services that they provide. Many of the 
ecosystem services that nature provides are not fully replaceable, and some are not replaceable at all. 
Countries need to value, account for, and protect natural capital. 
Declining natural capital is a contributing factor behind many natural disasters that threaten 
economic resilience, creating negative feedback loops that jeopardize economic growth and stability. 
For instance, biodiversity loss and unsustainable land management practices cause soil degradation, 
which can increase landslide and flood risk. This can further damage the productive layer of topsoil on 
which agriculture depends, which in turn can exacerbate biodiversity loss. This example is especially 
pertinent because, between 2012 and 2017, flooding accounted for 71% of natural disasters within 
Southeast Asia (AHA Centre 2018). 
Instead of sustainably managing natural capital, economies are utilizing ever more of the earth’s 
resources. Approximately 33% of the world’s land surface and 75% of freshwater resources are 
devoted to agriculture (IPBES 2019). Humans have combined technology with natural capital to 
achieve impressive increases in production. Agricultural production has increased threefold since 
1970. Forestry production has increased by almost 50%. However, these gains are not sustainable; of 
the 18 categories of nature’s contributions that the latest IPBES study assessed, 14 have declined 
(IPBES 2019). 
In the last century alone, socioeconomic activity has resulted in the loss of 35% of mangrove forests, 
40% of terrestrial forests, and 50% of wetlands (TEEB 2011). Overfishing has resulted in the full or 
overexploitation of 80% of the world’s fisheries. Estimations have indicated that 60% of ecosystem 
services that the natural environment provides have degraded in the last fifty years (TEEB 2011). 
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Biodiversity loss is rampant, increasing, and undoubtedly a result of human activity. Of the estimated 
8 million animal and plant species, around 1 million are facing the threat of extinction (IPBES 2019). In 
the current period, the loss of species is 100 to 1,000 times greater than in previous geological times 
(TEEB 2011; WWF 2018). In 2018, the WWF (2018) reported that humanity had wiped out 60% of 
mammals, birds, fish, and reptiles since 1970. 
While it always has impacts, the loss and associated cost of natural capital can pass unnoticed. This is 
because the value of natural capital is often missing from decisions, indicators, accounting systems, 
and market prices (TEEB 2011). The stress to ecosystems can remain unnoticed because many are 
resilient up to certain thresholds before experiencing a decline. This decline can be abrupt, severe, 
unpredictable, and irreversible. In other words, the risk profile associated with deteriorating natural 
capital is nonlinear. For example, coral reef systems are vital biodiversity hotspots and provide 
numerous ecosystem services, such as being important nurseries for many fish species. If ocean 
waters are too hot over a prolonged period of time, coral reefs bleach rapidly and will die quickly 
unless the waters quickly cool to safe levels. 
Research is increasingly indicating that we are approaching multiple planetary boundaries. One much-
noted study presented nine planetary processes that regulate the stability and resilience of the earth 
as far as it pertains to accommodating human life, concluding that only three natural systems (fresh 
water use, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification) are currently operating within the 
limits, although ocean acidification is close to its safe boundary (Steffen, Kirschenmann, and Korte 
2015). Importantly, the study found that we have crossed the safe planetary boundary for climate 
change, which will further stress other planetary boundaries, such as fresh water use and ocean 
acidification. Further deterioration will trigger multiple “tipping points,” points at which climate 
change pushes a part of the earth’s system into abrupt or irreversible change with global implications 
(Table 3). 
Table 3: Nine “tipping points” that could be triggered by climate change 
Tipping point Description Type Implication 
Greenland ice sheet 
disintegration 
Irreversible retreat of the ice sheet as a result of rising 
temperatures 
Melting Sea-level rise of up to 
7 meters 
Permafrost loss Abrupt increase in emissions of CO2 and methane 
through the thawing of frozen carbon-rich soils 
Melting Greenhouse gas release 
Atlantic meridional 
overturning circulation 
(AMOC) breakdown 
Shutdown of the AMOC caused by an increased influx 
of fresh water into the North Atlantic 
Circulation 
change 
Disruption to the ocean 
ecosystem 
Regional cooling 
Boreal forest shift A shift in boreal forests, seeing expansion into the 
tundra to the north and dieback to the south 
Biome shift Regional warming 
Ecological shift 
Amazon rainforest 
dieback 
Deforestation and hotter, drier conditions causing 
dieback of the rainforest and a shift toward savannah 
Biome shift Biodiversity loss 
Decreased rainfall 
West Antarctic ice 
sheet disintegration 
Collapse of the ice sheet triggered by persistent 
grounding-line retreat in one sector, cascading to 
other sectors 
Melting Sea-level rise of up to 
3 meters 
West African monsoon 
shift 
An abrupt change in Sahel rainfall resulting from a shift 
northward (wetter) or southward (drier) in the West 
African monsoon 
Circulation 
change 
Disruption to agriculture 
Ecosystem change 
Indian monsoon shift Strengthening of the monsoon caused by rising CO2 
emissions or weakening as a result of high aerosol 
emissions 
Circulation 
change 
Disruption to agriculture 
Greater rainfall extreme 
Coral reef die-off Rising temperatures pushing warm water corals 
beyond tolerable levels of thermal stress into an 
alternative state dominated by macroalgae 
Biome shift Ecosystem change 
Losses to fisheries and 
tourism 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Carbon Brief (2020), which used various academic sources of information. 
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Climate change will exacerbate the existing decline of natural capital 
The impact of climate change as a direct driver of changes in natural environments is likely to increase 
over the coming decades. Climate change is expected to have dramatic and adverse effects on natural 
capital, even with the achievement of the mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement (IPBES 2019). 
Furthermore, climate change will exacerbate the existing degradation of the natural environment and 
further diminish natural capital. 
The most notable example is coral reefs, which are already in decline and are highly sensitive to 
climate change. Climate change is causing oceans to rise, warm, and become more acidic; this is 
contributing to the death of coral reefs, with significant implications for food security and livelihoods. 
Over 25% of all marine species live in coral reefs, and about 850 million people directly benefit from 
their economic, social, and cultural services (WWF 2015), so the loss of these reefs will be 
catastrophic. Another example is agricultural practices that have led to the degradation of soils and 
made the surrounding landscape much more sensitive to heavy precipitation events and therefore 
vulnerable to flooding, which in turn causes more soil degradation. 
The natural environment will increasingly be unable to sustain healthy national economies 
As the UNEP FI and Global Footprint Network (2012, 3) pointed out, “As resource constraints tighten 
globally, countries that depend, in net terms, on levels of renewable natural resources and services 
beyond what their own ecosystems can provide may experience profound economic impacts as 
resources become more unreliable or costly.” Estimations of the loss in value of ecosystem services 
vary, but they all indicate a significant decline, which climate change will exacerbate. Costanza et al. 
(2014) calculated the global loss of ecosystem services during the period 1997 to 2011 due to land 
use change at US$4.3 to US$20.2 trillion per year.11 A recent analysis by the Global Futures initiative 
warned that continued erosion of natural capital at the current levels will lead to deterioration of the 
annual global GDP of 0.67% by 2050, equivalent to US$479 billion, and total losses of US$9.87 trillion 
between 2011 and 2050 (Roxburgh et al. 2020).12 
Deteriorating natural capital means that the natural environment will be less able to support 
economic prosperity and stability without major efforts at every level. There are already examples of 
deteriorating natural capital and climate change affecting the economy. 
An increasingly important area for concern is fresh water scarcity, which already exists in many places 
and will increase due to climate change. A recent report found that 19% of the global GDP derives 
from areas with high to very high water risk (Figure 6) (WWF and Investec Asset Management 2019. 
The effects of freshwater scarcity are already apparent. In 2018, the CDP (2018) reported corporate 
losses of US$38.5 billion due to water risks. Examples of material financial risks relating to fresh water 
scarcity are higher price volatility of agricultural ingredients, reduced agricultural production, higher 
transport costs, greater inconsistency in supply chains, and stranded assets due to shifting production 
zones (Ceres 2018). It is an issue that affects every country. In 2018, a drought in Europe, with a link 
to climate change, caused the river Rhine in Germany to fall so low that freighters could not transport 
goods and materials, denting the GDP. Fresh water scarcity is an issue that reaches all aspects of the 
economy. Electricity generation can depend significantly on fresh water and is vulnerable to droughts, 
particularly electricity from hydropower and coal power. In 2018, disclosures demonstrated that 
water risks caused US$9.6 billion in financial impacts on the power generation industry, often as a 
result of increased operating costs, compliance costs, and impacts on assets (CDP 2018). 
 
11  The differences in valuations are dependent on the unit values used. 
12  The authors of this study consider these estimates to be highly conservative and not suitable as an assessment of the 
total costs of nature’s loss. This is because the model only considers six ecosystem services (those for which there is 
enough evidence to quantify). It also does not account for tipping points—thresholds beyond which habitats change 
rapidly and irreversibly. The expectation is that future versions of the model will address these problems and further 
strengthen the economic case for halting and reversing the deterioration in natural capital. The model also does not 
capture climate change and water scarcity and other related environmental changes that are taking place. 
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Figure 6: Relative total GDP purchasing power parity per HydroSHEDS 
 
 
Source: WWF and Investec Asset Management (2019). 
 
Deteriorating natural capital also increases disaster risk, which undermines economic prosperity and 
stability (Monty, Murti, and Furuta 2016). The flooding event that occurred in Thailand in 2011 was so 
significant that it had repercussions for the entire global economy. The United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) estimated that the flood reduced the world’s industrial production 
by 2.5% (Haraguchi and Lall 2015). The increased costs associated with disaster recovery and 
rehabilitation mean that fewer resources can be devoted to other activities. According to the UNDRR 
(2015), disasters worldwide caused more than US$1.3 trillion in damage from 2005 to 2015, a 
significant proportion of which was uninsured. 
Deterioration of natural capital will increasingly impact on sovereign risk 
Deteriorating natural capital will inevitably become an increasingly core concern for financial 
regulators as deterioration continues and climate change impacts increasingly worsen in line with 
rising greenhouse gas emissions. Understanding the deterioration of natural capital and the 
environmental and climate risks that it poses to economies is the key to profiling economic prospects 
and the ability to repay debt at the national level. This has not been lost on sovereign debt investors 
and ratings agencies, which are increasingly gauging how a country is using its natural capital (WWF 
and Investec Asset Management 2019). 
Unfortunately, there has been limited analysis of the impact of deteriorating natural capital on 
sovereign debt and risk. There are several reasons for this, most notably the inability of traditional 
measures of economic activity, such as GDP, to capture the goods and services that the natural 
environment provides (WWF and Investec Asset Management 2019). Additionally, until recently, it 
has been difficult to map economic activity as well as the intensity of that activity spatially and to 
contrast it with the existing or projected deterioration in natural capital. New advancements in 
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geospatial data and tools are helping to resolve this issue, particularly in relation to the way in which 
sub-national vulnerability can influence national-level vulnerability (WWF and Investec Asset 
Management 2019). However, analysis will continue to face the challenge of assessing the possibility 
that depletion of natural capital in one geographic area may have a significant economic and credit 
impact in other areas, including geographically distant ones. 
One of the few studies that has specifically assessed the link between natural capital and sovereign 
risk highlighted a stark choice for sovereign bond issuers: actively protecting and enhancing natural 
capital and reinforcing the environmental fundamentals of sovereign bonds or instead continuing 
with business as usual, which undermines flows of ecosystem services, increases vulnerability to 
natural hazards, and intensifies market risk (Pinzón et al. 2020). 
Disclosure of nature-related financial risks is required as part of efforts to stabilize economies  
and protect long-term growth 
Currently, the need for climate-related financial disclosures is receiving a considerable amount of 
attention. This is due to the belief that a strong disclosure regime will increase market efficiency, 
improve transparency and the accurate pricing of risk, support economic resilience, help to attract 
capital, and maintain confidence in capital markets. There is also a belief that disclosures will enable 
investors to assess climate change impacts and support them in understanding how climate-related 
issues might affect future financial performance.  
Deteriorating natural capital poses similar risks and has the potential to create systemic challenges to 
global and economic financial systems as well as societies around the world. Consequently, calls for 
“nature-related financial disclosures,” similar to climate-related financial disclosures, have recently 
gained much traction (see WWF and AXA 2019), leading to the establishment of a Task Force on 
Nature-Related Financial Disclosures in July 2020. Nature-related financial disclosures would improve 
the understanding and monitoring of the impact of economic activities on nature, ascertain the 
amount of impact before the resilience of ecological systems deteriorates, and ensure the integrity of 
the ecological systems that provide the foundation of global economic activity (WWF and AXA 2019). 
3.2  Fiscal impacts of climate-related disasters 
Government finances and countries’ debt sustainability face exposure to different fiscal risks related 
to climate disasters. There has been a clear upward trend in the number and severity of climate-
related hazards. Climate scientists have predicted an increase in extreme weather events. Although 
the quantification of climate-related fiscal risks is challenging, it is safe to say that the fiscal risks 
related to climate change are bound to increase. 
The IMF classified fiscal risk into two categories: macroeconomic risks and specific fiscal risks, which 
may “arise from the realization of contingent liabilities or other uncertain events, such as a natural 
disaster, the bailout of a troubled public corporation or subnational government by the central 
government, or the collapse of a bank” (IMF 2018, 95). The IMF’s (2011, 47) Public Sector Debt 
Statistics guide defined contingent liabilities as “obligations that do not arise unless a particular, 
discrete event(s) occurs in the future.” Whether such an event will happen, whether an obligation will 
arise, and its potential size, are uncertain. Explicit contingent liabilities include public guarantees and 
other legal or contractual liabilities. Law and contracts do not establish implicit contingent liabilities, 
but they may arise because of public expectations or a necessity for the government to intervene. 
Implicit contingent liabilities may result from fiscal problems at the sub-national level, the bailout of 
public or private corporations or financial institutions, or spending on natural disaster relief (IMF 
2011, 2018). 
Table 4 provides an overview of the different fiscal risks stemming from climate-related disasters, 
following the IMF’s classification of macroeconomic risks and contingent liabilities, respectively. 
Macroeconomic risks related to natural disasters and extreme weather include risks of a disruption of 
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economic activity, which may adversely affect tax income and other public revenues and increase 
social transfer payments (e.g. Schuler et al. 2019); changes to commodity prices that could affect 
revenue or increase spending via fossil fuel or food subsidies; effects on inflation and interest rates 
through supply or demand shocks; and exchange rate effects (e.g. Farhi and Gabaix 2016). 
Table 4: Climate-related fiscal risk factors and illustrative climate change channels 
Risk factor Climate change channels 
Macroeconomic risks  
Economic growth (GDP or 
industry-level growth) 
Drought, excessive rainfall, storms, etc. cause shocks to economic growth by disrupting 
agriculture, fishing, mining, tourism, transport, hydro-power, insurance, etc., and affect 
revenue and spending 
Reduced income tax revenue if climate hazards affect workers’ health and productivity, 
employment, and output 
Payouts for unemployment insurance and other social protection schemes differ from the 
planned level 
Extreme weather events in other countries can potentially boost the demand for exports or 
affect commodity prices 
Trade Changes and disruptions to trade affect customs duty collection 
Commodity prices The increased severity and likelihood of extreme weather events in large producers increase 
the volatility of world commodity prices 
For extractives exporters: the government revenue differs from the expected level 
Changes in agricultural prices may affect domestic farm and food subsidy spending 
Interest rates Shortages in food or energy supply, among others, may cause inflation spikes 
Exchange rates A disaster may cause devaluation of the currency and increase external debt service costs 
Government procurement spending on imports differs from expectations 
Contingent liabilities  
Physical damage of public 
assets 
Destruction of government buildings or damage to public infrastructure through climate-
related disasters 
Unexpected spending on the repair and reconstruction of government buildings and other 
public assets 
Unexpected relief and recovery spending; possible spending to cover private sector losses 
(including, for example, government-run fire, flooding, and crop insurance) 
State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) 
SOEs suffer losses due to damage or lost revenue resulting from operation disruptions from 
extreme weather events; increased costs for carbon-intensive operations 
Sovereign loan guarantees are called 
Expectation that the government will cover SOE losses 
Public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) 
Infrastructure PPPs suffer damage or losses from extreme weather events 
Contractual obligations (for example, service-level guarantees) 
Expectation that the government will cover losses if the project fails 
Humanitarian crisis and 
public health emergency 
Changing climate and increased severity and likelihood of extreme weather events may affect 
the spread of vector-borne diseases, deaths from heat events, etc. 
Increased health spending 
Emergency relief and aid social safety net 
Judicial awards  Courts may determine that governments are liable for climate adaptation measures 
Source: Compiled by authors, in part drawing from Schuler et al. (2019, Table 4.1). 
 
There are several explicit and implicit contingent liabilities that expose governments to fiscal risks 
(Mitchell, Mechler, and Peters 2014; Hochrainer-Stigler 2018; Schuler et al. 2019). Natural disasters 
may damage or destroy physical government assets and public infrastructure. Governments may 
hence have to spend on damage repair or reconstruction. Natural disasters may also affect the assets 
or operations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This could diminish the asset value of SOEs or affect 
dividend payments to the government. Governments may also have to realize contingent liabilities 
and step in to bail out SOEs that a disaster has hit hard. Disasters may damage or destroy private 
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property and require government support for households and corporations to rebuild homes and 
businesses. To the extent that disasters cause instability to the financial sector, they may force 
governments to bail out ailing financial institutions (cf. Section 3.5). Last but not least, disasters can 
cause a severe humanitarian crisis, which may require public emergency measures, including rescue 
missions, temporary relocation of people, provision of food and shelter, or medical treatment. Such 
crisis response measures can be very expensive and have a significant impact on public spending. 
Bova et al.’s (2019) analysis of contingent liability realizations in a sample of 80 advanced and 
emerging economies for the period 1990–2014 showed that natural disasters (including geophysical 
events) are one of the most important sources of contingent liabilities, the realization of which can be 
a substantial source of fiscal distress. 
Table 5 provides an overview of the 20 most damaging natural disasters, relative to the afflicted 
countries’ GDP, in the period 1998–2019. By far the most damaging disaster was Hurricane Maria, in 
2017, which caused estimated damage equaling 260% of Dominica’s GDP. In 2004, Hurricane Ivan 
destroyed around 150% of Grenada’s GDP. Historically, climate-related disasters have inflicted the 
most damage on small, disaster-prone countries (Cantelmo, Melina, and Papageorgiou 2019). Small 
disaster-prone states also display higher volatility of tax revenue (Cabezon et al. 2015). It is therefore 
not surprising that disaster-prone economies face significantly higher public debt than economies 
that are less susceptible to disasters (Cabezon et al. 2015; Munevar 2018) and that natural disasters 
have in the past been contributing factors to sovereign debt defaults (Moody’s 2016a, 2020b).13 
Table 5: The 20 most damaging natural disasters, 1998–2019 
Country Year Type Name 
Damage  
(% of GDP) 
Disaster-prone 
country 
Small 
economy 
Dominica 2017 Storm Hurricane Maria 260.0 Yes Yes* 
Grenada 2004 Storm Hurricane Ivan 148.0 Yes Yes* 
Dominica 2015 Storm Tropical Storm Erika 90.2 Yes Yes* 
Honduras 1998 Storm Hurricane Mitch 72.9 No No 
The Bahamas 2019 Storm Hurricane Dorian 66.0 Yes Yes* 
Guyana 2005 Flood N.A. 35.5 No Yes* 
Belize 2000 Storm Hurricane Keith 33.4 Yes Yes* 
Tonga 2001 Storm Tropical Cyclone Waka 29.0 Yes Yes* 
Belize 2001 Storm Hurricane Iris 28.7 Yes Yes* 
Haiti 2016 Storm Hurricane Matthew 25.1 Yes Yes** 
Nicaragua 1998 Storm Hurricane Mitch 21.3 No No 
Samoa 2012 Storm Cyclone Evan 16.6 Yes Yes* 
Tajikistan 2008 Ex. temp. N.A. 16.3 Yes Yes** 
Mozambique 2019 Storm Tropical Cyclone Idai 16.0 Yes Yes** 
Fiji 2016 Storm Tropical Storm Winston 12.9 Yes Yes* 
Myanmar 2008 Storm Cyclone Nargis 12.6 No No 
Guyana 2006 Flood N.A. 11.6 No Yes* 
Thailand 2011 Flood N.A. 10.9 No No 
Notes: The computation for damage (% of GDP) uses data for each single event. Small economies comprise small states and low-
income countries. * denotes small states, which are countries with a population below 1.5 million that are not advanced economies 
or high-income oil-exporting countries (IMF). ** denotes low-income countries, which are countries with a GNI per capita below 
$995 in 2018. 
Source: Compiled by authors using data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database and from Cantelmo, Melina, and Papageorgiou (2019). 
 
13  Hurricane Ivan, which caused damage of more than 200% of its GDP, prompted Grenada’s sovereign debt restructuring 
during the period 2004–2006 (Moody’s 2016a; Asonuma et al. 2018). The Dominican Republic’s sovereign debt 
restructuring in 2005 was also partly due to damage caused by hurricanes in the two preceding years (Moody’s 2016). 
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The economic and fiscal losses resulting from a disaster depend on the intensity of the disaster, the 
vulnerability of the population and key industries, the physical resilience of the infrastructure and 
buildings, the quality of the crisis response, and the speed of recovery. The amount of the costs borne 
by governments themselves after natural disasters will vary based on how much infrastructure they 
choose to or are able to rebuild or repair and based on how international financial institutions 
support rebuilding efforts. The fallout also depends on the extent to which insurance covers assets 
and economic activities. The empirical evidence suggests that the uninsured part of catastrophe-
related losses drives the macroeconomic costs (Von Peter, von Dahlen, and Saxena 2012; Cebotari 
and Yousseff 2020), while insurance boosts financial resilience and supports the speed of recovery 
(Tesselaar, Wouter Botzen, and Aerts 2020). A major problem, however, is that many risks are not 
insurable or are insurable only at premiums that are unaffordable (IFRC 2018). 
Melecky and Raddatz (2011) examined the effects of geological, climatic, and other natural disasters 
on public expenditures and revenues in 81 middle-income and high-income countries over the period 
1975–2008 and found that government expenditure increased on average by 15% while government 
revenue fell by 10% over the five years following a natural disaster. They also found that countries 
with low insurance penetration experience greater expansion of fiscal deficits (by 15%) whereas 
government deficit remains unchanged in those with high insurance penetration. Using synthetic 
control analysis, Koetsier’s (2017) investigation of the impact of natural disasters in 163 countries for 
the period 1971 to 2014 revealed a significant surge in government debt following the most 
damaging and deadliest disasters. On average, public debt rises by 11.3% of the GDP in comparison 
with a synthetic control group, with a median effect of 6.8% of GDP. Some natural disasters cause an 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of over 20%. 
Overall, it is clear that climate-related natural disasters pose a significant risk to sovereign debt 
sustainability through both macroeconomic and contingent liability risks. Despite the complexities 
involved in modeling these risks, it is crucial for fiscal sustainability analysis to incorporate climate 
disaster scenario analysis. Risk projections of disaster losses and their fiscal implications need to 
include changes to exposure and vulnerability under different climate pathways (Bouwer 2011). 
Schuler et al. (2019) provided an example of fiscal sustainability analysis that aimed to quantify the 
range and likelihood of potential fiscal consequences of alternative natural disaster scenarios. This 
analysis included the simulation of stochastic shocks to important macroeconomic variables and 
projections of public finance variables and the way in which shocks may affect them. 
Of course, it will also be important to mitigate fiscal risk through adaptation policies. Bouwer et al. 
(2007) emphasized that disaster risk reduction ought to be at the center of climate adaptation 
policies and put forward three recommendations: (i) improve data collection for a better evaluation 
of disaster policies, the identification of the factors driving loss trends, and the development of early 
warning systems; (ii) expand the role of disaster risk reduction in adaptation; and (iii) develop and 
apply innovative finance mechanisms including insurance and risk transfer instruments. 
3.3 Fiscal consequences of adaptation and mitigation policies 
Adaptation and mitigation policies are indispensable for responding to the challenges that climate 
change poses. To achieve the Paris climate goals and limit global warming to manageable levels, large 
investments are needed in a low-carbon transformation of infrastructure and energy systems. 
Moreover, economies need to invest in resilience to address vulnerabilities from extreme weather 
events and the effects of gradual global warming. The Global Commission on the Economy and 
Climate (2016) estimated that globally, until 2030, it will be necessary to spend around USD90 trillion 
on infrastructure, including energy, all of which needs to be sustainable and climate resilient. While 
the private sector has to finance parts of these investments, governments will have to play an 
important role in setting the right incentives through climate policies such as carbon prices/taxes, 
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border adjustments, and prudential frameworks for financial institutions. Moreover, the public sector 
will have to finance a considerable share of adaptation and mitigation measures directly.14 
3.3.1 Fiscal implications of adaptation policies 
Public adaptation to climate change affects public budgets directly on the expenditure side  
(e.g. Bachner, Bednar-Friedl, and Knittel 2019). Adaptation costs comprise all the expenses associated 
with policies and measures aimed at easing the environmental, social, and economic impacts of 
climate change, both preventive and remedial (Forni, Catalano, and Pezzolla 2019). The Global 
Commission on Adaptation (2019) emphasized the need to invest strategically to reduce exposure 
and vulnerability, prepare for climate impacts, and develop schemes that help recovery (Table 6). 
Table 6: Basic elements of climate change adaptation 
Reduce (and prevent) Prepare (and respond) Restore (and recover) 
• Agriculture research and 
development 
• Climate-proofing buildings and 
infrastructure 
• Land use planning 
• Nature-based solutions to protect 
people and assets 
• Permanent relocation (migration)  
• Early warning systems  
• Forecast-based action (contingency 
planning)  
• Strengthen first responders 
• Temporary evacuation 
• Insurance and risk finance 
instruments  
• Social safety nets  
• Recovery services, including health 
and education  
• Build back better 
Source: Replicated by authors from Global Commission on Adaptation (2019). 
The 2016 Adaptation Finance Gap Report estimated the costs of adaptation at between 
US$140 billion and US$300 billion per year by 2030 and between US$280 billion and US$500 billion 
per year by 2050, with potentially higher costs for worse emission pathways (Puig et al. 2016). 
However, Neufeldt et al. (2018) pointed to the existence of major information gaps and emphasized 
that particularly the omission of adaptation cost estimates for biodiversity and ecosystem services is 
likely to increase the overall cost of adaptation further. Adaptation finance in 2016 amounted to only 
USD22 billion (Oliver et al. 2018). There is general agreement that the current amounts financing 
adaptation, both public and private, are insufficient (e.g. Micale, Tonkonogy, and Mazza 2018). This is 
despite the dividends that adaptation investment generates (Tanner et al. 2015). 
To scale up adaptation finance (as well as mitigation finance), multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
have advanced the “billions to trillions” agenda to “unlock, leverage, and catalyze private flows  
and domestic resources” (African Development Bank et al. 2015, 2). The idea is to use official 
development assistance, or “blended finance,” to mobilize private capital for investment in 
sustainable development. Critics of this approach have raised concerns about the financial stability 
risks associated with “the escorting of international capital by multilateral development agencies into 
frontier and emerging market settings” (Carroll and Jarvis 2014, 540). A fundamental problem of 
initiatives aimed at leveraging private investment by “de-risking” is that the risk itself does not 
disappear but merely shifts to public balance sheets (Mazzucato et al. 2018). This may create new 
contingent liabilities (cf. Section 3.2). 
  
 
14  Some have argued that the private sector should conduct adaptation measures and that the role of the government is 
limited to setting the right incentives (e.g. Tol 2005; Jones, Keen, and Strand 2013). 
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In particular, concerns have been raised that issues around the “complexity, accountability and 
transparency” of blended finance (Mawdsley 2018, 194) and the growing risks of related financial 
innovation and over-financialization in developing economies (Akyuz 2017) may contribute to debt 
crises. Financial stability risks may also arise from the fact that both development finance institutions 
and private financers usually provide finance only in international currency, which leaves borrowers 
with foreign exchange risk.15 UNCTAD (2019a, viii) stated critically that “the focus of the development 
finance agenda on complex – and mostly non-transparent – new financial instruments and on 
securitized finance, does not bode well for its ability to deliver reliable financing at the required scale 
to where it is most needed.” UNCTAD’s (2019) estimations for a group of 31 developing countries 
suggest that public debt-to-GDP ratios would have to rise from 47% to 185% to finance basic 
investments to meet the SDGs in poverty, nutrition, health, and education if financed through debt 
(alternatively, countries would have to grow at an average of 11.9% p.a.). Many of these investments 
have a link to adaptation. 
Especially lesser developed economies tend to have a relatively low debt servicing capacity and are 
vulnerable to the build-up of external debt. Since these are the countries with the greatest needs for 
adaptation finance, it will be important to develop robust debt management frameworks and limit 
risk exposure to international debt financing. 
3.3.2  Fiscal implications of mitigation policies 
Mitigation costs comprise all the expenses associated with policies and efforts aimed at reducing or 
preventing greenhouse gas emissions to limit global warming (Forni, Catalano, and Pezzolla 2019). 
Climate change mitigation will require substantial investment in low-carbon sources of energy, which 
will strain public finances. The IPCC (2018) estimated that USD1.6–3.8 trillion annually will be 
necessary for investment in energy systems alone to limit global warming to 1.5°C. As discussed in the 
context of adaptation finance, there is a risk that the necessary investments will overstretch public 
finances and that opaque and complex financing practices will lead to higher debt burdens than 
expected. 
There are, however, further impacts that mitigation policies, both at home and abroad, may have on 
public finances. Various “transition drivers” could trigger a (forced) decline of high-carbon industries 
and cause macroeconomic disruptions (Semieniuk et al. 2020). These may require greater public 
spending to offset the reduction in private investment and consumption, public support programs for 
regions particularly affected by the transition, higher budget deficits because automatic stabilizers will 
lead to higher social spending, or a bailout of dwindling financial institutions that failed to mitigate 
the transition risk (cf. Section 3.5). 
A low-carbon or even zero-carbon transition would inevitably have to involve the phasing out of  
fossil fuels. This could cause trouble for governments that currently rely to a high degree on revenues 
from fossil fuels. As can be seen in Table 7, some governments rely heavily on revenues from the 
extraction of oil, natural gas, and coal resources. These make up 5.6% for G20 countries on average, 
with France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey earning (almost) no revenue from 
fossil fuel extraction on the one side and the Russian Federation, where a third of government 
revenues, and Saudi Arabia, where the government’s entire revenues stem from fossil fuel extraction, 
on the other side. Clearly, governments that rely on fossil fuel revenue face high transition risks  
and need to diversify their revenue streams away from fossil fuels (OECD, World Bank, and UN 
Environment 2018).16 
 
15  For a discussion of the shortcomings of blended finance in leveraging private capital, see Attridge and Engen (2019). 
16  Morris, Kaufman, and Doshi (2019) analyzed the risk of fiscal collapse in coal-reliant communities in the US. They 
emphasized that the coal industry is “an important contributor to local government finances through a complex system of 
property, severance, sales, and income taxes; royalties and lease bonuses for production on state and federal lands; and 
intergovernmental transfers” in 26 “coal-mining dependent” US counties. 
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Table 7: Estimated rents from the extraction of oil, natural gas and coal resources in G20 countries 
 
Estimated rent  
(US$ billion) 
Share of GDP  
(%) 
Share of total  
government revenue  
(%) 
Period average 
2001–
2005 
2006–
2010 
2011–
2016 
2001–
2005 
2006–
2010 
2011–
2016 
2001–
2005 
2006–
2010 
2011–
2016 
G20 (excl. European Union) 483 1,015 1,032 1.6 2.3 1.8 4.8 7.1 5.6 
Argentina 6 12 11 3.6 3.6 2.0 16.4 13.3 6.1 
Australia 8 25 24 1.6 2.7 1.7 4.6 7.9 4.9 
Brazil 11 29 37 1.8 1.8 1.6 5.1 5.0 4.9 
Canada 35 46 24 3.8 3.2 1.4 9.4 8.1 3.6 
People’s Republic of China 51 180 184 2.9 4.1 1.9 18.2 18.3 6.8 
France 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Germany 2 5 3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
India 13 37 41 2.2 2.9 2.1 11.9 14.8 10.3 
Indonesia 11 27 30 5.0 5.3 3.3 27.1 31.8 22.6 
Italy 1.0 2.0 3.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mexico 27 50 47 3.5 4.9 3.9 17.6 21.1 16.7 
Republic of Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Russian Federation 82 195 230 16.9 14.5 12.2 44.8 38.6 33.8 
Saudi Arabia 91 205 276 38.7 45.2 39.3 101.4 104.6 102.9 
South Africa 5 12 9 2.8 4.0 2.5 11.5 14.5 8.8 
Turkey 1 2 1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.4 
United Kingdom 17 26 19 0.8 1.0 0.7 2.3 2.6 1.9 
United States 119 162 94 1.0 1.1 0.5 3.3 3.8 1.8 
Rest of World 304 751 857 3.8 5.4 4.9 3.2 15.8 15.8 
OPEC (excl. Saudi Arabia) 178 457 531 26.4 26.9 25.1 30.4 78 84.5 
World 787 1,766 1,889 2.0 3.0 2.5 4.0 9.0 7.7 
G20 = Group of Twenty, OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
Source: Compiled with data from OECD, World Bank, and UN Environment (2018). 
The decline of fossil fuel and other carbon-intensive industries may increase public social expenditure 
to cushion the effects on unemployment. It may also require public investments to support structural 
change in regions that the low-carbon transition affects badly to create new opportunities for 
“stranded workers.” For instance, the European Union—where the coal sector and directly linked 
activities employ 238,000 people—has announced funding plans to ease the socio-economic 
consequences for coal regions, including a “Just Transition Fund” (Widuto 2019). Importantly, the loss 
of jobs in carbon-intensive industries may be offset by good structural and industrial policies. Based 
on empirical evidence from India, Ethiopia, and Mexico, Norton et al. (2020) highlighted the potential 
of employment-based social assistance to address the “triple challenges of global inequality, climate 
change and biodiversity loss.” 
At the same time, a low-carbon transition could generate significant public savings, for instance from 
phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. The IMF’s estimates put global subsidies for fossil fuel energy at 
US$5.2 trillion in 2017, equal to 6.5% of the world GDP (Coady et al. 2019).17 By promoting greater 
 
17  Coady et al. (2019, 2) defined fossil fuel subsidies “as fuel consumption times the gap between existing and efficient 
prices (i.e. prices warranted by supply costs, environmental costs, and revenue considerations).” 
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fossil fuel consumption, which disproportionally benefits the wealthiest parts of the population 
(Coady, Flamini, and Sears 2015), fossil fuel subsidies exacerbate air pollution, which has dire 
consequences for human health (Watts et al. 2019) and public health expenditure. 
Moreover, governments could generate substantial revenue from carbon taxes, which they could use 
for adaptation and mitigation investment or for financing a “just transition.” The IMF (2019a) 
estimated that a tax of US$75 per ton of carbon would generate revenue amounting to 1.6% of the 
GDP for G20 countries on average (weighted by the GDP). As Figure 7 shows, the revenue from 
carbon taxes would vary considerably across the G20 countries, ranging from 0.6% of GDP in France 
to 4.4% in the Russian Federation. 
Figure 7: Revenue from comprehensive carbon taxation in 2030, selected countries (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from IMF (2019a). 
It is impossible to give a wholesale assessment of the fiscal implications of mitigation policies as these 
will depend very much on the structure of an economy and the specific policies that countries adopt 
both domestically and internationally. The overall fiscal impact of introducing carbon taxes, phasing 
out fossil fuel subsidies, and foregoing rents from the extraction of oil, natural gas, and coal resources 
will differ across countries, as will the costs of structural change. It is apparent, however, that the 
implications for public finances will be greater in economies centered on carbon-intensive activities 
and those in which the government relies heavily on revenues from fossil fuel extraction. In addition, 
as Huxham, Anwar, and Nelson (2019, 11) pointed out, “[w]ell managed and less concentrated risk 
can facilitate the transition and lower its cost in countries across the world.” 
3.4  Macroeconomic impacts of climate change 
The physical and transition impacts of climate change can cause aggregate supply and demand 
shocks. Table 8, which is loosely based on a taxonomy that Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka (2018) 
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proposed, shows different types of supply- and demand-side shocks that may result from either 
physical or transition climate impacts. We will discuss them briefly in turn. 
3.4.1  Supply shocks 
Supply shocks affect an economy’s production or productive capacity and, accordingly, their actual or 
potential output. Climate change may exert an impact on the aggregate supply in various ways 
(e.g. Cœuré 2018; Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka 2020). 
As Section 3.2 discussed, extreme weather events can interrupt production, damage the capital stock 
and infrastructure, or diminish the output in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing industries. They can 
also disrupt transport routes and value chains and cause input shortages (see Section 3.6 for a more 
detailed discussion). Climate disasters may divert resources from innovation to reconstruction and 
replacement. Importantly, they can cause shocks to local labor markets (e.g. Belasen and Polachek 
2009; Kirchberger 2017). With extreme weather events becoming more frequent, some have argued 
that climate-related supply shocks may be “no longer temporary but close to permanent” (Debelle 
2019, 4). 
Gradual global warming can also cause supply shocks. Predictions indicate that climate change will 
have a significant impact on land use through sea-level rise, desertification, and land degradation, 
among others (IPCC 2019b; Kulp and Strauss 2019), as well as on marine ecosystems (IPCC 2019a). All 
these can affect the productive capacity in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and other industries that 
directly rely on ecosystems (cf. Section 3.1). Although macroeconomics has generally viewed land as a 
production factor of relatively little importance (Hubacek and van den Bergh 2006), climate change 
may impose new constraints on land use (e.g. Hertel 2018; Froese and Schilling 2019). Climate change 
could also have substantial effects on the number of hours worked due to extreme heat and on labor 
productivity (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015a; Day et al. 2019). Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel’s (2015a) 
analysis of data on economic production for 166 countries over the period 1960–2010 revealed 
nonlinear effects of temperature on economic production. They found that economic productivity 
peaks at around 13°C, with higher temperatures causing productivity to decline. Colder countries 
hence benefit from global warming up to a certain point, while temperate and hot countries  
suffer. Building on Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel’s (2015a) analysis with expanded data coverage, the 
IMF’s (2017) estimates indicate that a 1°C temperature rise from 25°C would reduce growth by 
1.2 percentage points for the same year for a median low-income developing economy. Furthermore, 
alterations in the physical environment could make living conditions in some regions unbearable and 
cause large-scale migration, which would affect the labor supply. Impacts on productive assets 
(e.g. loss of production sites through a sea-level rise) could affect capital stock. The need for 
investment in adaptation may divert resources away from productive investment or spending on new 
technologies, although adaptation investment could also spur innovation. 
Supply-side shocks can also be a result of transition impacts (McKibbin et al. 2017). In particular, 
climate policies can lead to stranded assets and stranded technology (Bos and Gupta 2019; Semieniuk 
et al. 2020). There is a risk that structural change of an economy away from high-carbon and toward 
low-carbon sectors will render parts of the workforce unemployed if the sectors that previously 
employed them cease. If work skills are not transferable to other industries, this could lead to a 
problem of “stranded workers” or migration. Climate policies may constrain the use of land or 
ecosystem services, with impacts on an economy’s output potential. Climate policies could also lead 
to substantive changes in the energy supply. It is not clear, however, whether decarbonization 
policies and the development of new renewable energy sources would amount to a negative or a 
positive supply shock. 
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Table 8: Macroeconomic impacts of climate change 
  Physical impacts 
Transition impacts 
  From extreme 
weather events 
From gradual 
global warming 
Demand Investment Damage to household and 
corporate balance sheets 
causes reduction of 
investment 
Changes to household and 
corporate balance sheets 
affect investment 
Effects on household and 
corporate balance sheets 
Growing demand for 
responsible investment 
Public investment push 
(“green new deal”) 
“Crowding out” from 
climate policies 
Consumption Loss of income and 
damage to household 
balance sheets reduce 
consumption 
Effects on household income 
Wealth effects due to 
changes in property prices 
Effects on corporate balance 
sheets 
Effects on public finances 
“Crowding out” from 
climate policies 
Changes of consumption 
patterns because of a shift 
in preferences or taxation 
(e.g. carbon taxes) 
Shifts in demand from 
migration or political 
instability 
Wealth effects due to share 
and bond prices 
Effects on public finances 
Trade Disruption to 
import/export flows due 
to climate disasters 
Changes to patterns and 
volumes of trade 
Distortions from 
asymmetric climate policies 
Changes to patterns and 
volumes of trade 
Supply Labor supply Loss of hours worked due 
to climate hazards 
Loss of hours worked due to 
extreme heat 
Labor productivity effects of 
climate change 
Migration effects 
“Stranded labor” Migration 
effects 
Natural capital  Loss of arable land, 
biodiversity loss, water stress 
Climate policies may 
constrain/restrict the use of 
land or ecosystem services 
Energy, food, 
and other inputs 
Food and other input 
shortages (e.g. through 
supply chain disruptions) 
 Changes to the energy 
supply through 
decarbonization policies 
and new renewable energy 
sources 
Capital stock Damage due to extreme 
weather 
Loss of productive assets 
Diversion of resources from 
productive investment to 
adaptation capital 
Stranded assets 
Diversion of resources from 
productive investment to 
mitigation capital 
Technology Diversion of resources 
from innovation to 
reconstruction and 
replacement 
Diversion of resources from 
innovation to adaptation 
capital 
Technology may become 
stranded 
Uncertainty about the rate 
of innovation and adoption 
of low-carbon technologies 
Source: Compiled by authors based on the taxonomy of Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka (2018). 
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3.4.2  Demand shocks 
As Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka (2020) pointed out, climate change impacts can also cause 
demand-side shocks. Extreme weather events can reduce household income and wealth and 
therefore private consumption. Furthermore, damage to corporate balance sheets can lead to a 
reduction of investment. However, after the initial stage of loss, a period of recovery, during which 
the rebuilding of infrastructure and production sites and the replacement of stocks give a temporary 
boost to investment and consumption, typically follows natural disasters (IMF 2016). A negative 
demand shock is more likely to occur when a large share of losses is uninsured (Batten, Sowerbutts, 
and Tanaka. 2016). Extreme weather events can also affect the international demand for goods and 
services (cf. Section 3.6). 
Furthermore, slow-onset changes to global warming can lead to structural economic changes, which 
may affect the aggregate demand through effects on household income (e.g. income from farming or 
fishery), wealth effects (e.g. through changes in property prices), effects on corporate balance sheets, 
or effects on public finances. Global warming may also exert an impact on investment through effects 
on household and corporate balance sheets. Last but not least, global warming can influence the 
patterns and volume of trade, which we will discuss in greater detail in Section 3.6. 
Climate policies aimed at advancing the transition to a low-carbon economy, changes in consumer 
preferences, and technological change can have a significant impact on the domestic and foreign 
demand as well as investment. A global transition to a low-carbon world economy would imply falling 
demand for carbon-intensive goods and services, which could contribute to the stranding of assets. 
Private investment could be affected through effects on household and corporate balance sheets 
from structural changes to the economy (e.g. the growth or demise of different industries) or a 
growing demand for sustainable investment. In particular, a stricter climate policy could cause a 
reduction of investment in high-carbon sectors (Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka 2020). Furthermore, 
a boost in public investment to finance climate change mitigation (“green new deal”) could have 
impacts on both public and private investment, including the potential crowding out of private 
investments from climate policies. 
3.4.3  Implications for long-run growth and sovereign risk 
As Section 3.2 discussed, the economic impacts of extreme weather events can constitute a 
significant risk for fiscal sustainability, especially for smaller developing economies. Supply and 
demand shocks from extreme weather events, although short term in nature, can also have lasting 
impacts on growth (Acevedo 2014; Klomp and Valckx 2014; Botzen, Deschenes, and Sanders 2019) 
and public finances. 
Moreover, the supply- and demand-side effects of gradual global warming and transition impacts, 
which we discussed above, can cause fundamental and enduring structural changes to the economy. 
For many countries, climate change will have profound impacts on their long-run productive capacity 
and potential output. A country’s long-term growth potential will inevitably have ramifications for its 
public finances and debt sustainability. 
Models estimating climate change’s impacts on economic growth inexorably make a host of 
assumptions about climatic trends, tipping points, technological innovation, adaptive capacity, and 
the effects of all these on human well-being and economic activity. Long-term growth projections 
hence require caution. In particular, quantifications of the long-term economic impact of climate 
change, and as a corollary the impact on government debt, may underestimate the cumulated impact 
by not taking into account the non-linear implications of increasingly frequent natural disasters on 
investment and incomes, given the difficulties to model such implications. Still, they provide a useful 
indication of growth trends in different climate scenarios. Most projections have suggested that the 
economic cost of inaction is immense. 
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Table 9 displays Khan et al.’s (2019) recent projections on losses in GDP per capita by the years 2030, 
2050, and 2100 in two different representative concentration pathway (RCP) scenarios, RCP2.6 and 
RCP8.5. RCPs are the greenhouse gas concentration trajectories that the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) uses. The RCP2.6 pathway is a relatively optimistic scenario in which the 
increase in global warming is limited to 0.01°C per annum, in line with the Paris Agreement. RCP8.5 is 
commonly referred to as the high-emission or “business-as-usual” scenario. The RCP2.6 scenario 
projects that sea levels will rise between 29 and 59 centimeters, while the likely range in the RCP8.5 
scenario would be between 61 and 110 centimeters, relative to 1986–2005 (Oppenheimer et al. 
2019). Khan et al.’s (2019, 7) estimations suggested that “a persistent change in climate conditions 
has a long-term negative effect on per capita GDP growth.” In particular, the world’s real GDP per 
capita would be 7.22% lower in 2100 under RCP8.5 compared with an output loss of 1.7% under 
RCP2.6. According to these estimates, GDP per capita would decline in all countries, both rich and 
poor, cold and hot, in the business-as-usual scenario, although the estimated effects would differ by 
country. 
 
Table 9: Percentage loss in GDP per capita by 2030, 2050, and 2100 in the RCP 2.6  
and RCP 8.5 scenario 
 2030 2050 2100 
 m=20 m=30 m=40 m=20 m=30 m=40 m=20 m=30 m=40 
World  
RCP2.6 –0.01 –0.01 –0.02 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.58 1.07 1.57 
RCP8.5 0.40 0.80 1.25 1.39 2.51 3.67 4.44 7.22 9.96 
People’s Republic of China  
RCP2.6 –0.22 –0.45 –0.71 –0.38 –0.80 –1.31 0.24 0.45 0.67 
RCP8.5 0.31 0.58 0.87 0.90 1.62 2.30 2.67 4.35 5.93 
European Union  
RCP2.6 –0.04 –0.08 –0.13 –0.06 –0.13 –0.22 0.05 0.09 0.13 
RCP8.5 0.24 0.50 0.80 0.79 1.53 2.35 2.67 4.66 6.69 
India  
RCP2.6 0.12 0.26 0.42 0.41 0.81 1.27 1.44 2.57 3.69 
RCP8.5 0.60 1.16 1.78 2.13 3.62 5.08 6.37 9.90 13.39 
Russian Federation  
RCP2.6 –0.07 –0.14 –0.23 –0.16 –0.34 –0.56 –0.33 –0.71 –1.19 
RCP8.5 0.51 1.03 1.63 1.62 3.08 4.61 5.28 8.93 12.46 
United States  
RCP2.6 0.10 0.20 0.33 0.29 0.60 0.96 0.98 1.88 2.84 
RCP8.5 0.60 1.20 1.86 2.13 3.77 5.39 6.66 10.52 14.32 
Rich countries  
RCP2.6 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.33 0.37 0.58 1.09 1.62 
RCP8.5 0.42 0.84 1.33 1.46 2.67 3.93 4.74 7.76 10.75 
Poor countries  
RCP2.6 –0.08 –0.16 –0.25 –0.08 –0.18 –0.32 0.55 0.99 1.43 
RCP8.5 0.37 0.72 1.09 1.24 2.18 3.11 3.78 6.05 8.25 
Hot countries  
RCP2.6 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.62 1.11 1.60 
RCP8.5 0.39 0.76 1.17 1.35 2.37 3.39 4.17 6.65 9.10 
Cold countries  
RCP2.6 –0.01 –0.02 –0.03 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.56 1.05 1.57 
RCP8.5 0.41 0.81 1.28 1.40 2.56 3.76 4.53 7.40 10.24 
Note: The computation of the estimations uses moving averages of temperature and precipitation for the respective countries 
based on the past m years, with m=30 as the baseline and m=20 and m=40 as robustness checks. 
Source: Compiled with data from Khan et al. (2019, Table 7). 
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Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel’s (2015a) projections suggest that, because of global warming, global 
average incomes will be 23% lower in 2100 in a “business-as-usual” (RCP8.5) emissions scenario 
compared with a non-climate change scenario (Figure 8). Their estimates also implied that a small 
number of cooler, rich countries will benefit from global warming while poorer countries with a 
tropical climate will suffer particularly bad effects.  
Figure 8: Economic impact of climate change on the world 
 
Source: Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015a), https://web.stanford.edu/~mburke/climate/map.php. 
Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, the IMF (2017) estimated the long-run effects of global 
warming on GDP and public debt for a representative low-income country. Figure 9 shows the 
estimates for an RCP4.5 scenario, leading to a temperature of about 2.4°C (left panel), and, for  
the unmitigated RCP8.5 climate change scenario, leading to a 4.3°C temperature increase by 2100 
(right panel). Assuming a static economic structure, in the RCP8.5 scenario, the estimates indicate 
that the output would decline by about 9% and private investment by 11% by 2100, while the  
public-debt-to-GDP ratio would increase by 5 percentage points. In the RCP4.5 scenario, the output 
would only fall by 4% and private investment by 5% by 2100, while the public-debt-to-GDP ratio 
would increase by 2 percentage points. In terms of net present value, these estimates would 
correspond to cumulative losses amounting to 100% and 48%, respectively, of the current GDP. 
However, the IMF emphasized that wide confidence intervals surround their central projections and 
that there are “sizable downside risks”: the output could decline by more than 8% in the RCP4.5 
scenario and more than 16% in the RCP8.5 scenario, while public debt could increase by 10% and 20% 
of GDP, respectively. 
Whilst projections have differed, most have suggested that climate change is likely to have significant 
impacts on growth trajectories, with implications for debt sustainability. It is therefore imperative that 
national authorities as well as international organizations such as the IMF integrate climate scenario 
analysis into debt sustainability analysis.  
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Figure 9: Long-term impact of a temperature increase  
for a representative low-income developing country 
 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from the IMF (2017). 
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3.5  Climate-related risks and financial sector stability 
3.5.1  Impact of climate risks on the financial sector 
The Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) highlighted 
climate change as a key risk affecting the financial system. The NGFS (2019) noted four distinctive 
characteristics of climate change: (i) a far-reaching impact in breadth and magnitude, (ii) a 
foreseeable nature, (iii) irreversibility, and (iv) dependency on short-term actions. It is for these 
reasons that it recommended that central banks and supervisors integrate climate risks into financial 
stability monitoring and supervision. 
Physical climate risks manifesting as credit risks for banks 
Acute physical risks, that is, extreme weather events, and chronic physical risks, such as worsening 
water stress or a sea-level rise, can result in direct damage to operating assets and reduce the 
production output of borrowers. Raw material shortages in supply chains and disruptions to 
transport, storage, distribution, or retail capabilities can lead to reductions in output and revenues. 
Companies may not have adequate insurance coverage for both property and business interruption 
risk or may find that their premiums rise significantly. Reduced household and corporate expenditure 
due to the diversion of expenditure toward disaster recovery can also affect the demand for goods 
and services. Other physical risks, such as heat stress, can reduce labor productivity and increase 
energy consumption costs due to the need to cool buildings and manufacturing plants. 
These pressures can combine to reduce borrowers’ operating margins and cash flows and the value of 
collateral assets, leading to credit downgrades, a higher probability of default, and a reduction in the 
secondary market value of loans held on bank balance sheets. In more severe situations, borrowers 
will not be able to meet their debt service obligations, resulting in a higher incidence of non-
performing loans (NPL) and a higher loss given default (LGD) due to the reduced value of collateral 
assets. Figure 10 illustrates the transmission mechanisms from physical risks to financial stability risks 
for banks, investors, and insurers. 
Figure 10: From physical risk to financial stability risks 
 
Source: Replicated by authors from NGFS (2019, Figure 1). 
Climate Change and Sovereign Risk 
32 
The 2018 UNEP FI banking pilot project on the implementation of the recommendations of the Task 
Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), involving 16 banks assessing physical risks, 
showed a downgrade in credit rating and a higher probability of default in some cases (UNEP FI  
and Acclimatize 2018). For example, one bank’s agriculture loan portfolio showed an increase of 
1.1×–1.5× in the probability of default in a 4°C scenario, with the average portfolio rating 
deteriorating by one notch. The Toronto Dominion Bank tested 20 borrowers in its North American 
power and utilities portfolio and found that the majority experienced a one-notch credit downgrade 
in all three climate scenarios that it employed. 
The bankruptcy of Pacific Gas and Electricity (PG&E) company is a dramatic example of how physical 
climate-related risks can affect banks, investors, and insurers. Its rating downgrade and 2019 
bankruptcy filing triggered a default on all its debt (Kirong 2018). The company recently agreed a 
US$24.5 billion settlement payable to victims and insurance companies that faced significant claims 
from businesses and individuals under their insurance coverage for wildfire damage (Gonzales 2019). 
The company’s equipment had ignited catastrophic wildfires, the size and extent of which were 
significantly magnified by the worsening drought and heat due to climate change, causing severe 
damage (Union of Concerned Scientists 2018; Borunda 2019). However, this bankruptcy does not 
seem to have increased the perception of climate risk in the US utilities sector for a variety of reasons, 
leading to weak market signals to encourage climate risk mitigation (Macwilliams, Lamonaca, and 
Kobus 2019). In the long run, this may worsen the financial stress that utilities, banks, investors, 
insurers, state and local governments, rate payers, and tax payers face. 
Regarding other chronic physical risks, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated that 
an increase in heat stress resulting from global warming will cause productivity losses worth 
US$2.4 trillion, with the impact being most pronounced in lower-middle- and low-income countries 
(ILO 2019). The expectation is that the agriculture and construction sectors will be the worst hit, 
accounting for 60% and 19%, respectively, of working hours lost in 2030, with potential negative 
consequences for food prices.  
Transition climate risks manifesting as credit risks for banks 
Climate risks related to policy, technology, and market changes may also have a negative impact on 
borrowers’ credit profile by stranding production assets and/or reducing the demand for their 
products and services. Manufacturing assets, natural resources, and infrastructure assets, which 
typically have longer useful lives, are at risk of obsolescence and early closure. For example, the 
decision of a growing number of governments to phase out internal combustion engines (ICEs) will 
result in reduced market demand for such cars and lower utilization rates or even early closure of ICE 
auto manufacturing plants (Climate Centre 2018). The increasing cost competitiveness of renewable 
energy versus coal-fired power generation is another case in point. 
These risks can materialize to reduce the profitability and cash flows of businesses as well as the value 
of assets that banks hold as collateral. These could result in credit downgrades, higher incidence of 
NPLs, and more loss given defaults. Figure 11 illustrates the transmission mechanisms from transition 
risks to financial stability risks for banks, investors, and insurers. 
The above-mentioned 2018 UNEP FI-led TCFD pilot project showed more severe impacts from 
transition risks than from physical risks (UNEP FI and Acclimatize 2018). Barclays Bank tested 
35 electric utilities in the EU and US under the 2040 2°C scenario, which showed that the average 
probability of default of the portfolio was 2.2 times higher in the US and 2.3 times higher in the EU 
than the baseline. Another bank tested its metals and mining portfolio and found that the probability 
of default increased by between 1.4 and 2.0 times by 2040. 
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Figure 11: From transition risk to financial stability risks 
 
Source: Replicated by authors from NGFS (2019, Figure 2). 
De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Dutch central bank, performed an energy transition risk stress test 
for the Dutch financial sector using four scenarios: a policy shock scenario, a technological shock 
scenario, a confidence shock scenario, and a double shock scenario (policy and technology shocks 
combined) (DNB 2018). The DNB found that banks had the lowest losses at 1–3% of the total stressed 
assets, pension funds’ losses ranged from 7 to 10%, and insurers’ losses ranged from 2 to 11%. 
The Bank of England intends to use its 2021 biennial exploratory scenario to assess the risks to the 
United Kingdom (UK) banking and insurance sectors from climate change (BoE 2019). The intention is 
to use three scenarios that include both physical and transition risk transmission mechanisms: (i) an 
early policy action scenario in which countries implement policy changes early and global warming 
stays below 2°C, (ii) a late policy action scenario in which the delayed policy response is more severe 
and physical risks manifest more quickly, although the global average temperature rise is still below 
2C, and (iii) a no policy action scenario in which the policy risk is low but the global average 
temperature increases substantially by 2080. 
The UK banking sector has considerable exposure to sectors with high climate risk. The loan 
exposures to fossil fuel producers, energy utilities, and emission-intensive sectors are equivalent to 
70% of the largest banks’ common equity Tier 1 capital. Around 12% of equity and 8% of corporate 
bond portfolios of UK insurers face exposure to high-carbon technologies. As such, the potential 
impact could be significant and the learnings from performing such a stress test will be invaluable for 
other supervisors with similarly exposed finance sectors. 
Banks: Climate risks as liquidity risks due to impact on balance sheet from credit risks and fire sales 
of assets in financial markets 
Unforeseen increases in NPLs and significant write-downs of assets due to abrupt policy changes or 
physical climate events can lead to sharp downward revisions of profit forecasts for banks. A climate 
Minsky moment, as the governors of the central banks in England and France (BoE 2019) warned 
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about, would see fire sales of climate-affected assets that people perceive to be declining in value. 
The credit and market risks can combine to create a lack of confidence in the financial soundness of 
counterparties and uncertainty regarding banks’ own funding needs. These can lead to the freezing of 
the interbank lending market or a spike in lending rates. A lack of insight into the level of climate-
related risks in loan portfolios is likely to worsen the situation. 
A lack of data on banks’ and their corporate borrowers’ ESG policies and exposure to climate risk may 
exacerbate any turmoil as counterparties cannot assess and price the true level of risk. This was 
apparent during the sub-prime crisis due to the complexity of the financial instruments and the lack 
of transparency (Dodd and Mills 2008). As such, any repricing due to climate risk may be more abrupt 
and of a greater magnitude due to the fear factor, the complexity of measuring nonlinear climate 
impacts, and the lack of data. 
Investors: Effects on portfolio valuations due to stranding and repricing of assets  
In the same way as physical and transition climate risks manifest as credit risks for banks via higher 
NPLs and LGD arising from deteriorating operating margins, cash flows, and value of assets, climate 
risks can affect the value of investors’ portfolios. The pressure on earnings, asset values, and lower 
growth forecasts for businesses with less climate-resilient business models that cannot easily rebound 
from short-term shocks will result in a drop in securities’ prices or valuations for non-listed assets. 
Even if investors do not crystallize the losses through an immediate sale of the affected assets, the 
mark to market value of their portfolios will receive a negative impact with no certainty of future 
recovery.  
In 2019, 20 institutional investors participated in a pilot study on climate risk scenario analysis to 
quantify the physical and transition risks in investment portfolios (UNEP FI 2019). The study used a 
portfolio of 30,000 companies to represent the investable market universe and found that an average 
level of physical climate risk had a –2.14% impact on value. Transition risk in a 1.5°C scenario had a far 
stronger negative impact of up to –13.16%. Adding both types of risk but netting off the +10.74% 
upside from technological opportunities resulted in downside exposure of –4.56% to investment 
portfolios. The agriculture and utility sectors faced the greatest exposure to policy changes with  
–82.5% and –50.6% value at risk, respectively. 
Insurers/reinsurers: Negative effects on margins due to higher insurance claims 
Besides the impact on insurance firms’ investment portfolios, there will be an effect on the 
underwriting business of insurers/reinsurers. Extreme weather events may cause unexpectedly high 
insurance claims on property, casualty, medical, travel, and business interruption policies, which 
predictions show will increase in frequency and intensity with climate change and chronic climate-
related changes. Transition climate risk can manifest as lower insurance premiums sold if corporate 
assets become stranded or as higher claims on directors’ and officers’ liability policies as company 
boards and management face lawsuits for inadequate management of climate risks (Willis Towers 
Watson 2019). The higher claim incidence can reduce the profitability of insurance firms and 
potentially influence their credit ratings. Insurers may respond by either reducing their insurance 
coverage or increasing their premiums, both of which will have negative impacts on the credit profile 
of businesses. 
The DNB (2017) used climate scenarios of 1.5°C and 3.5°C warming by 2085 to assess the potential 
impact of flooding damage on the non-life insurance sector. The DNB estimates suggested that 
climate-related claims’ burden from homeowners’ insurance policies would increase by 25%–131% in 
the 3.5°C scenario compared with 10%–52% in the 1.5°C scenario. 
Even now, the insurance industry is already experiencing a higher incidence of loss events as well as 
higher insured losses (Figure 12). The average number of weather-related loss events for the last 
10 years up to 2018 was 612 registered events per year, compared with 425 for the period  
1980–2018, as recorded by Munich Re’s NatCatSERVICE (Munich Re 2020). In 2018, there were 
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798 registered loss events with US$166 billion overall losses, of which US$77 billion were insured 
losses—the fourth costliest year since 1980 (Löw 2019). The insured loss for 2017 was US$142 billion, 
the highest annual figure in the period 1980–2018 and considerably higher than the average of 
US$49 billion for the ten years prior to 2017. The 2019–2020 Australian wild fires have already 
affected the largest domestic insurance companies’ performance (Fernyhough 2020; Insurance 
Australis Group (IAG) 2020), which may have consequences for their future cost of reinsurance and 
capital and hence their appetite to insure Australian companies. 
Figure 12: Number of relevant weather-related loss events worldwide and overall  
and insured losses in US$ billion (in 2018 values), 1980–2018 
 
Note: The numbers of events are on the left axis, and losses are on the right axis. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from NatCatSERVICE (Munich Re 2020). 
3.5.2  The negative feedback loop between financial sector instability and sovereign risk 
Climate risks in banking, credit conditions and growth in the real economy 
The banking sector is the primary market for corporate finance. Climate risks that result in liquidity 
issues for banks will reduce their ability to lend to corporates to fund their operations and growth. A 
growing level of NPLs and the inability to project climate-related risks accurately will lead banks to 
tighten their lending criteria. As insurers and reinsurers face higher insured losses due to climate 
events, the ability of corporates to secure adequate insurance coverage decreases. This will mean 
lower protection of the value of bank collateral and will further reduce banks’ appetite to lend to 
high-risk companies and sectors. These are precisely the system-level impacts that a growing number 
of central banks and supervisors, such as the Bank of England, are testing through climate stress tests 
(BoE 2019). 
In addition, if central banks raise the discount rate to counter inflation resulting from supply chain 
shocks due to climate events, the higher borrowing costs that banks face will pass to borrowers, 
making credit more expensive for the real economy. A resultant credit crunch would have additional 
negative consequences for the GDP, employment, exports, and tax revenues from corporates, all of 
which combine potentially to worsen the sovereign risk profile.  
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Multiple studies have investigated the impact on the interbank market and the consequent effect on 
the real economy as firms and households face credit constraints. Altavilla et al. (2019) estimated that 
interbank rate uncertainty increased the lending rates of euro area banks for loans to non-financial 
firms by up to a maximum of 100 basis points during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis and the 
2010–2012 European sovereign crisis. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) estimated that, during the 
2008 financial crisis, the US banking sector experienced new loans to large borrowers dropping by 
47% during the peak period relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit 
boom. The reduction in lending was due to the combined effect of a run by short-term bank creditors 
and a run by borrowers that drew down credit lines in anticipation of liquidity issues. 
The credit squeeze also affects households. Antoniades (2014) used micro-level data on mortgage 
loan applications to separate out any contraction in the loan demand and found that there would 
have been a 14% increase in the number of mortgage applications originating during 2007 and 2008 if 
banks had entered the crisis with levels of exposure to liquidity risk reduced to the lowest quartile. 
Estimates have indicated that the economic costs of banking crises occurring across 13 countries 
between 2007 and 2009 amounted to a median output loss of 25% of GDP (Laeven and Valencia 
2010). This demonstrates that the combined direct costs—including impacts on the banking sector’s 
contribution to GDP, tax revenues, and employment—and indirect costs of shocks to the banking 
sector can have a significant impact on the economic and fiscal health of the country. Research has 
also shown that banking recessions are deeper and last longer than other recessions, with the 
recovery of pre-recession output levels requiring one more year in banking recessions (IMF 2015a). 
This is due to banks’ need for rapid deleveraging via restrictions on credit expansion, exacerbating the 
debt overhang and uncertain macroeconomic outlook arising from credit booms that typically 
precede banking recessions. 
Impact of financial upheavals on governments and state linked pension funds  
and investment companies 
Banks can form a significant component of local stock market capitalization and may have state 
pension funds or sovereign wealth funds as anchor shareholders. State-owned banks are a case in 
point, with the asset share of government-owned banks accounting for 18% of banking system assets 
across 65 developing countries in 2010 (Cull, Soledad Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2017). Significant 
reductions in their valuations due to climate shocks would result in lower investment income for state 
pensions as well as lower sovereign fund returns and asset values. The potential pension deficits and 
lower state investment returns could worsen the budget deficit, resulting in a strain on government 
debt levels or reserves, which are considerations for sovereign credit ratings.  
Impacts of government-funded bank bailouts or the expectation of such, and realization of finance 
sector-related contingent liabilities on the debt burden and/or sovereign credit ratings 
In a more severe crisis resulting from climate shocks, sovereign contingent liabilities, as defined by the 
Public Sector Debt Statistics Guide (IMF 2011), may crystallize. Liabilities related to the finance sector 
would include guarantees for non-sovereign borrowing by subnational governments and public and 
private sector entities (including guarantees for mortgages and student and small business loans), 
state insurance schemes for commercial bank deposits, minimum returns from private pension funds, 
bank failures, and investment failures of pension funds (Bova et al. 2016). For example, there may be 
a need for bank bailouts via asset purchase programs, equity injections, debt guarantees, and/or 
renationalization, as occurred in the global financial crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis, and the 
Asian financial crisis.  
Both types of liabilities can result in a spike in government debt to GDP ratios, which affects sovereign 
credit risk. There is also the risk of contagion across borders, which may be stronger in countries with 
a monetary or fiscal union. Bova et al. (2016) found that, across 80 countries between 1990 and 2014, 
realizations of contingent liabilities related to the financial sector cost an average of 9.7% of the GDP, 
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significantly more than other types of liabilities, such as those related to subnational governments 
(3.7%) or the private non-financial sector (1.7%). 
The risk of central banks having to act as “climate rescuers of last resort” in a systemic financial crisis 
and purchase significant amounts of financial sector assets with impaired value due to physical or 
transition climate shocks arises as a serious consideration for central banks (Bolton et al. 2020). Using 
their 13-country sample for recent crises from 2007 to 2009, Laeven and Valencia (2010) found a 
median increase in public debt of 24% of the GDP over the 3-year period following the start of the 
crisis. The European Central Bank’s analysis (ECB 2015) showed a similar impact, with the finance 
sector bailout contributing to an increase of 27 percentage points in general government debt in the 
euro area between 2008 and 2014. 
Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) assessed the change in debt to GDP ratios in 2008–10 for the 
eurozone countries, Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland and found that a 10% 
increase in financial sector distress prior to the bailouts predicted a 2.4 percentage point increase in 
the public debt to GDP ratio. Their analysis suggested a significant transfer of financial sector credit 
risk to sovereign balance sheets as the average pre-bailout period bank and sovereign credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads of 63 bps and 14 bps increased to 184 bps and 112 bps, respectively, in the  
post-bailout period. They also found that, during the bailout period, a 10% increase in the sovereign 
CDS spread led to a 4.5% decrease in the bank CDS spread, further supporting this direction of  
risk transfer. 
Breckenfelder and Schwab’s (2018) analysis of cross-border contagion effects of such bank to 
sovereign risk transfers concluded that, during the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of the 
130 largest banks in the euro area, a 1% decline in bank equity in stressed countries was associated 
with a 0.33% increase in sovereign CDS in non-stressed countries. Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci 
(2016) modeled the potential for banks’ foreign exposures (public sector, banks, and non-bank private 
sector) to affect their domestic sovereign risk, finding that a change of 1 basis point in risk-weighted 
foreign exposure corresponded to an average change of 0.4 basis points in domestic sovereign CDS 
spreads.  
Outside of the EU, the US faced its first ever credit rating downgrade from AAA to AA+ due to 
concerns about the government’s ability to manage and reduce its medium-term debt (Reuters 2011) 
arising from bipartisan disagreements over fiscal policy. The debt burden increased due to the 
bailouts necessary to stabilize the financial system during the sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
Sovereign risk ratings as a ceiling on private credit ratings of banks, affecting their costs of lending 
to the real economy 
Credit rating agencies refer to sovereign ratings or country ceilings as a significant determinant of 
private credit ratings (Moody’s 2019c). As such, any downgrades of sovereign ratings will put pressure 
on banks’ own ratings. Banks’ own funding costs may increase as a reflection of higher domestic 
sovereign risk, leading investors to require higher yields as compensation. This effect will be stronger 
if a bank’s loan assets are largely domestic, have the national government as the borrowing 
counterparty, or include loans with domestic sovereign guarantees, such as infrastructure-related 
financing. The implicit sovereign guarantee of a bailout also figures in the equation. 
Certain investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, are also subject to stricter 
investment restrictions regarding the credit rating profile of issuers, and, in a more severe 
downgrade, the bank will have reduced access to wholesale funding and public bond markets. This 
may result in banks’ on-lending to the real economy decreasing or becoming more expensive. 
Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) demonstrated the negative feedback loop between the 
government and the financial sector, whereby a fall in the value of public guarantees that an 
overburdened sovereign provides exposes the banking sector to its own sovereign risk. For example, 
they noted that the S&P downgrade of US Treasuries led to downgrades of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
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Mac and a rise in the CDS rates of US financial institutions. In assessing European sovereigns and 
banks, they found that, after the bailouts, a 10% increase in the level of sovereign CDS was associated 
with a 0.9% increase in the level of bank CDS. 
Breckenfelder (2018) found that the credit risk of the companies that are most reliant on bank 
financing was most sensitive to increased sovereign risk. The analysis of 226 firms from 15 European 
countries showed that a 10% increase in the level of sovereign credit risk resulted in a 1.1% increase 
in the level of corporate credit risk. This was partly due to tighter lending conditions from an affected 
domestic financial sector. The sovereign credit risk manifested via two channels, the financial channel 
and the fiscal channel, through which governments increase taxes and reduce subsidies or 
guarantees. The fiscal pressures, if significant, will deteriorate the borrower credit profile, creating a 
secondary negative feedback loop to affect the credit ratings of banks. 
Effects of economic or currency crises banks’ NPLs and credit ratings 
Severe economic downturns can create significant pressure on the financial sector through a 
widespread impact on borrowers’ cash flows. The European Systematic Risk Board (ESRB) (2019) 
highlighted business cycles and asset price shocks as two of the main drivers behind system-wide 
increases in NPLs, especially if shocks affect the sectors to which banks are most exposed, such as 
retail and commercial real estate. The data suggested that most of the eurozone countries that had 
experienced a system-wide NPL increase had faced a severe recession after the global financial and 
European sovereign debt crises. Studying a panel of 27 banks from the Baltic region over the period 
2005–2014, Kjosevski and Petkovski (2017) estimated that a 1 percentage point increase in 
unemployment and inflation led to an increase of 1.4 and 0.7 percentage points in NPLs. 
Currency crises can have a more devastating effect if the loans are foreign currency denominated 
whilst borrowers’ revenues are local currency denominated or if the borrowers’ raw materials and 
revenues have different currency denominations. Laeven and Valencia (2012) estimated that, of the 
147 banking crises that occurred between 1970 and 2011, 16% were preceded by a currency crisis in 
the same country within 3 years prior to the start of the banking crisis. All of these led to increases in 
NPLs, which, if severe enough, will require the state to step in to bail out or even close banks. Banks 
with more geographically diversified businesses may have a lower direct impact from their own 
sovereign, but this also allows for the contagion effect from other countries that may face higher 
climate risk-related shocks. 
Sovereign risk in bank and non-bank financial institutions’ balance sheets 
Banks hold government bonds, which are liquid and low risk, as part of their own liquidity 
management strategy. The IMF (2015a) noted that the home bias in sovereign debt is due to factors 
such as the preferential treatment of sovereign debt in regulator frameworks, the use of sovereign 
debt as collateral, the liquidity of sovereign bond markets, and government policies. To the extent 
that banks hold bonds issued by sovereigns that are impacted by climate risk, the worsening 
sovereign credit will have a direct impact on the capital base of banks and hence their credit profile 
and/or their lending appetite. The credit crunch feeds back to the sovereign profile through a 
dampening of economic growth. Insurance firms and investors may also have large exposures to their 
domestic sovereign, as Angelini, Grande, and Panetta (2014) noted. They found evidence to suggest 
that sovereign insolvency risk transmits to all of a country’s private institutions and not just to its 
banks. This would increase the potency of the negative feedback loop as it will affect the wider 
finance sector. 
Farhi and Tirole (2018) described the other feedback loop, the doom loop, as a deadly embrace, 
which weakens the sovereign balance sheet due to public debt-funded bailouts of banks. This further 
weakens the credit profile of banks due to their sovereign debt holdings. Governments may also rely 
on domestic banks as a source of funding during periods of financial crisis, putting additional pressure 
on them to hold more government bonds. The eventual sovereign default triggers a banking crisis. 
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Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2014) found that the average European bank held about one sixth of 
its risk-weighted assets in sovereign bonds, typically on their banking book rather than their trading 
book. 69.4% of these bonds were issued by the country in which the bank was headquartered. Hence, 
banks are directly exposed to home-country sovereign risk via their bond holdings. 
Looking beyond Europe, Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2018) conducted a wider study of 20,000 banks 
in 191 countries and assessed the role of their public bond holdings in 20 sovereign defaults during 
the period 1998–2012. They found that banks hold on average 9% of their assets (12% for non-OECD) 
in government bonds and that the worsening sovereign credit directly affects the value of banks’ 
assets. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) found even more extensive holdings in their study of 858 banks from 
46 countries over the period 1999–2014. They determined that the government debt-holding figure 
for emerging and developing economies ranged from 15.6% to 20.9% of their total assets, potentially 
reflecting the less developed private banking and bond markets and the greater role of state-owned 
banks, among other possible reasons. The IMF (2015a) found that a higher ratio of bank loans to  
GDP and a larger share of sovereign debt instruments on banks’ balance sheets had a significant 
positive relationship with the probability of sovereign distress conditional on bank stress (bank to 
sovereign contagion). 
There is also evidence of cross-border contagion when banks face exposure to foreign sovereign risk. 
Alogoskoufis and Langfield (2019) and Steffen, Kirschenmann, and Korte (2017) highlighted the need 
for regulatory reform to consider cross-border contagion from banks’ concentrated exposure to 
foreign sovereign credit risk.  
The pressure or inclination for state-related banks to purchase more domestic sovereign debt was 
apparent in the eurozone banking crisis. Ongena, Popov, and Van Horen’s (2019) analysis of 60 banks 
in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain during the sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012 found that 
domestic banks, especially state-owned banks, purchased significantly more domestic sovereign debt 
in the months when their governments needed to issue new or refinance debt. Altavilla, Pagano, and 
Simonelli (2017), who investigated 226 banks in the euro area between 2007 and 2015 and found 
that public, bailed out, and poorly capitalized banks purchased domestic public debt more than other 
banks, supported this finding. Public banks in the stressed country increased their sovereign debt 
holdings by 17% more than private banks, in line with the “moral suasion” hypothesis. These 
purchases coincided with the largest ECB liquidity injections. Becker and Ivashina (2018) reported 
findings consistent with this hypothesis of financial repression. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) affirmed a 
more general pattern with their finding that exposure to domestic sovereign debt increased 
disproportionately more in distressed eurozone countries (from 2.5% to 7% of assets) than in non-
distressed countries (2.7% to 4%). 
Acharya et al.’s (2018) analysis of the impact of sovereign bond holdings on banks’ lending behavior 
found that, during the European sovereign debt crisis, the impairment in banks’ value due to 
exposure to sovereign debt and the risk-shifting behavior of weakly capitalized banks resulted in a 
53% reduction in the probability of firms securing new syndicated loans. Lending contraction 
explained between 44% and 66% of the overall negative real effects on European firms. Gennaioli, 
Martin, and Rossi (2018) found a similar effect in their study covering 191 countries, estimating that a 
1-dollar increase in government bonds was associated with a 0.60-dollar decrease in bank loans 
during defaults and that the average quantum of bonds held before the default occurred accounted 
for 90% of the decline. 
Central banks’ exposure to climate risk and cross-border contagion risk for the financial sector 
Central banks are lenders of last resort and hold on average 67% of their assets in government bonds 
(OMFIF 2019). Hentov et al.’s (2019) assessment of 30 large reserve holders concluded that high-
grade sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds made up 59.9% of the total portfolio of central banks  
(or 68% of reserves excluding gold and IMF allocations). Central banks will need to understand their 
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exposures to other countries’ sovereign risks arising from climate change if they hold those countries’ 
government bonds. 
The ECB initiated its Corporate Sector Purchase Programme as part of a quantitative easing policy to 
boost growth. As of 21 February 2020, the ECB held EUR194 billion of corporate bonds (ECB 2020). 
This portfolio also faces exposure to climate transition risk. Nguyen and Merle (2019) found that, for 
the portfolio to align with a 50% carbon footprint reduction to meet one of the requirements of the 
Paris-aligned benchmark, the ECB would have to exclude 25 out of the 113 issues in the portfolio. 
Some central banks have recently started to incorporate climate and sustainability matters into their 
portfolio management practices. The Banque de France recently published its first responsible 
investment report (BdF 2019), which reflected the requirements of Article 173 and the TCFD on 
climate risk exposure and management. The Banque de France has also committed to aligning its 
investments to a 2°C trajectory. The Swedish central bank divested bonds issued by the Canadian 
province of Alberta and the Australian states of Queensland and Western Australia due to these 
issuers’ large negative climate impact (Sveriges Riksbank 2019). 
Sovereigns which are under financial stress may tighten fiscal policies, putting pressure on cash 
flows of banks’ borrowers 
Sovereigns that are stressed may increase taxes or reduce subsidies, which will have a negative 
impact on banks via cash flow reductions for themselves as well as their borrowers. Reductions in 
government guarantees will also weaken the credit risk profile of borrowers, increasing the LGD 
for banks. 
Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) discussed the tendency of emerging market governments to 
pursue procyclical fiscal policies whereby public expenditures fall and tax rates rise during recessions 
and vice versa. Reinhart, Kaminsky, and Vegh (2004) (which Vegh 2015 updated) analyzed 104 
countries over the period 1960–2003 and found that over 90% of low-income and middle–low-
income countries exhibited a positive amplitude of the fiscal spending cycle compared with 50% for 
OECD countries. They also found that the inflation tax rate was procyclical for all groups, with low-
income countries showing the largest amplitude (3 percentage points) and OECD countries the 
smallest (0.9 percentage points). They posited that these governments face difficulties in borrowing 
during times of sovereign stress and that international creditors’ requirements for fiscal consolidation 
(or austerity) in providing rescue packages result in the need to cut spending and raise taxes even 
during severe recessions. Greece is a recent case study of this. 
Breckenfelder (2018) attributed the finding that a 10% increase in the level of sovereign credit risk is 
associated with a 1.1% increase in the level of corporate credit risk to the financial channel and fiscal 
channel. Governments under fiscal stress may increase taxes and reduce subsidies or guarantees, 
causing deterioration of their borrower credit profile and creating a secondary feedback loop to the 
finance sector.  
Clearly, multiple interacting channels create the sovereign–bank nexus. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) 
provided policy reform recommendations that account for the nexus acting as a multiplier and 
accelerant of vulnerabilities in both sectors. These do not factor in climate risk transmission 
mechanisms, which add additional layers of complexity due to both the nonlinear dynamics of climate 
risk and the difficulties of modeling socio-political responses to what is inherently a problem of global 
common resources. 
Banks, as well as investors and insurers, will need to apply climate stress testing to both their 
sovereign bond assets and their loans, investments, and potential claims to understand how 
sovereign-related climate risks can affect both their assets and their liabilities. Due to their cross-
border loan/claim and sovereign debt exposures, banks and insurers will have to work closely with 
their supervisors to assess the risk of cross-border contagion. Regional contagion risk creates a 
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greater need for central banks to work with each other to understand exposures and resilience to 
climate risks. 
3.6  Impacts of climate change on international trade and capital flows 
Climate change can have substantial impacts on an economy’s trade in goods and services and capital 
flows with the rest of the world. Both the physical impacts of climate change and the disruptions 
resulting from the climate policies that trading partners adopt, technological change, or changes  
to consumption patterns can affect international trade and financial flows. Historically, balance of 
payments problems have often been at the root of country risk and led to external debt crises 
(Bouchet, Fishkin, and Goguel 2018). Protracted current account imbalances tend to cause liquidity 
problems and, if not resolved, solvency problems. We can hence consider the current account 
balance to be an important indicator of sovereign risk, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
A current account deficit is not a problem as such. For instance, a country may be a net borrower 
internationally and use its external credit to finance productive investment that will enhance its long-
term productivity and development so that it can repay international debt without difficulty at a later 
stage. A current account deficit will be problematic, however, if the underlying cause is a lack of 
international competitiveness or if the economy in question simply lacks goods and services that it 
could export to the rest of the world. A country with a large current account deficit is dependent on 
foreign finance and, to paraphrase Mark Carney, relying on the “kindness of strangers.” 
3.6.1  Impacts of climate change on international trade 
There are several ways in which climate change could affect the patterns and the volume of 
international trade flows (Wilbanks et al. 2007; WTO and UNEP 2009; Dellink et al. 2017; UNCTAD 
2019b). These can have potentially significant effects on countries’ balance of payments positions 
and, ultimately, sovereign risk. Impacts can be grouped in three categories: (i) disruptions to trade 
from climate-related extreme events and disasters; (ii) long-term effects of global warming on 
endowments and production; and (iii) transition impacts on international trade. 
(i) Disruptions to trade from climate-related extreme events and disasters 
Climate-related extreme weather events could cause physical damage and disruptions to critical 
transport infrastructure and activities and make the industrial supply, transport, and distribution 
chains more vulnerable. For example, ports or transport routes, including train lines, roads, and 
waterways, may have to close temporarily due to impacts from extreme weather events.18 This could 
cause delays in the shipping and distribution of goods and impede international commerce. An 
increase in the frequency and intensity of weather events that results in disruptions of supply, 
transport, and distribution chains may raise transportation costs. This would have a negative impact 
on trade in general but could cause particular problems for the operation of international production 
chains, which often rely on in-time delivery of parts and components. The impacts could particularly 
affect developing economies, the export models and integration into the global economy of which 
have often relied on participation in international trade–production networks (WTO and UNEP 2009). 
Indeed, climate change could lead to permanent changes to trade–production networks and 
transport routes and change a country’s access to and opportunities in international trade. 
  
 
18  Curtin (2019), for instance, warned of major disruptions to container shipping because of rising sea levels and an increase 
in the frequency and intensity of storms. 
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Moreover, climate-related disasters could damage the productive capital stock and physical 
infrastructure that the export sector relies on, such as utilities’ infrastructure. Disasters could also 
destroy facilities that were producing goods and services for the domestic market that now need to 
be replaced by imports. Floods, droughts, storms, and other severe weather could also destroy 
harvests, livestock, or fish production and diminish food exports or increase the demand for food 
imports. The damage that extreme weather events causes could reduce profitability and make new 
projects less attractive. Given the growing importance of global value chains and trade–production 
networks, extreme weather events could also cause significant disruptions to production in countries 
that are not directly affected by disasters. Empirically, the evidence suggests that natural disasters 
diminish exports while exerting ambiguous effects on imports.19 
(ii) Long-term effects of global warming on endowments and production 
The physical effects of gradual global warming could affect domestic output in various ways through 
changes in endowments and production, with potential impacts on an economy’s export capacity and 
import needs. For instance, long-term climatic trends may have a significant impact on agricultural 
output, for example crop yields, with positive or negative impacts on export capacity. Climate change 
consequences, such as increasing average temperatures, water scarcity, or sea-level rise, may also 
affect other sectors, including manufacturing. Additionally, climate change could have a significant 
impact on international tourism, which often relies on natural assets and pleasant and safe climatic 
environments (Scott, Jones, and McBoyle 2006; Wilbanks et al. 2007; WTO and UNEP 2009). For many 
developing countries, tourism constitutes an important service export in the balance of payments. 
Overall, rising temperatures and other effects of climate change could reshape comparative 
advantages and thereby change international trade patterns and specialization. The impact is likely to 
be greater for economies with a comparative advantage that is due to their climatic or geophysical 
characteristics (WTO and UNEP 2009). It is necessary to note that regions within an economy may 
experience very different effects, with some gaining and others losing. 
The empirical evidence on the historical impact of physical climate change on trade flows is still 
sketchy. Osberghaus’s (2019) recent survey of the empirical literature, covering 21 studies, found that 
average temperature rises appear to affect export values negatively, particularly those of 
manufactured and agricultural exports, while imports experience lower impacts. Using a dynamic 
computable general equilibrium model, Dellink et al. (2017) projected that the economies that 
climate change affects the most will experience a greater decline in exports than in imports and GDP, 
while producers in the least-affected economies are likely to experience improvements in their 
competitive position on both domestic and export markets. Their model predicted that trade in 
agricultural commodities would experience particularly strong effects. Moreover, Dellink et al. (2017) 
found that the impacts will be most pronounced in Africa and Asia. 
(iii) Transition impacts on international trade 
The climate policies that trading partners adopt, technological change, and changes to consumption 
patterns, either at home or abroad, could have a significant impact on imports or exports. If major 
economies adopted forceful measures to curb carbon emissions, including decarbonization of their 
energy and transport systems, this would have significant repercussions for the global demand for 
fossil fuels and their prices (Holz et al. 2018; Huxham, Anwar, and Nelson 2019). Oil price shocks have 
led in the past to significant changes in the balance of payments of both oil exporters and oil 
importers (e.g. Özlale and Pekkurnaz 2010; Cheung, Furceri, and Rusticelli 2013; Allegret 2014). 
Moreover, oil price shocks can cause significant fiscal disruption (IMF 2015b). 
 
19  Cf. Gassebner, Keck, and The (2010), Oh and Reuveny (2010), Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013), El Hadri, Mirza, and Rabaud 
(2019), and Osberghaus (2019). 
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The pace of technological change will shape the global demand for fossil fuels, especially in the field 
of renewable energy, climate policy, and other policy trends that affect their demand, including 
policies to reduce local pollution (Holz et al. 2018). Stringent climate and environmental policies could 
lead to rapid changes in a country’s energy mix, as could a continued fall in the cost of renewable 
energy generation. Countries that are currently dependent on fossil fuel imports may be able to 
substitute these with domestic renewable energy. Indeed, fossil fuel importers may benefit from a 
double dividend from a reduced energy import bill and the ability to spend leftover income in the 
domestic economy (Mercure et al. 2018). Current fossil fuel importers would also benefit from 
greater energy security. Fossil fuel exporters, in contrast, would stand to lose a source of revenue. For 
instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimated that Kazakhstan, the 
exports of which comprise more than 50% fossil fuels, could see its fiscal revenues declining by 40% 
by 2040 compared with business as usual if the global economy were to transition to a green scenario 
(EBRD 2018). At the same time, growing investment in renewable energy would create opportunities 
for countries with endowments of materials (such as nickel, cobalt, lithium, or rare earth elements) 
that certain renewable energy technologies or electrical vehicles require as well as countries that 
have an edge in the development and production of these new technologies. 
Climate change policies can have implications for competitiveness across sectors but also across 
countries (Mani 2007). To address concerns about potentially adverse effects on the domestic 
economy, proposals for border tax adjustment measures initially emerged in the late 1990s (Hoerner 
1998), and researchers have discussed them more widely since the mid-2000s (e.g. Hontelez 2007; 
Mattoo et al. 2009, Werksman, Bradbury, and Weischer 2009). Border tax adjustments are essentially 
duties that countries with high carbon prices levy on imported manufactured goods from countries 
without or with lower carbon prices. There are three main motives for introducing border 
adjustments (Brandi 2010). First, countries that implement carbon prices may seek to protect their 
domestic industry from the adverse effects that carbon prices may have on their international 
competitiveness. The idea is to create a level playing field and make sure that domestic producers do 
not have a competitive disadvantage compared with producers in places without similar climate 
policies. Second, related to the first motive, countries may seek to avoid carbon leakage, that is, the 
relocation of carbon-intensive operations to countries with laxer emission constraints. Third, 
countries may introduce carbon border adjustments to put pressure on other countries to implement 
more ambitious climate policies and prevent other countries from free riding on international 
climate policy. 
The discussions around carbon border adjustments have intensified recently, not least in the 
European Union (EU) with the European Commission’s plans for a European Green New Deal (Brandi 
2019). As Tooze (2020, 7) stated recently, “[i]f labor costs and migrant workers were the trade policy 
issues of the 20th century, carbon border taxes are the frontier of trade policy in the 21st.” Indeed, 
carbon border adjustments have become a real possibility in the EU, with a potentially significant 
impact on the EU’s trading partners.20 Major trading partners’ climate policies and carbon border 
adjustments could have substantial impacts on economies with carbon-intensive export sectors. 
  
 
20  Imported carbon emissions account for a growing share of the EU’s consumption-based emissions, with most imported 
carbon emissions originating from emerging economies, especially the PRC (Simola 2020). In 2018, the French 
Government put forward a national strategy that seeks to end deforestation resulting from imports of beef, palm oil, soy, 
cocoa, and wood. The EU–Mercosur Trade Agreement, which the parties reached in July 2019, has not received 
ratification due to concerns that it contradicts the EU’s climate goals. 
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Overall, there are various ways in which the physical and transition impacts of climate change could 
affect international trade volumes and patterns. Gains and losses will spread unevenly across 
countries. Economies with high dependency on carbon-intensive exports and relatively undiversified 
export sectors are particularly at risk, as are climate-vulnerable economies in geographies with a 
relatively high average temperature. Commodity-dependent developing countries may be particularly 
at risk. UNCTAD Secretary-General Mukhisa Kituyi described climate change as an “existential threat 
to commodity-dependent developing countries” (UN News 2019).21 
Climate-related supply and demand shocks could have short- or long-term impacts on international 
prices and the terms of trade as well as on the exchange rate. There is little understanding of these 
yet. Furthermore, climate-related supply and demand shocks and changes to international trade 
patterns may have significant impacts on capital flows into and out of the economy. 
3.6.2  Impacts of climate change on international capital flows 
One of the three main goals of the Paris Agreement is “making finance flows consistent with a 
pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (Article 2.1c). 
Dasgupta et al. (2016, 6) thus argued that the Paris Agreement “provides the seeds for deeper 
reforms of the global financial system.” Nevertheless, only a few studies have so far investigated how 
climate change may affect international financial flows.22 Of those that have, almost all have focused 
on the impact of natural disasters on remittances or foreign aid inflows (Osberghaus 2019). 
Osberghaus’s (2019) review of 12 studies revealed that most studies have found small increases in 
remittances and aid inflows after disasters, as we may expect. David (2010) reported that bank 
lending and equity funding have not helped to offset disaster effects and may even have amplified 
negative economic outcomes. David therefore cautioned that countries with high vulnerability to 
natural disasters should consider this in their management of their capital account. Escaleras and 
Register (2011) found that natural disasters have a negative association with foreign direct 
investment inflows. 
One dimension that has been explored very sparsely thus far is the potential longer-term impact of 
climate change on the international financial system and the patterns of international financial 
flows.23 If climate change has an impact on trade and current accounts, by implication it will also have 
impacts on financial flows and capital accounts. Countries in which the current account deteriorates 
because of climate-related impacts on their economies may turn from current account surplus 
countries into deficit countries; alternatively, those that previously had a current account deficit may 
see this worsen, which could in turn enlarge the sovereign risk. 
A corollary of major changes to countries’ current account positions is that the private and/or public 
financial in- and outflows would change. While many small climate-vulnerable countries have never 
had access to international capital markets, even countries with previous access to international 
private capital may face permanent exclusion from foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, 
and debt flows because of climate risk. These countries would then have to rely exclusively on export 
income, remittances, and international aid transfers. 
  
 
21  According to UNCTAD (2019b), all of the ten most climate-vulnerable countries in 2017 were commodity-dependent 
developing countries, while only three of the 40 most climate-vulnerable countries were not reliant on commodity 
exports. 
22  A large and growing literature has examined climate finance, that is, international investment flows aimed at climate 
change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. For a framing, see, for instance, UNFCCC (2007). 
23  Carnevali et al. (2019) developed an ecological open-economy stock flow-consistent model aimed at exploring the 
international transmission channels of climate risk. 
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Importantly, major changes to a country’s current account position could have profound impacts on 
its foreign exchange reserves, which in turn could have direct consequences for its sovereign risk. 
Moreover, large-scale changes to the foreign exchange reserve holdings of several sizable economies 
could have substantial implications for the global reserve system. For instance, a drying up of revenue 
from oil exports would not only have an adverse impact on oil exporters’ current account positions. 
The waning of petrodollar income, much of which has hitherto been invested in financial assets in 
major international financial centers (Higgins, Klitgaard, and Lerman 2006), could reduce the 
international demand for financial assets denominated in US dollars or other reserve currencies and 
affect international interest rates. 
Last but not least, the financial market instability that climate risk induces could affect international 
capital flows, as we discussed in section 3.5. If a major financial center were to experience a financial 
crisis, say because of the burst of a carbon bubble in its financial system, this may have regional or 
global repercussions. Likewise, a crisis in a country’s domestic financial system, for example triggered 
through climate-related losses in the banking system, could lead to capital flight, which could then 
trigger an exchange rate and balance of payments crisis. These may be extreme scenarios, but it will 
be important to explore them further. 
To sum up, the physical and transitional impacts of climate change could affect the volumes and 
patterns of international trade and finance in several ways. For some countries, this may have a 
material impact on their balance of payments and hence their sovereign risk. How important these 
impacts may be for individual countries depends, on the one hand, on the speed at which change 
impacts are unfolding and, on the other hand, on the capacity of countries to adapt and safeguard or 
enhance the resilience of their export and financial sectors. 
3.7  Impacts of climate change on political stability 
Political instability can undermine the ability or willingness of a government to repay its debt. For 
instance, Clark (1997) emphasized the potential impact of political events on the probability of 
sovereign default, while Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) maintained that countries that are politically 
unstable and more polarized have higher default rates and as a result have to pay a higher default risk 
premium in international credit markets.24,25 The economic and social effects of climate change may 
accentuate the social tensions within a society and fuel political instability. Moreover, climate change 
leads to large-scale migration movements, which could also lead to political tensions or even inter- 
and intrastate conflicts. The following sections will briefly discuss in turn the links between climate 
change and inequality, migration, and conflict. 
Inequality 
As we discussed earlier, climate change is disproportionally affecting developing countries in warmer 
climates. Using counterfactual historical temperature trajectories, Diffenbaugh and Burke (2019, 
9808) found a “very high likelihood that anthropogenic climate forcing has increased economic 
inequality between countries.” Their results indicated that the ratio of per capita income in the top 
and bottom deciles is 25% larger because of global warming. Even though between-country inequality 
has fallen over the last five decades, their findings give a likelihood of about 90% that the reduction 
was slower because of climate change. 
  
 
24  See also Balkan (1992). 
25  The literature on political risk has mostly focused on election outcomes (e.g. Block and Vaaler 2004; Kirikkaleli and 
Ozun 2019). 
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However, global environmental change can also affect inequality within countries and stir social 
tensions. Islam and Winkel (2017) described the impact of climate change on within-country 
inequality as a vicious circle, in which the adverse impacts of global warming disproportionately affect 
disadvantaged groups, which causes inequality to worsen (Figure 13). They pointed to three main 
channels: (i) greater exposure of disadvantaged groups to climate hazards; (ii) greater susceptibility to 
climate-related losses and damage; and (iii) a lower ability to cope with and recover from losses and 
damage, due to a lack of resources. 
Figure 13: Effects of inequality of disadvantaged groups 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Islam and Winkel (2017, Figure 1). 
Migration 
Climate-related disasters can lead to migration within and between countries, which may induce 
political instability. Black et al. (2011, 447) predicted that climate change will “almost certainly alter 
patterns of human migration” and that environmental factors will become a greater driver of 
migration. Froese and Schilling (2019) described climate change as a multiplier of risk, which 
exacerbates existing societal problems and aggravates human security risks, including food and water 
insecurity. Extreme weather events, such as storms and droughts, can lead to a loss of livelihoods and 
spur migration. Likewise, rising temperatures and sea-level rises can make entire regions inhabitable, 
lead to displacements, and create “climate refugees.” 
According to Hauer et al. (2020), a median sea-level rise of 0.79 meter by the year 2100 could 
permanently inundate about 88 million people—0.79% of the world’s population. Burzyńskia et al.’s 
(2019) projections indicated that climate change will lead to voluntary and forced displacement in the 
magnitude of 100 to 160 million workers in the 21st century, a figure that would result in 200 to 
300 million climate migrants when including dependents. 
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Migration tends to flow from rural to urban areas and from poorer to more affluent locations 
(Penning-Rowsell, Sultana, and Thompson 2013). In response to hazard events, people relocate to 
locations where they are safe and can recover their income. With the socio-economic effects of 
climate change being greater in countries with higher temperatures, predictions have shown that 
inter-state migration will occur from low- to high-latitude countries. However, given the legal limits to 
cross-border migration, around 80% of forcibly displaced people will relocate within their country 
(Burzyńskia et al. 2019). The World Bank has estimated that, by 2050, 143 million people (or 2.8% of 
the population) in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America could have to relocate within 
their countries away from “less viable areas with lower water availability and crop productivity and 
from areas affected by rising sea level and storm surges” to “escape the slow-onset impacts of climate 
change” (Kumari Rigaud 2018, xix). 
Climate and conflict 
Conflicts are hardly ever monocausal, but research has emphasized climate change as an additional 
driver that can trigger new or intensify existing conflicts (Gleick 2018). Buhaug (2016) stressed that 
climate change has an indirect and conditional effect on crises, rather than a general causal effect.26 
Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel’s (2015b, 577) meta-analysis of 55 studies found that “deviations from 
moderate temperatures and precipitation patterns systematically increase conflict risk.” Abel et al.’s 
(2019) empirical analysis with data on asylum-seeking applications for 157 countries over the period 
2006–2015 suggested that climatic conditions had significant effects on the number of asylum 
seekers in the years 2011–2015. They concluded that the impact of climate on conflict and asylum 
seeking is limited to specific time periods and contexts. Nevitt (2020) argued that climate change 
accelerates existing national security threats and acts as a “catalyst for conflict,” creating a “new 
climate-security nexus.” As such, it is widely accepted that climate change can be a “threat multiplier” 
(CNA Corporation 2007, 6) and influence the dynamics of interaction between societal actors 
(Buhaug 2016).27 
Importantly, climate change-induced migration could cause conflict in receiving areas (Reuveny 
2007). Others have highlighted energy insecurity, resource scarcity, water insecurity, and poverty as 
sources of vulnerability and conflict (Blondel 2012; ADB 2017). Figure 14 displays the direct and 
indirect effects of climate change on resource availability, which can contribute to unleashing 
potential conflict and cooperation dynamics. Land degradation and a change in land use related to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation can lead to stress on food, water, income, livelihoods, 
health, and transportation and energy systems (Froese and Schilling 2019). The increased stress could 
trigger conflict, but it could also lead to efforts to find cooperative solutions. 
  
 
26  See also Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi (2012), Adger et al. (2014), Buhaug et al. (2014), and Salehyan (2014). 
27  See also Wallace (2018), Mach et al. (2019), Van Weezel (2019), Vestby (2019), Work (2019), Roche et al. (2020), and 
Scheffran (2020). 
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Figure 14: Conceptual framework of the direct and indirect effects of climate change  
on resource availability and potential conflict and cooperation dynamics 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on Froese and Schilling (2019). 
3.8  Summary 
The discussion in this chapter has shown that the impacts of climate change and the efforts to 
achieve climate change adaptation and mitigation can constitute material risks to sovereign credit. 
Table 10 summarizes the main points and lists the relevant indicators that could be useful for 
analyzing climate risks. 
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Table 10: Risk channels, potential effects and relevant indicators 
Risk channel Potential effects Relevant indicators 
Depletion of natural capital and 
natural services 
• Loss of natural capital increases 
vulnerability to climate shocks 
• Erosion of ecosystem services 
undermines an economy’s output 
potential 
• Ecological footprint 
• Dependency of an economy on 
ecosystem services 
Fiscal impacts of climate-
related disasters 
• Direct disaster losses/costs of 
reconstruction or repair 
• Contingent liabilities 
• Loss of tax revenue 
• Projected frequency of climate-related 
disasters  
• Historical insured and uninsured losses 
from climate-related disasters 
• Historical and projected contingent 
liabilities 
• Availability of contingency 
arrangements/disaster funds 
Fiscal consequences of 
adaptation and mitigation 
policies 
• Direct public spending on adaptation 
and mitigation investment 
• Public cost of facilitating structural 
change (“just transition”) 
• Loss of revenue from carbon-intensive 
sectors 
• Projected change to land uses due to 
climate change 
• Expected fiscal cost of required 
adaptation and mitigation investment 
(adaptation finance gap/mitigation 
finance gap) 
• Share of government revenues from 
high-risk sectors 
Macroeconomic impacts of 
climate change 
• Greater intensity and magnitude of 
supply and demand shocks 
• Projected impact of climate change on 
economic sectors 
• Economic diversification 
Climate-related risks and 
financial sector stability 
• Financial stability risks to the financial 
sector 
• Exposure of financial institutions to 
climate risks based on the 
location/exposure of their investments 
Impacts of climate change on 
international trade and capital 
flows 
• Disruption of international supply 
chains and trade flows 
• Lasting changes to comparative 
advantages and international trade 
patterns and specialization 
• Impacts on balance of payments 
• Openness of the economy and export 
diversification 
• Carbon intensity of exports 
• Share of high-risk commodities (e.g. 
fossil fuels and agriculture) in total 
exports 
Impacts of climate change on 
political stability 
• Accentuation of social tensions and 
resource conflicts 
• Greater intra- and inter-state migration 
movements, which may foster inter- 
and intrastate conflicts 
• Existing resource conflicts 
• Dependency on food imports 
Source: Compiled by authors.  
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4. Climate Change and Sovereign Risk in 
Southeast Asia and Implications for 
Macrofinancial and Fiscal Stability 
 
Southeast Asian countries are among those most heavily affected by climate change, with devastating 
impacts on the economy that are increasing at a faster pace than in other regions (Yusuf and 
Francisco 2009, ADB 2017). Financial investors in the region are increasingly recognizing the 
investment risks associated with climate change (Munich Re 2013, CWR et al. 2019), and a growing 
number of financial authorities across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have 
started to address climate-related financial risks in their work (Volz 2019, Durrani, Masyitah, and Volz 
2020). The central banks and monetary authorities of six ASEAN countries have already become 
members of the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) 
and started to consider impacts of climate change on their economies and how to address these.28 
This chapter assesses the macrofinancial risk for ASEAN countries and the implications for 
macrofinancial stability. We first review climate risks in Southeast Asia as a whole, before examining 
which of the potential transmission channels discussed in Chapter 3 are particularly relevant for 
ASEAN countries. 
4.1  Climate risks in Southeast Asia 
According to the IPCC (2014)’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), average temperatures in Southeast 
Asia have increased by approximately 0.14°C–0.2°C every decade since 1960. If global increases in 
greenhouse gas emissions follow the business-as-usual scenario, parts of Southeast Asia could enter 
into new climate regimes due to the frequent occurrence of unprecedented heat extremes (IPCC 
2014). Even if the 2°C goal of the Paris Agreement is achieved, Southeast Asia is projected to be 
affected by summer heat extreme events every 2–5 years. Under a business-as-usual scenario they 
are expected to occur every year (ADB 2017). Figure 15 displays the change in the number of days in a 
year where the daily temperature is projected to exceed the local 90th percentile in 2030–2040, 
compared to the baseline period of 1975–2005. The darkest orange represents the most days, while 
grey represe4nts a decrease in days. 
The AR5 IPCC report indicates that precipitation patterns will undergo significant changes at the 
regional level, although inter-regional differences do exist and projections remain problematic (IPCC 
2014). Annual total wet-day rainfall, rainfall from extreme rain days, and the ratio of rainfall between 
the wet to the dry seasons has increased. However, while there has been an increasing frequency of 
extreme events in northern Southeast Asia there are decreasing trends in Myanmar. Additionally, 
Peninsular Malaysia has experienced a decrease in the frequency of wet days and total rainfall during 
the monsoon season, but the Southeast Asian region has experienced an increase in rainfall intensity 
(IPCC 2014). An increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme rainfall events is projected for the 
Southeast Asia region (ADB 2017). In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), two-thirds of 
the country’s population face an average of 1.5 serious floods or drought every year (World Bank and 
GFDRR 2012). Figure 16 shows the change in the number of days in a year when the daily rainfall 
volume is projected to exceed the historical local 95th percentile in 2030–2040, compared to the 
 
28  The six central banks and monetary authorities are the National Bank of Cambodia, Bank Indonesia, Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, the Bank of Thailand, Bank Negara Malaysia, and the Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
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baseline period of 1975–2005. The darkest orange represents the most days, while light blue 
represents a decrease in days. 
Figure 15: Change in the number of days in a year where the daily temperature  
is projected to exceed the local 90th percentile in 2030–2040 
 
Source: Four Twenty Seven. 
Figure 16: Change in the number of days in a year when the daily rainfall volume  
is projected to exceed the historical local 95th percentile in 2030–2040 
 
Source: Four Twenty Seven. 
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Rising temperatures and droughts also increase wildfire risk. Figure 17 depicts projected change in 
wildfire potential for the period 2030–2040, based on the availability of burnable vegetation and on 
projected soil moisture deficit. The darkest areas have the most exposure to increased wildfire 
potential, while the lightest areas have the least exposure.  
Figure 17: Projected change in wildfire potential in 2030–2040 
 
Note: Soil moisture deficit is modelled using the Keetch-Byram Drought Index. Wildfire fuel is derived from high resolution land 
cover data from the European Space Agency. 
Source: Four Twenty Seven. 
Several ASEAN countries are at high risk of experiencing water stress, i.e. the competition among 
water users relative to available surface water resources (Table 11, Figure 18). Singapore is facing 
extremely high water stress, and is ranked number 1 globally in terms of water stress. Indonesia and 
the Philippines are also projected to face high water stress, while Malaysia and Thailand face low to 
medium water stress. Global warming of 1.5°C is projected to increase the number of people exposed 
to water scarcity by 79 million across Southeast Asia (UNESCAP 2020). 
Sea level rise rates in the Western Pacific Ocean were about three times greater than the global mean 
during 1993–2012. This is a particular concern for Southeast Asia and especially for the Philippines 
and Indonesia which are archipelagic states (IPCC 2014). Projections indicate an increase in sea levels 
of 3–6 meters by 2030 (Marzin et al. 2015). This will result in land loss and contribute to coastal 
erosion, flooding, and salt-water intrusion. Global warming of 1.5°C is also projected to increase the 
incidence of river flooding. The population affected by river flooding is projected to increase by 71% 
in Cambodia, 135% in the Lao PDR, 47% in Myanmar, 129% in Thailand, and 139% in Viet Nam 
(UNESCAP 2020). Resulting economic damage is projected to increase by 70% in Cambodia, 143% in 
the Lao PDR, 49% in Myanmar, 119% in Thailand, and 148% in Viet Nam (UNESCAP 2020). 
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Table 11: Projected water stress ranking for ASEAN countries for 2040  
under a business-as-usual scenario 
 Rank All sectors Industrial Domestic Agricultural 
Brunei Darussalam 157 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Cambodia 135 0.38 0.52 0.41 0.37 
Indonesia 51 3.26 3.42 3.28 2.99 
Lao PDR 149 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.07 
Malaysia 83 1.78 1.78 1.70 2.00 
Myanmar 146 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.15 
Philippines 57 3.01 2.96 2.92 3.26 
Singapore 1 5.00 5.00 5.00 NA 
Thailand 80 1.82 1.71 1.59 1.85 
Viet Nam 107 0.96 1.02 0.98 0.95 
Note: Higher scores on the scale from 0 to 5 correspond to greater competition among water users relative to available surface 
water resources. A score of 0–1 corresponds with low water stress, with a ratio of withdrawals to available water of <10%; a score 
of 1–2 corresponds with low to medium water stress, with a ratio of withdrawals to available water of 10–20%; a score of  
2–3 corresponds with medium to high water stress, with a ratio of withdrawals to available water of 20–40%; a score of  
3–4 corresponds with high water stress, with a ratio of withdrawals to available water of 40–80%; and a score of 4–5 corresponds 
with extremely high water stress, with a ratio of withdrawals to available water of >80%. 
Source: Compiled with data from Luo, Young, and Reig (2015). 
Figure 18: Projected water stress risk in ASEAN countries in 2040 
 
Note: Distribution of water-stress levels, comprised of six indicators that measure current water stress, water availability, and 
projected changes in water availability in volume and in relative terms in 2040. Data derived from Aqueduct Global Maps 2.1 and 
Aqueduct Water Stress Projections. 
Source: Four Twenty Seven. 
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Even though the vulnerability to climate risks varies significantly across Southeast Asian countries, the 
region constitutes one of the most climate vulnerable regions in the world where economic impacts 
of global warming are predicted to be among the largest (Yusuf and Francisco 2009; ASEAN 2017; 
Kompas, Pham, and Che 2018; UNESCAP 2020). More than 152 million people (24% of the population) 
across Southeast Asia reside in areas that experience flood events, and more than 389 million people 
(62% of the population) reside in areas that experience drought events (UNESCAP 2020). There are 
numerous multi-hazard hotspots across Southeast Asia, including the Mekong Delta in Cambodia and 
Viet Nam, the eastern coastline of Viet Nam up to the Red River Delta, the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy) 
Delta in Myanmar, the Chao Phraya Delta in Thailand, Manila and other vulnerable areas across the 
Philippines, and various populated islands in Indonesia (Thomalla, Boyland, and Calgaro 2017). In Viet 
Nam and the Philippines, 76% of the population lives in high multi-hazard risk areas, in Cambodia the 
percentage is 56%, in Indonesia 53%, and in Myanmar 51% (UNESCAP 2019). 
In the widely-used Climate Risk Index by Germanwatch, which ranks countries according to fatalities 
and economic losses due to weather-related loss events, four ASEAN countries—Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Viet Nam, and Thailand—are listed among the 10 countries most affected by climate-
related disasters over the period 1999 to 2018, with Cambodia coming close behind on rank 12 
(Table 12). At the same time, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore rank among those countries with the 
least fatalities and damage. Figure 19 shows a significant increase in the absolute number of extreme 
weather events in ASEAN since the start of the last century. The increase has been driven by a rapid 
growth in the number of floods, storms, and landslides. 
Table 12: Climate Risk Index for 1999–2018 
CRI Rank Country CRI score 
Fatalities 
1999–2018 
(Rank) 
Fatalities per 
100,000 
inhabitants 1999–
2018  
(Rank) 
Losses in 
million US$ 
(PPP)  
1999–2018 
(Rank) 
Losses per unit 
GDP in % 
1999–2018 
(Rank) 
175 Brunei Darussalam 169.17 168 154 179 180 
12 Cambodia 35.33 40 34 52 26 
77 Indonesia 76.83 16 92 21 120 
76 Lao PDR 76.33 86 77 92 63 
114 Malaysia 103.33 64 102 66 143 
2 Myanmar 10.33 1 1 19 20 
4 Philippines 17.67 7 16 9 29 
180 Singapore 172.17 172 172 163 177 
8 Thailand 31.00 22 62 4 18 
6 Viet Nam 29.83 14 42 13 34 
CRI = Climate Risk Index, GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = purchasing power parity. 
Note: The CRI score is calculated as a weighted average of the individual scores. For instance, with Viet Nam ranking 14th in 
fatalities among all countries, 42nd in fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants, 13th in losses, and 34th in losses per unit GDP, Viet Nam’s 
CRI score is calculated as follows: 14x1/6 + 42x1/3 + 13x1/6 + 34x1/3 = 29.83. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Eckstein et al. (2019). 
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Figure 19: Historical occurrences of extreme weather events in ASEAN, 1900–2019 
 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from EM-DAT (2020). 
Table 13 provides a breakdown of the average number of annual fatalities, people affected, absolute 
losses, losses as share of GDP for the period 2000–2019, as well as the total number of events over 
this period. Average total annual losses amounted to 0.44% of GDP in Cambodia, 0.27% in the Lao 
PDR and Myanmar, and 0.19% in Thailand. These averages, however, conceal the damage that can be 
caused by single events. In 2008, Cyclone Nargis caused economic damage totaling an estimated 
12.6% of GDP in Myanmar. The damage caused by the 2011 flood in Thailand is estimated at 10.9%  
of GDP. Over the period 1993–2018, the 10 ASEAN countries and their combined population of 
622 million experienced direct economic losses from weather-related events worth US$124 billion, 
which equates to an annual loss of US$5.2 billion (Table 14). Of these, only 14% were insured. 
However, this figure is due to a relative high insurance coverage in Thailand, where 27% of losses 
were insured. In the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam, and Cambodia, hardly any losses were insured, 
while insurance covered only 5% of losses in the Philippines, 8% in Indonesia, 11% in Singapore, and 
14% in Malaysia. 
Table 13: Impacts of climate-related disasters in ASEAN countries, 2000–2019 
Country 
Total deaths 
(average  
2000–2019) 
Total people 
affected  
(average  
2000–2019) 
Total losses in  
US$ million  
(average  
2000–2019) 
Total losses as 
share of GDP in % 
(average  
2000–2019)* 
Number of events 
(total 2000–2019) 
Cambodia 42 646,601 54.46 0.44 24 
Indonesia 30 37,010 44.78 0.01 189 
Lao PDR 14 177,989 22.85 0.27 20 
Malaysia 4 65,377 30.19 0.01 47 
Myanmar 3,489 158,644 104.62 0.27 40 
Philippines 83 522,994 76.23 0.04 273 
Thailand 31 941,647 574.33 0.19 82 
Viet Nam 34 268,182 135.4 0.11 142 
Notes: No events were reported for Brunei Darussalam and Singapore between 2000 and 2019. Numbers for total deaths and 
people affected are rounded. * These numbers are not weighted by GDP/year but by the average of total losses in US$ million by 
the GDP average between 2000 and 2019. 
Sources: Compiled by authors with data from EM-DAT (2020), World Development Indicators, and International Monetary Fund. 
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Table 14: Losses from weather-related events, 1993–2018 
 
Overall losses  
(2018 values in US$ million) 
Insured losses  
(2018 values in US$) Fatalities 
Brunei Darussalam 3 NA 2 
Cambodia 2,200 2.3 1,221 
Indonesia 15,000 1,200 5,960 
Lao PDR 460 NA 188 
Malaysia 2,300 330 974 
Myanmar 5,500 NA 143,070 
Philippines 24,000 1,200 20,617 
Singapore 42 4.4 2 
Thailand 55,000 15,000 3,681 
Viet Nam 19,600 43 9,247 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from NatCatSERVICE. https://natcatservice.munichre.com. 
4.2  How can climate change affect sovereign risk in Southeast Asia? 
The preceding overview clearly shows that climate risk is very high for the region as a whole, although 
there are marked differences across countries. The following analysis will first review the depletion of 
natural capital in Southeast Asia and then examine the relevance of the six risk channels discussed in 
Chapter 3 for sovereign risk in Southeast Asia. 
4.2.1  Natural capital as the basis of economic prosperity 
The consumption of natural capital in all Southeast Asian countries has increased dramatically over 
the last thirty years as consumption and population sizes have increased. According to Global 
Footprint Network data, every country in Southeast Asia has a higher ecological footprint per capita in 
comparison to bio-capacity per capita (Table 15). “Ecological footprint per capita” represents the 
domestic and foreign biologically productive land and water individuals require to produce all 
resources they consume and absorb all associated waste generated, using prevailing technology and 
resource management practices (Global Footprint Network 2020). “Bio-capacity per capita” 
represents the capacity of ecosystems to produce the biological materials used by an individual and 
to absorb waste material generated, under current management schemes and extraction 
technologies (Global Footprint Network 2020). The result is a bio-capacity deficit meaning that the 
region is importing bio-capacity through international trade, liquidating domestic ecological assets, or 
emitting wastes into global common resources such as the atmosphere in the case of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Myanmar and the Lao PDR are the only countries which do not operate at a bio-capacity 
deficit; however, they are close to operating at net-zero. 
The depletion of natural capital is reflected in the deteriorating of ecosystems across the region. 
Southeast Asia is home to some of the world’s most diverse terrestrial and marine ecosystems. As of 
2007, 792 key biodiversity areas—sites of global biodiversity significance—were identified. Globally, 
approximately one-third of all coral reefs (Box 2), mangroves, and seagrass areas are in Southeast 
Asia. Unfortunately, Southeast Asia is experiencing massive habitat and species loss, largely due to 
economic activities (production and pollution). Reducing the rate of biodiversity loss is a major 
challenge. Deforestation of tropic forests has and continues to be a problem, historically due to 
logging, but recently largely due to oil palm cultivation. Mangrove losses are among the highest in the 
world with 630 square kilometers being stripped away annually over the last two decades. Losses of 
coral reefs are also reported to be the highest in the world, in 2008 the rate of loss was estimated at 
40% (Brander and Eppink 2012). 
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Table 15: Depletion of natural capital across Southeast Asia 
 Bio-capacity per capita Ecological footprint per capita Bio-capacity reserve/deficit 
Brunei Darussalam 2.8 4.3 –1.5 
Cambodia 1.1 1.4 –0.3 
Indonesia 1.3 1.7 –0.4 
Laos PDR 2 1.9 0.1 
Malaysia 2.3 3.9 –1.6 
Myanmar 1.9 1.7 0.2 
Philippines 0.6 1.3 –0.7 
Singapore 0.1 5.9 –5.8 
Thailand 1.2 2.5 –1.3 
Viet Nam 1.0 2.1 –1.1 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Global Footprint Network (2020). 
 
If unsustainable practices continue, these ecosystems will be under considerable threat and are at risk 
of collapse. It has been estimated that 96% of coral reef areas will be in highly, very highly, and critical 
condition by 2050. This will significantly damage and alter coastal economies and livelihoods, 
particularly for the fisheries and tourism sectors. The foregone value of reef-related fisheries is 
estimated at US$5.64 billion per year (Brander and Eppink 2012). Mangrove areas are expected to 
decline by 2.08 million hectares from 6.04 million hectares by 2050 if current trends continue, with 
associated losses of US$2.16 billion (Brander and Eppink 2012). 
Climate change will exacerbate existing and introduce new risks posed by declining natural capital in 
the ASEAN region. Projected sea level rise in the Western Pacific Ocean will result in land loss and 
contribute to coastal erosion, flooding, and salt-water intrusion, deteriorating the natural capital of 
coastal environments with subsequent impacts on coastal economies such as agriculture and 
aquaculture. This will subsequently impact local food security through straining livelihoods and 
food supply. 
Box 2: The Coral Triangle 
The Coral Triangle is a 6 million square kilometer (km2) region spanning six countries, where 76% of the 
world’s coral species and six of the world’s seven marine turtle species can be found (WWF 2019). There  
is over 100,000 km2 of coral reefs within the Coral Triangle, comprising 30% of the global total  
(Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2009). The Coral Triangle directly provides livelihoods to 120 million people and 
supports a nature-based tourism industry worth US$12 billion a year (Brander and Eppink 2012). 
Commercial fisheries within the Coral Triangle amount to over US$3 billion, with annual tuna exports alone 
amounting to US$1 billion. The natural capital within the Coral Triangle provide significant ecosystem 
services such as contributing to water quality maintenance along coastlines, stabilizing sediments, and 
acting as filtration systems as water runs from land to sea. Coral reefs act as vital green infrastructure by 
reducing wave power. These functions cannot be economically replaced if these ecosystems are lost 
(Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2009). The annual economic net benefits per km2 of healthy coral reefs in Southeast 
Asia ranges from US$23,100 to US$270,000 in relation to the benefits they provide in relation to coastal 
protection, fisheries, tourism, recreation, and aesthetic values (Burke, Selig, and Spalding 2002). 
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4.2.2  Fiscal impacts of climate-related disasters 
As discussed before, the Southeast Asian region has seen an increase in the number and intensity of 
climate-related disasters. Figure 20 shows the average annual loss as percentage of GDP for ASEAN 
countries. The Lao PDR (8.7%), Cambodia (8.0%), the Philippines (6.7%), and Viet Nam (6.2%) face the 
largest average annual losses, relative to GDP. In contrast, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore face 
almost no losses. 
Figure 20: Average annual loss as percentage of GDP, by country 
 
Note: Figures are based on probabilistic risk assessment. Singapore is not displayed as its value is below 0.5%. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from UNESCAP (2020). 
The immediate impact of disasters on public finances, which comprises the cost of damage and repair 
of public property, spending on crisis responses and recovery, as well as foregone tax income due to 
output losses, is not easy to measure, given indirect effects. The account of contingent liabilities 
related to climate-related disasters in Southeast Asia is patchy. Table 16 provides an overview  
of historic contingent liabilities of five ASEAN countries—Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand—over the last three decades. Besides financial crises (and associated 
problems with public–private partnerships), natural disasters were the main trigger of contingent 
liabilities. In this list the largest contingent liability related to a climate-related disaster was realized in 
Thailand after the flooding of 2011, amounting to 3% of GDP. 
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Table 16: Historic contingent liabilities of ASEAN countries, 1990–2019 
Country Year(s) 
Subtype of 
contingent 
liability 
Impact 
amount  
(% of GDP) Additional information 
Indonesia 1994 Financial 
sector 
2.0 Nonperforming assets equaled to more than 14% of banking system assets, 
with more than 70% in state banks. Recapitalization costs for five state banks 
amounted to nearly 2% of GDP. 
1997–2001 Financial 
sector 
56.8 Widespread systemic banking crisis associated with the Asian crisis affected 
both state-owned banks and private commercial banks. The government 
declared a temporary blanket guarantee and a bank restructuring package 
that ultimately implied the closure of more than 60 banks and gross outlays of 
over 50% of GDP. 
1997–1998 Natural 
disaster(s) 
NA Total damage from huge fires estimated at 3.1% of GDP in 1997 and 1.3% of 
GDP in 1998.  
1998 SOEs 4.0 During the 1998 crisis the central government paid for the electricity 
company's fuel costs, amounting to 4% of GDP. 
1998 PPPs NA Substantial obligations on PPP contracts in power plants and roads became 
due during the Asian crisis. 
2004 Natural 
disaster(s) 
1.8 Public expenses for recovery and reconstruction efforts following the Aceh 
and West Sumatra tsunami amounted to US$4.6 billion. 
2005–2007 Natural 
disaster(s) 
0.7 Total damage estimated at 1.6% of GDP. Total cost of reconstruction 
estimated at US$4.5 billion but a large part donor financed (around $4 billion 
pledged for 2005–2009 on and off budget). Total impact on overall balance 
(considering budget disaster related expenditures minus on budget grants 
and concessional loans) for 2005–2009 was 0.7% of GDP. 
Lao PDR 2009  0.4 Public expenses for recovery and reconstruction efforts following Typhoon 
Ketsana. 
Malaysia 1997–1999 Financial 
sector 
16.4 Large systemic banking crisis (associated with the Asian crisis) with 
nonperforming loans peaking at 25–35% led to substantial government 
support. 
2001 Private 
nonfinancial 
sector 
3.5 An assumption of debt by the government (equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP) 
associated with the debt restructuring of the Malaysian Airline System and 
two other large infrastructure projects (Putra and Star Light Rail), which until 
then were managed and operated by the private sector. 
Philippines 1991 Natural 
disaster(s) 
0.4 EM-DAT estimates the total damage at 1.7% of GDP. A powerful earthquake in 
July 1990 and a strong typhoon in November interrupted export production 
and inflicted heavy damage on infrastructure. A sharp rise in capital outlays 
for earthquake reconstruction (by P$5 billion, or 0.4% of GNP) was included in 
the 1991 budget. 
1995 Natural 
disaster(s) 
NA Total damage from storm estimated at 1.2% of GDP. 
1997–2001 Financial 
sector 
13.2 The crisis raised the magnitude of NPLs in bank portfolios. This in turn 
necessitated recapitalization to restore asset qualities. 
2009 Natural 
disaster(s) 
1.4 Typhoon Ketsana and a second typhoon directly after resulted in recovery and 
reconstruction requirements totaling US$4.4 billion, including US$2.4 billion 
public spending needs. 
2014 Natural 
disaster(s) 
1.0 Typhoon Yolanda, the strongest storm ever to make landfall, struck the 
central Philippines in November 2013, causing an estimated total damage of 
4.6% of GDP. The government earmarked about ₱120 billion (1% of GDP) for 
reconstruction spending in 2014. 
Thailand 1993 Natural 
disaster(s) 
NA Total damage due to flood estimated at 1.7% of GDP. 
1997–2000 Financial 
sector 
43.8 Finance companies had large exposure to the property sector and were 
severely affected by the economic downturn. Widespread nationalization and 
bank closures took place amid large systemic crisis and very high 
nonperforming loans. 
1998 PPPs NA Substantial obligations on PPP contracts in power plants and roads became 
due during the Asian crisis. 
2011 Natural 
disaster(s) 
3.0 The total damage of the Thai flooding is estimated at 11.7% of GDP. A 
reconstruction investment program equivalent to 3% of GDP was initiated as a 
response. 
PPP = public–private partnership, SOE = state-owned enterprise. 
Source: Compiled with by authors with data from Bova et al. (2019), Cevik and Huang (2018), and World Bank and GFDRR (2012). 
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The expected annual fiscal burden arising as a consequence of natural disasters (including recovery 
and reconstruction liabilities) as a percentage of government expenditure was estimated by the 
World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) at 2.5% for 
Myanmar, 1.5% for the Philippines, 1.0% for Cambodia, 0.9% for the Lao PDR, 0.7% for Viet Nam, 
0.3% for Indonesia, and 0.1% for Thailand and Malaysia, respectively (World Bank and GFDRR  
2012, Figure 21). However, the estimated probable fiscal burden arising as a consequence of a  
1-in-200-year probable maximum economic loss event as a percentage of annual government 
expenditure are significantly higher. The World Bank and GFDRR (2012) estimate these at 23% for the 
Lao PDR, 19.5% for the Philippines, 18% for Cambodia, 5% for Viet Nam, 4% for Indonesia, and 1.5% 
for Malaysia and Thailand, respectively (Figure 22). With global warming accelerating, chances are 
that disaster losses will rise further, unless investment in adaptation and resilience is scaled up 
substantially, which would also increase direct fiscal burdens. 
Figure 21: Annual expected fiscal burden arising as a consequence of natural disasters  
as a percentage of annual government expenditure 
 
Note: Limited data were available for Myanmar and therefore the data may not accurately reflect long-term average annual losses. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from World Bank and GFDRR (2012). 
Figure 22: Estimated probable fiscal burden arising as a consequence of a 1-in-200-year probable 
maximum economic loss event as a percentage of annual government expenditure 
 
Note: Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam did not represent sufficient number of loss years, either historically or simulated, to 
compute reliable probable maximum economic losses. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from World Bank and GFDRR (2012). 
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A major problem is that disaster losses, both private and public, are largely uninsured across 
Southeast Asia. According to the ASEAN Insurance Pulse 2019 report, in 2018 nonlife insurance 
premiums in ASEAN accounted for only 1.0% of GDP, less than one-third of the global average of 2.8% 
(Schanz, Alms & Company 2019). Because of this insurance protection gap, governments will have to 
step in to cover losses more often, requiring them to fund disaster response and recovery and 
reconstruction activities. 
Most ASEAN countries have contingency lines in public budgets or reserves for unforeseen 
expenditures, often explicitly related to natural disasters. However, these tend to be modest and 
insufficient in the face of larger events. A prominent example is the Philippines, which has established 
Calamity Funds and Quick Response Funds to provide contingency financing in case of disasters. Every 
local government unit is required to allocate 5% of its annual budget to a Calamity Fund, 30% of 
which goes into a Quick Response Fund, while the rest is dedicated to mitigation, prevention, and 
preparedness programs (Cevik and Huang 2018). 
4.2.3  Fiscal consequences of adaptation and mitigation policies 
Fiscal implications of adaptation policies 
To protect people and the economy from the physical effects of climate change, ASEAN countries will 
need to substantially scale-up adaptation finance, including investment in physical and social 
infrastructure that will help to reduce exposure and vulnerability, and prepare for climate impacts. 
ASEAN governments will also need to invest in faster and more efficient recoveries. Although various 
studies look into the cost of adaptation (e.g. UNEP 2016, 2018), the literature is sketchy and 
comprehensive assessments or syntheses of the cost of adaptation for Southeast Asian countries are 
lacking to date. 
In many ways, public infrastructure forms the backbone of a nation and is essential for health, safety, 
and economic continuity. Transportation infrastructure provides an important example when 
discussing the fiscal consequences of climate adaptation. Economies and communities depend on 
continuous transportation infrastructure and a system that is not prepared for climate change is likely 
to affect fiscal resources by necessitating increased expenditures due to repair costs and potentially 
reducing revenue when assets such as toll roads, ports, and airports are disrupted. Climate-resilient 
infrastructure is critical to economic continuity. Persistent disruptions to infrastructure can lead to 
declines in economic productivity and reduced revenue. By investing in adaptation and proactive 
planning, governments can avoid some of these costs. However, upfront infrastructure investment is 
also costly and presents significant fiscal challenges. How and when sovereigns invest in infrastructure 
adaptation can have impacts on their fiscal resources as well as other credit indicators. 
ADB (2017) estimates infrastructure investment needs in Southeast Asia at US$2,759 billion (in 2015 
prices) for the period 2016–2030. This amounts to annual investment needs of US$184 billion on 
average, or 5.0% of projected GDP. Taking into account additional cost for climate mitigation and 
adaptation,29 climate-adjusted estimates of total investment needs are US$3,147 billion or 
US$210 billion annual average, or 5.7% as share of GDP. Compared with the baseline estimates, the 
estimated costs are US$388 billion or 14% higher when investments are climate proofed, i.e. made 
resilient to climate change impacts such as sea level rise and intensified extreme weather events that 
can damage infrastructure and reduce its lifespan. In terms of annual expenditure, costs would rise 
from US$184 billion to US$210 billion. ADB (2017) estimates total infrastructure investment needs  
in Indonesia at US$1,108 billion, or US$74 billion annual average (5.5% of GDP) for the period  
2016–2030. The climate-adjusted estimates for Indonesia are US$1,229 billion or US$82 billion or 6% 
of GDP annually. 
 
29  In terms of climate mitigation, these figures include incremental costs for low-carbon energy investment. It should be 
noted that low-carbon energy is in most cases cheaper now than fossil-fuel based energy (IRENA 2020). 
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Figure 23 shows estimates by UNESCAP (2020) for annual average additional investment of ASEAN 
countries to meet global average investments in the social sectors and 2% of GDP in infrastructure 
required to reduce disaster losses over the period 2016–2030. UNESCAP (2020) points out that the 
additional investment needs are lower than the average annual expected losses from disasters. 
Indeed, their estimates suggest that in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet 
Nam the additional investments required per year are more than 50% lower than the average annual 
expected losses. Considering the potential loss and damage related to major disasters, returns of 
these investments are even more favorable. For instance, the US$47 billion in additional investment 
estimated for Thailand over the period 2016–2030 is only 13% of the losses incurred as a 
consequence of the 2011 flood (UNESCAP 2020). 
Figure 23: Average additional investment required per year, 2016–2030 (US$ billion) 
 
Note: Additional investment figures refer to the difference between projected average annual investment if public expenditure in 
each sector, from 2016–2030, continues at the same percentage of GDP as in 2016, and average annual investment required over 
2016–2030, if investments in each sector meet global averages. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from UNESCAP (2020). 
When reviewing 4,135 transportation infrastructure sites across ASEAN, we find that floods present 
the most significant risks to a large proportion of these assets (Figure 24). Transportation 
infrastructure is most at risk in Myanmar, where 62% of the roads are exposed to floods. 
Transportation infrastructure is essential for commuters and supply chains, underpinning national 
economies. While infrastructure can be funded in several different ways, public assets require 
government financing for maintenance and repairs. In many cases, infrastructure is built to withstand 
the historical occurrences of extreme events but is not prepared for the repeated severe inundation 
or record high temperatures that it will increasingly endure in a changing climate. 
Public infrastructure funding typically comes from national or local budgets or from spending 
supported by financing instruments such as debt, insurance or grants from development finance 
institutions (Ambrosio et al. 2019). Climate change can have impacts on each of these funding 
options. For example, shifting temperature patterns or rainfall regimes can affect travel demand at 
airports and ports, as commodity production and tourism may shift. This can lead to reduced revenue 
and in turn make it more challenging to pay back loans, which can eventually lead to reduced credit 
ratings and more expensive debt in the future. This creates a negative feedback loop in which those 
cities and countries that are most vulnerable to climate hazards often find it the most challenging to 
obtain financing. The increasing frequency of floods and storms can complicate insurance options and  
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increase premiums. However, there is a potential for increased grant opportunities as development 
finance institutions increasingly identify climate adaptation as an investment opportunity. When 
approached proactively, infrastructure adaptation will change fiscal planning but not deteriorate 
fiscal resources.  
Figure 24: Proportion of ASEAN transport infrastructure exposed to climate hazards 
 
Source: Compiled with data from Four Twenty Seven. 
Infrastructure projects have long-life times and it is thus essential to factor changing climate 
conditions and resilience into their development. If climate resilience is not integrated into decision 
making, there will be fiscal impacts as governments incur sudden costs, reduce their debt reserves, 
and ultimately have trouble repaying their loans. However, if governments integrate climate 
considerations up front into both infrastructure development and fiscal planning, they will likely  
incur lower unexpected costs and can work climate change resilience into the infrastructure 
investment upfront. 
In the Philippines, 80% of assessed infrastructure, primarily ports and airports, has at least high risk 
for heat stress (Figure 25), 75% has at least high risk to hurricanes and typhoons, 52% has at least 
high risk to floods, and 32% has at least high risk to sea level rise. Each of these hazards has potential 
to cause disruption and increase costs, with rippling impacts on public finances. For example, when 
flood events that used to be rare increasingly occur every several years, ports, airports, and highways 
experience inundation that they were not built for. 
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Figure 25: Exposure of the Philippines transportation infrastructure to floods 
 
Source: Four Twenty Seven (2020). 
In the Philippines, infrastructure has traditionally been funded and operated publicly, although 
public–private partnerships have started to increase (MacLean 2017). The Duterte administration, 
which began in 2016, has identified infrastructure development as a high priority, with a commitment 
to spending up to 7% of the country’s annual GDP on these investments (UNESCAP 2017). Integrating 
climate resilience and adaptation into these considerations in the initial investment phase can help to 
make the best use of these fiscal resources and reduce unexpected costs in the future. The federal 
government is responsible for most of the country’s infrastructure funding, along with official 
development assistance and the private sector. The government’s funding is dependent on 
comprehensive tax reform, which can be particularly vulnerable to climate change. Population 
displacement after storms can reduce the tax base, while business disruptions and reduced labor 
productivity affect economic activity and consumer behavior with implications for tax reform, political 
sentiment, and associated revenues.  
In its National Communications to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, the Philippines 
identified climate proofing infrastructure as an adaptation priority (Philippines 2014), which has 
implications for its budgeting and fiscal planning. It is exploring the possibility of implementing levies 
on road and port users, as well as airline and shipping services, to help finance adaptation. 
Fiscal implications of mitigation policies 
According to ADB (2015), if the goals of the Paris Agreement are to be met, then greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions in Southeast Asia will be driven mostly by improving energy efficiency, halting 
deforestation (critical to reducing decarbonization costs), and increasing low-carbon energy 
investment. ADB estimates put the annual cost for the region at US$2 billion—roughly 0.6% of the 
combined GDP of ASEAN countries. 
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Table 17 shows a summary of the emissions and the carbon intensity of generation in the year 2030, 
as well as the total investment required under the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and 
an enhanced low-carbon action scenario for Indonesia and Viet Nam. The latter foresees a significant 
rise of renewable energy in the overall energy generation mix as well as enhanced energy efficiency. 
The total investment needs to achieve the NDCs in the energy sector are estimated at US$298 billion 
for Indonesia and US$209 billion for Viet Nam. To achieve the more ambitious enhanced low-carbon 
action scenarios, which would reduce power sector emissions compared to the NDCs by 13% in 
Indonesia and 12% in Viet Nam, US$330 billion and US$194 billion are needed, respectively. It should 
be noted that the estimated additional cost of achieving the enhanced scenario, compared to the 
NDCs, are negative, partly because of energy efficiency savings.  
Table 17: Emissions and total investment to achieve Nationally Determined Contributions—
scenario and enhanced low-carbon goals in Indonesia and Viet Nam 
 
Power 
sector 
emissions 
in 2014 
(MtCO2) 
Power sector emissions in 2030  
(MtCO2) 
Carbon intensity of generation in 2030 
(gCO2/kwh) 
Total investment  
(US$ billion) 
 
NDC 
Scenario 
Enhanced 
low 
carbon 
scenario % change 
NDC 
Scenario 
Enhanced 
low-
carbon 
scenario % change 
NDC 
Scenario 
Enhanced 
low-
carbon 
scenario % change 
Indonesia 168 496 431 –13 606 526 –13 298 330 11 
Viet Nam 50 299 264 –12 537 503   –6 209 194   –7 
gCO2 = grams of carbon dioxide, kWh = kilowatt-hour, MtCO2 = million tons of carbon dioxide, NDC = nationally determined 
contribution. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Zhai, Mo, and Rawlins (2018). 
The ADB pointed out that mitigation costs for ASEAN are lower than the amount spent on subsidizing 
fossil-fuels, which in 2010 equated to 3% of GDP; gradually and predictably reducing fossil-fuel 
subsidies would free financial resources to finance mitigation efforts and set the right price signals  
for the low-carbon transformation to occur (Raitzer et al. 2015). However, a low-carbon or even  
zero-carbon transition would have to involve a phasing out of fossil fuels. This could cause trouble for 
governments that currently rely to a high degree on revenues from the extraction of oil, natural gas, 
and coal resources. In Indonesia, revenues from fossil fuel accounted for 22.6% of total government 
revenues in the period 2011–2016 (OECD, World Bank, and UN Environment 2018). A back-of-the-
envelope calculation for Indonesia suggests that the introduction of a US$75 per ton carbon tax 
(+1.8%/GDP), the loss of fossil fuel revenues (–3.3%/GDP for 2011–2016), and the saving of fossil fuel 
subsidies (0.7%/GDP in 2017) would worsen the fiscal balance by 0.8% of GDP.30 Foregone revenues 
from fossil fuel extraction would be a particular problem for Brunei Darussalam, where the oil and gas 
industry contributes around 60% of the country’s GDP. 
4.2.4  Macroeconomic impacts of climate change 
ASEAN members will likely experience larger economic losses from climate change than most other 
areas of the world due to climate change impacts on agriculture, tourism, energy demand, labor 
productivity, health, and ecosystems integrity (Raitzer et al. 2015). Estimations of climate change 
impacts on economic growth are inexorably based on a host of assumptions on climatic trends, 
tipping points, technological innovation, adaptive capacity and the effects of all these on human  
well-being and economic activity. Long-term growth projections hence need to be taken cautiously.  
 
 
30  Estimates for carbon tax revenues and data on fossil fuel revenues are from OECD, World Bank, and UN Environment 
(2018), while data on fossil fuel subsidies are from International Energy Agency’s Energy Subsidies database (2019). 
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Still, they do provide a useful indication of growth trends under different climate scenarios. Most 
projections suggest that the economic cost of inaction is immense. The ADB estimates that under a 
business-as-usual scenario, Southeast Asian GDP will decline by 11% by 2100 (Raitzer et al. 2015).31 
Table 18 displays recent country-by-country projections by Kahn et al. (2019) on losses in GDP per 
capita by the years 2030, 2050, and 2100 under RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios. As discussed earlier, 
Kahn et al. (2019)’s estimations suggest that the world’s real GDP per capita would be 7.22% lower in 
2100 under RCP8.5, compared to an output loss of 1.7% under RCP2.6. According to Khan et al. 
(2019)’s estimates, under RCP8.5 real GDP per capita would be 8.46% lower in 2100 in the 
Philippines, 7.51% in Indonesia, 5.15% in Viet Nam, 4.12% in Malaysia, and 3.89% in Thailand. 
Table 18: Percent loss in GDP per capita in Southeast Asian countries by 2030, 2050, and 2100 
under the RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios 
 RCP2.6 Scenario RCP8.5 Scenario 
2030 2050 2100 2030 2050 2100 
Brunei Darussalam –0.15 –0.07 1.41 0.16 0.50 1.65 
Cambodia –0.36 –0.38 1.84 0.10 0.26 0.74 
Indonesia 0.19 0.61 1.92 0.91 2.79 7.51 
Lao PDR –0.09 –0.07 0.78 0.19 0.65 2.34 
Malaysia –0.15 –0.31 –0.34 0.53 1.51 4.12 
Myanmar –0.34 –0.61 0.25 0.29 0.80 2.24 
Philippines 0.29 0.98 3.05 0.98 3.09 8.46 
Thailand –0.03 –0.05 0.06 0.29 1.12 3.98 
Viet Nam 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.38 1.51 5.15 
RCP = Representative Concentration Pathway. 
Note: No data available for Singapore. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Kahn et al. (2019, Table A.2). 
Projections by Burke et al. (2015a) are even bleaker (Table 19). Their estimates suggest that because 
of global warming, global average incomes will be 23% lower in 2100 under a RCP8.5 emissions 
scenario compared to a scenario without climate change. According to their estimates, climate 
change will not only hold back economic growth of Southeast Asian countries but even reverse their 
economic development in the second half of the century. By 2050, the estimated impact of global 
warming on per capita GDP ranges from –30.6% in the Philippines to –38.9% in Cambodia. By the end 
of the century, GDP per capita is projected to be lower by around 80% across the region. Projections 
by Kompas, Pham, and Che (2018), presented in Table 20 show a similarly bleak picture. 
  
 
31  Earlier estimates by the ADB put these losses at 6.7% of GDP (ADB 2009). 
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Table 19: Impacts of global warming (3°C) on the GDP of Southeast Asian countries 
Country 
Projected 
average 
temperature 
increase by 
2100 (in °C) 
Peak of positive 
growth rate 
over time with 
climate change 
(approximately) 
Peak of GDP 
per capita over 
time with 
climate change  
(in US$) 
GDP per capita 
without 
climate 
change in 
2099  
(in US$) 
Change in 
GDP per 
capita,  
2040–2059 
Change in 
GDP per 
capita, 
2080–
2099 
Brunei Darussalam 3.25 2,044 41,737.88 126,684.7 –34.16 –81.47 
Cambodia 3.60 2,075 3,740.398 24,706.32 –38.94 –81.57 
Indonesia 3.32 2,067 8,841.082 38,561.36 –31.44 –77.93 
Lao PDR 3.84 2,069 3,567.634 17,327.95 –32.31 –79.17 
Malaysia 3.41 2,058 11,768.98 48,048.28 –33.53 –80.70 
Myanmar 3.85 NA NA NA NA NA 
Philippines 3.05 2,074 6,785.432 32,200.74 –30.61 –76.38 
Singapore 3.23 NA NA NA NA NA 
Thailand 3.69 2,058 8,341.051 40,265.12 –37.81 –84.70 
Viet Nam 3.74 2,066 3,593.551 17,668.67 –33.60 –80.82 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Burke et al. (2015a). 
Table 20: Projections on the GDP of ASEAN countries under different climate change scenarios 
 Impacts of Global Warming (3°C) on GDP 
(% Change/Year) 
Long-Run Impacts of Climate Change 
Scenarios on GDP (% Change/Year) 
Country 2027 2037 2047 2067 Long run 1°C 2°C 3°C 4°C 
Brunei Darussalam –0.373 –0.815 –1.308 –2.385 –5.563 –1.202 –3.314 –5.563 –8.173 
Cambodia –1.175 –2.439 –3.758 –6.482 –12.101 –3.509 –7.572 –12.101 –17.183 
Indonesia –1.242 –2.594 –4.020 –6.973 –13.267 –3.347 –7.980 –13.267 –19.040 
Lao PDR –1.039 –2.164 –3.342 –5.765 –10.621 –3.369 –6.795 –10.620 –15.759 
Malaysia –1.091 –2.293 –3.568 –6.229 –12.118 –3.084 –7.145 –12.118 –17.339 
Philippines –1.206 –2.592 –4.093 –7.275 –14.798 –4.113 –9.185 –14.798 –20.986 
Singapore –0.905 –1.958 –3.106 –5.562 –11.652 –2.729 –6.923 –11.652 –16.566 
Thailand –0.766 –1.605 –2.500 –4.401 –9.243 –2.541 –5.749 –9.243 –13.269 
Viet Nam –0.802 –1.636 –2.500 –4.276 –7.959 –2.223 –4.862 –7.959 –11.641 
Rest of Southeast Asia –1.342 –2.767 –4.237 –7.234 –12.924 –3.811 –8.110 –12.924 –18.573 
Note: separate data for Myanmar are not available. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Kompas, Pham, and Che (2018). 
The agricultural and fisheries sectors are among the sectors most exposed to the physical impacts of 
climate change. Despite a growing importance of manufacturing, agriculture (including forestry, 
hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production) still plays a major role 
in most economies of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Brunei Darussalam and Singapore 
(Figure 26). Except for these two countries, employment in agriculture constitutes between 10% and 
62% of total employment, and value added to GDP ranges between 7% and 21%. Climate change is 
projected to lower employment in agriculture due to lower crop yields (Rutten et al. 2014). Rising 
temperatures and changing precipitation patterns, along with rising sea levels, a higher probability of 
floods and droughts, and more intense tropical storms will impact the availability of arable land and 
agricultural production, (Parker et al. 2019) and could have material impact on the economy at large. 
Already now, average annual losses in agriculture are estimated at 2.4% of GDP for ASEAN countries 
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on average, with losses highest in Cambodia and the Lao PDR, with 5.5% and 5.4% of GDP, 
respectively (Figure 27). 
Figure 26: Role of agriculture in GDP and employment, 2019 
 
Note: Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from World Development Indicators. 
Figure 27: Average annual agricultural loss as percentage of GDP 
 
Note: Data for Myanmar are not available. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from UNESCAP (2020). 
In Viet Nam, climate-related flood risks threaten the population, economic assets, and food security 
in the Red River Delta and the Mekong River delta (Rutten et al. 2014). In the Red River Delta and the 
Mekong River Delta, both of which are vital agricultural and industrial regions in Viet Nam, floods are 
imperiling around 67% of the total population and over US$400 billion in assets, and up to 32% of 
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built-up land, 47% of paddy rice areas, and 32% of other agricultural land are at risk of flooding 
(Rutten et al. 2014). Overall, as much as 7% of agricultural land may be lost in Viet Nam in the case of 
a 1-meter sea level rise (Dasgupta et. al 2009). In case of sea level rise of 5 meters, Viet Nam is 
estimated to lose 23% of its agricultural land, while 11% of agricultural land would be inundated in 
Myanmar, 6% in Indonesia, 4% in Thailand, and 2% in the Philippines (Chen, McCarl, and Chang 2012). 
The coastal Mekong Delta is also facing growing problems of soil and water salinization linked to 
climate change (Tuong et al. 2003). Moreover, agricultural production in the Mekong Delta will be 
affected by a “high exposure to flooding, sea level rise and drought” and “a decline in the climatic 
suitability of rice and maize” (Parker et al. 2019: 1). In Viet Nam’s highlands, coffee production will be 
affected by “a loss of climatic suitability for coffee” and “the presence of flooding and drought (Parker 
et al. 2019: 1). Overall, large parts of Viet Nam’s agricultural sector are at risk of being severely 
affected by climate change, with potentially devastating effects on the livelihood of tens of millions of 
people. This underlines the crucial importance of enhancing adaptive and protective measures to limit 
adverse socioeconomic effects of climate change. Going forward, ASEAN countries need to conduct 
comprehensive climate-risk vulnerability assessments to systematically mitigate risks. 
4.2.5  Climate-related risks and financial sector stability 
The financial sector, and especially banking, forms an important part of ASEAN economies. In 
Singapore, Southeast Asia’s leading financial hub, the finance and insurance sector accounted for 
13.9% of GDP in 2019 (SingStat 2020), while in Malaysia it accounted for 11.4% of GDP in 2019 (MOF 
Malaysia 2020). Across ASEAN, the financial, insurance, and pension sectors combined are a net 
exporter of services, accounting for 9.3% of 2018 exports and 6.2% of imports (ASEANstats 2019). 
Section 3.5 discussed the physical and transition risks that financial institutions are exposed to, and 
how these risks can translate into sovereign risk. Given the substantial climate-related risks facing 
Southeast Asian economies, it is evident that financial institutions across the region are exposed to 
material financial risks. For the time being, however, only a few ASEAN-based financial institutions 
have started to systematically analyze and quantify their exposure to climate-related risks, and 
financial supervisors across the region are also in early stages in understanding and monitoring 
these risks. 
Physical climate risks manifesting as credit risks for banks 
ASEAN is already witnessing the negative impact of climate risks on the banking sector. The severe 
floods in Thailand in 2011 impacted borrowers’ credit profiles and ability to repay debt. The Bank of 
Thailand had to step in to support flood-affected borrowers by allowing banks to maintain pre-flood 
credit ratings, reduce interest rates, delay repayment amounts, and extend repayment periods for 
these borrowers (BOT 2012). Insurance was also inadequate to cover losses, with insured losses 
accounting for approximately US$10.8 billion of the US$45.7 billion economic costs of the floods 
(Aon Benfield 2012). 
Bangkok Bank, one of the largest commercial banks in Thailand, announced at the start of 2020 that it 
expected the level of NPLs in the Thai banking industry to increase that year due to Thailand’s worst 
drought in 40 years, which was compounding a global economic slowdown (Banchongduang 2020). 
Bangkok Bank already had to reschedule and suspend repayments for some of its own clients, while 
Bank of Thailand data showed that NPLs in small and medium-sized enterprises increased from 4.25% 
in Q2 to 4.75% in Q3 2019 (Banchongduang 2020). The state-backed Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives had to step in to offer emergency and restoration loans to support affected 
farmers (Chantanusornsiri 2020). 
Other ASEAN countries have seen similar increases in NPLs due to extreme weather-related events, 
which will increase in severity and frequency with climate change. In Cambodia, NPLs in the 
agriculture sector increased in 2018 due to natural disasters, rising to 8.2%, which was considerably 
higher than other sectors such as manufacturing (4.1%) and construction (4.2%) and the overall rate 
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of 2.8% (NBC 2019). The recent drought led the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to ask 
farmers to plant only one crop during the 2019–2020 dry season to prevent water shortages (Vireak 
2019). This may also lead to higher NPLs for 2020 for the agriculture sector (Hutt 2020). 
In the Philippines, which has one of the highest rates of extreme-weather related events in ASEAN, 
has also seen its agriculture sector impacted. In 2018, the agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 
sector grew by only 0.8%, compared to a 4% expansion in 2017 (BSP 2019a), due to the 19 typhoons 
that hit the Philippines, especially typhoon Ompong which hit the major rice-producing area of 
northern Luzon. The central bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), provided temporary 
rediscounting relief measures to banks in calamity-affected areas in 2018. This is not the first time the 
BSP had to step in. In 2013, the BSP granted regulatory relief (e.g. reduced loan loss provisions) to 
banks so they could assist customers affected by extreme weather events (BSP 2013a). In December 
2012, cooperative banks saw their NPLs rise to 19.84% compared to 9.49% six months earlier, largely 
due to typhoons (BSP 2013b). 
The International Labour Organization (2019) estimated that 3.1% of working hours in ASEAN were 
lost in 2015 due to rising temperatures and this is projected to rise to 3.7% (equivalent to 13 million 
full time jobs) in 2030. Viet Nam, Thailand, and Cambodia are projected to bear the brunt of the heat 
with over 5% of working hours lost. If these effects are not factored into bank credit projections, 
there will be unforeseen and unpriced credit risks. For Cambodia, the agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries sector accounted for 9.4% and the construction sector accounted for 9.1% of overall bank 
credit in 2018, so the two sectors most impacted by heat stress together account for almost 20% of 
banks’ exposure (NBC 2019). 
Transition climate risks manifesting as credit risks for banks 
The European Union recently decided to transition away from palm oil as a biofuel by 2030 and also 
published a new framework to address deforestation through measures including shifting demand 
toward deforestation-free products (Dusser 2019, EC 2019a, EC 2019b). Such policy and market 
changes may result in stranded landbanks for Indonesian and Malaysian palm oil growers if no 
alternative sources of demand materialize (Morel et al. 2016). The Indonesian and Malaysian 
governments have stepped up the domestic use of palm oil-based biofuel to absorb the oversupply. 
The French government’s decision to remove tax breaks for the use of palm oil in biofuel has already 
resulted in stranded capital expenditures and losses for the Total biorefinery in France (De Clerq and 
Trompiz 2019). 
Similarly, the necessary transition toward renewable energy for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea in a sustainable development scenario compatible with the 
Paris Agreement (IEA 2019) has potential implications for the medium and long-term profitability of 
coal mines in Indonesia. Reduced demand in these key export markets will reduce the ability of coal 
companies to service and refinance debt obligations.  
In the power sector, over three-quarters of onshore wind and four-fifths of solar photovoltaic projects 
due to be commissioned in 2020 across the globe will produce energy at lower cost than the cheapest 
fossil fuel options, even without subsidies (IRENA 2019). For example, there is increasing evidence of 
the cost competitiveness of solar energy versus coal-fired energy in India due to technological 
advances, which is enhanced by the lower water requirements of solar energy in water scarce India 
(Buckley 2019). The technological risk compounds the policy risk. 
If Viet Nam, Indonesia, and Philippines are to meet the necessary commitments under the Paris 
Agreement, estimates show that up to US$60 billion of coal-fired power plants are at risk of stranding 
through earlier retirement at 15 years rather than 40 years (CTI 2018). The Carbon Tracker Initiative 
estimates that a phasing out of coal power in Indonesia in accordance with the Paris climate goals 
would lead to asset stranding in the order of US$34.7 billion (CTI 2018). Under the same scenario, 
owners of assets of coal power utilities in Viet Nam stand at risk of losing US$11.7 billion of mostly 
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operating capacity. In the Philippines, US$21 billion of assets associated the current expansion of coal 
capacity at risk of stranding (CTI 2018). Caldecott, McCarten, and Triantafyllidis (2018) estimate that 
87.7% of Southeast Asia’s current fossil fuel generation assets are incompatible with a 1.5°C budget, 
and 17.8% are incompatible with a 2°C budget. Around half of planned generation assets are 
incompatible with both the 2°C and 3°C carbon budgets. These pose significant risks for both the 
banks financing the projects as well as for the sovereign where state guarantees are provided. 
Banks: Climate risks as liquidity risks due to impact on balance sheet from credit risks and fire sales 
of assets in financial markets 
In ASEAN, the lack of disclosure and relatively slow progress on portfolio level climate scenario 
analysis by banks may increase liquidity risk. None of the 35 largest ASEAN headquartered and listed 
banks disclose the breakdown of their energy financing portfolio (coal/fossil fuels vs. renewables), nor 
their exposure to other high climate risk sectors such as mining and agriculture. 14 of the 35 banks 
disclosed sensitive sector policies but some have only one or two policies, suggesting potential 
unmitigated climate risk in other sectors. Only three Singapore banks stopped financing new  
coal-fired power plants, while other banks continue to increase balance sheet exposure to coal. Only 
two banks have disclosed a climate risk strategy and only two banks have undertaken a portfolio 
climate analysis. 
To address the uneven progress by ASEAN banks, there has recently been positive momentum on the 
harmonization of ASEAN sustainable banking regulations. Banking regulators and associations in 
Indonesia (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan 2017, 2018), Malaysia (BNM 2019), Singapore (ABS 2018), Thailand 
(TBA 2019), and Viet Nam (SBV 2015, 2018) have recently issued sustainable banking guidelines that 
require banks to strengthen their governance of environmental, social and governance issues and 
highlight climate change as a key issue. The BSP is currently conducting an industry consultation on its 
proposed sustainable finance framework (BSP 2019b). Thus far, only the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore has highlighted the need for forward looking stress tests and increased supervisory focus 
on climate risk (Kung 2019). 
Investors: Effects on portfolio valuations due to stranding and repricing of assets 
ASEAN capital markets had an aggregated market capitalization size of US$2.5 trillion as of December 
2018 (WFE 2019). The ASEAN bond market has been growing, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand seeing robust growth in their local currency bond markets which grew from 
US$1.117 trillion in March 2017 to US$1.518 trillion in December 2019 (ADB 2020). The equity and 
debt capital markets are an increasingly important source of funding for companies. Potential 
reductions in portfolio value faced by investors could be greater due to the higher physical climate 
risks faced by Southeast Asian countries compared to Europe or North America and also the relatively 
slower progress to transition business models to improve climate alignment. Of the 800 companies 
that have committed to set science-based targets to decarbonize their business models in line with 
the Paris Agreement, only nine are based in ASEAN. 
Indonesian coal mining companies saw their bond prices fall to 70–85 cents in the dollar in the 
six months to October 2019 (Wee and Dahrul 2019). This has been attributed by some investors 
partly as a result of the shift to renewable power in Europe, and partly due to the highest production 
volumes in the last decade. The Government of Indonesia has responded to the 28% drop in 
Indonesian coal prices by ordering production cuts (Listiyorini 2020). 
Insurers/reinsurers: Negative effects on margins due to higher insurance claims 
The fact that Southeast Asia is one of the most vulnerable regions to physical climate risk will have a 
negative impact on insurers providing coverage in this region if they are unable to either increase 
premiums or purchase adequate reinsurance. Thai insurers suffered at least US$10.8 billion in losses 
from the 2011 Thai floods, and rating agencies highlighted the negative impact on the insurance 
sector. Due to the significant losses incurred by reinsurers, some reinsurers decided to limit future 
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exposure to flood risk through various measures including total exclusion of natural catastrophe 
cover, significant increases in the price of reinsurance cover, and for some, a total exit of the Thai 
market (AON Benfield 2012). The high cost of reinsurance will reduce the coverage and/or 
affordability of insurance for companies and could have implications for the value of banks’ collateral 
assets in the event of any default by their clients and also for the value of investors’ portfolios when 
catastrophe recovery costs are not adequately covered. 
Overall, depending on the extent of physical risks and the abruptness of transition risks, climate risks 
can have a significant negative impact on banks, investors, insurers, and other financial institutions. 
ASEAN financial authorities in each country need a deep understanding of climate risk resilience of 
their financial sector and must work with other national policy makers to create a smoother transition 
to reduce shocks. Given the complexities involved in modelling the nonlinear effects of climate 
change and the lack of robust data, there could be significant turmoil and instability in ASEAN’s 
banking systems and financial markets. As such, there is an urgent need to understand the data and 
types of analysis required for robust risk management. 
There is a high risk of contagion due to the interconnectedness of ASEAN markets and supply chains, 
as well as to the exposure of ASEAN banks, in particular banks in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, to 
regional assets. ASEAN central banks, financial supervisors, and policy makers will need to work 
together to assess and manage intra-ASEAN risk exposures and harmonize policies and regulations to 
address the potential contagion effect and maximize regional climate resilience. 
Financial sector risk can become sovereign risk 
Although ASEAN does not have a monetary or fiscal union and may not face the same contagion risk 
as was seen in the eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 showed 
how contagion effects could cause a crisis to spread from one country—Thailand—to the entire 
region, even affecting countries with relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals like Malaysia 
(Hassan 1999). The large intraregional trade and supply chain linkages and intraregional exposure of 
banks may increase the risk of contagion. Moreover, the Asian crisis showed how weaknesses of 
initially a few financial institutions could fuel speculation and capital flight and develop into a systemic 
financial crisis that would then turn into a sovereign crisis. As discussed earlier, contingent liabilities of 
ASEAN countries were historically often related to financial crisis, often with serious fiscal implications 
(Table 16). After the global financial crisis, the Philippines government highlighted financial sector 
risks as one of the five main sources of risk that could threaten fiscal stability (Republic of the 
Philippines 2012). 
Even though ASEAN economies have reduced the currency and maturity mismatch problems that 
contributed to the Asian crisis, and most have turned into current account surplus countries, the 
speed and scale of capital outflows during the COVID-19 crisis have revealed the vulnerability to 
changes in market sentiments (Beirne et al. 2020). Government-funded bank bailouts or the 
expectation of such, or a weakened banking sector may worsen the debt burden and/or sovereign 
credit risk by exacerbating economic or financial crises.  
Governments and state linked pension funds and investment companies are significant 
shareholders of banks and will be directly exposed to decreased stock market valuations  
of bank stocks 
Sovereign risk may also be affected because of the close links that exist between ASEAN 
governments, their state linked pension funds and investment companies, and the banking sector. 
Banks feature prominently in the largest companies by market capitalization on ASEAN stock 
exchanges. For example, seven out of the largest 30 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia’s main board 
are financial institutions (Bursa Malaysia 2019), and three Singapore banks make up over 39% of the 
weighting of the STI Index of the largest 30 companies on the Singapore Exchange (FTSE Russell 
2020). In Malaysia, government-linked pension funds and investment companies such as the 
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Employees Provident Fund, Permodalan Nasional Berhad, Kumpulan Wang Persaraan, and the 
sovereign wealth fund Khazanah Nasional Berhad are key stakeholders in several banks. Together 
they hold directly or via trustees 54.5% of CIMB Bank (CIMB 2020) and 23.7% of Maybank (Maybank 
2019), the two largest banks in Malaysia. Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund Temasek owns 11.1% of 
DBS Bank (DBS 2019), Southeast Asia’s largest bank. The government of Indonesia owns 56.75% of 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI 2019),  60% of Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI 2020), and 60% of Bank 
Mandiri (Bank Mandiri 2020)–three of the four largest banks in the country. In Myanmar, the four 
state-owned banks account for 31% of the banking system’s assets as of September 2018 (AMRO 
2019). In the Philippines, two of the top 10 banks are state owned, including Land Bank of the 
Philippines, the country’s fourth largest bank. The predominance of state-linked shareholdings in 
ASEAN banks creates a very direct transmission channel from the financial sector to sovereign risk via 
the value of state-owned assets, even in a more benign scenario. 
Due to the dual role of the financial sector as a direct contributor to GDP, tax revenues, employment, 
exports, and sovereign assets and as the main source of funding for businesses and to some extent 
for governments, climate shocks to the financial sector will reverberate across the wider economy. 
This could result in a larger negative impact, which may be exacerbated by a worsening of 
government debt burden to fund any required bailouts, leading to increased sovereign risk.  
The potential for cross-border contagion is not trivial due to the high levels of intra-ASEAN business, 
trade, and financing activity and also dependence on key trading partners. ASEAN central banks and 
supervisors will have to work together to understand the vulnerabilities and resilience of the financial 
sector in each of their home markets and any potential cross-border contagion effects. 
4.2.6  Impacts of climate change on international trade and capital flows 
Most Southeast Asian economies are highly integrated into the world economy. In 2018, the ratio  
of exports of goods and services over GDP was larger than the OECD average of 29.2% in all  
ASEAN countries but Indonesia (21.0%). Given the importance of the export sector for growth and 
employment, ASEAN countries are exposed to a number of material climate-related risks. There are 
several ways through which climate change could affect the patterns and the volume of international 
trade flows of ASEAN countries, with potentially significant effects on countries’ balance of payments 
positions and, ultimately, sovereign risk.  
Supply chains across Southeast Asia face disruptions from climate-related hazards 
As discussed, physical impacts of climate change can interrupt production and transportation, which 
can disrupt trade. Such disruption may be particularly problematic in Southeast Asia given the 
region’s trade is closely related to regional and global value chains, where parts and components are 
shipped between different production sites across countries to benefit from countries’ respective 
comparative advantages. These value chains depend on timely delivery and are sensitive to 
disruptions. Starting with Singapore and Malaysia, Southeast Asian countries have become major 
participants and regional and global trade-production networks since the early 1970s, especially in 
the electronics and automotive sectors. Indeed, engagement in global production sharing has been a 
major factor behind the export-led development success of Southeast Asian countries. The share of 
network trade in total manufacturing exports is much larger in Southeast Asia than in any other 
region of the world, with products related such networks accounting for 71.5% of merchandise 
exports of Southeast Asia over the period 2011–2012 (Athukorala 2016). Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam are particularly integrated in network trade, and to a somewhat 
lesser degree Indonesia (Athukorala 2016, 2019). More recently, Cambodia and the Lao PDR have also 
started to participate in regional production networks, especially in the garment sector (DiCaprio and 
Suvannaphakdy 2017). 
The most prominent example of a large-scale disruption of supply chains are the Thai floods of 2011. 
Among other impacts, the floods inundated numerous industrial parks where components for the 
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supply chains of automotive and electronic products were produced, causing standstill of operations 
across the region and the world, prominently in Japan (Haraguchi and Lall 2015). Although often 
unnoted, the region regularly experiences impactful weather events that degrade infrastructure and 
disrupt commerce and supply chains. In 2019 alone, landslides and rainstorms damaged roadways 
along major transportation routes in Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Viet Nam (BSI 2020). 
Manufacturing is exposed to multiple climate hazards 
Manufacturing accounts for the majority of merchandise exports in all ASEAN countries except 
Brunei Darussalam and the Lao PDR.32 As manufacturing centers, most ASEAN countries provide key 
inputs into global supply chains and economies. The impacts of climate hazards on manufacturing 
facilities pose significant economic risks where the damage occurs, but can also significantly affect 
international trade and capital flows, particularly in industries with complex global supply chains. 
Manufacturing is an industry that is particularly vulnerable to climate hazards due to its reliance on 
energy intensive equipment, onsite operations, employee labor, in addition to complex supply chains. 
Manufacturing facilities are disrupted during floods and storms, sometimes due to onsite damage but 
often due to employees’ inability to get to work due to damaged regional infrastructure, or lack of 
critical components due to disrupted supply chains. Likewise, during extreme heat events, employee 
health can be threatened and productivity can decline. Energy intensive facilities are also vulnerable 
to blackouts due to high demands on the grid during heat waves. As average temperatures increase 
this can lead to a persistent decline in productivity and increase in energy costs. 
Manufacturing facilities from large listed companies in the ASEAN countries are highly exposed to 
climate hazards, with 99% of assessed facilities in the region at least highly exposed to heat stress and 
43%, 38% and 21% at least highly exposed to water stress, floods, and hurricanes and typhoons, 
respectively (Table 21). Newman and Hewston (2018, 1) identify Southeast Asia as one of four 
regional hotspots (besides West Africa, Central Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa), “where, 
without adaptation, rising heat stress will drive labor capacity losses in key sectors, with the potential 
to substantially undermine their export economies.” Based on the current sectoral composition of 
exports and projected daily temperatures for the period 1980–2045, they estimate that 5.2% of 
Southeast Asia’s export value—including agriculture, forestry and fishing, as well as extractive 
activities—is projected to be at risk by 2045 because of heat stress-induced labor capacity losses. 
Table 21: Percent of manufacturing facilities with at least high risk to climate hazards 
 Heat stress Water stress Floods Sea level rise 
Hurricanes and 
typhoons 
Total number 
of facilities 
assessed 
ASEAN 99 43 38 4 21 2,931 
Indonesia 98 66 57 2 0 576 
Malaysia 100 36 36 3 0 280 
Philippines 96 79 39 7 88 380 
Singapore 100 99 33 7 0 335 
Thailand 100 8 27 2 0 612 
Viet Nam 100 1 34 4 48 522 
Note: Percent of manufacturing facilities owned or operated by large listed companies in ASEAN Countries with high exposure to 
key climate hazards. 
Source: Compiled with data from Four Twenty Seven.  
 
32  In 2018, the share of manufacturing in total merchandise export was 8.6% in Brunei Darussalam, 94.4% in Cambodia, 
54.4% in Indonesia, 41.1% in the Lao PDR, 75.0% in Malaysia, 50.2% in Myanmar, 87.5% in the Philippines, 77.1% in 
Singapore, 81.3% in Thailand, and 85.2% in Viet Nam (ASEANstats database). 
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Viet Nam in particular stands out with all of its assessed manufacturing facilities exposed to at least 
high heat stress and almost half with at least high exposure to hurricanes and typhoons (Figure 28). 
Viet Nam’s key exports include broadcasting equipment, telephones, integrated circuits, textile 
footwear, and leather footwear. These are industries with many manufacturing operations, as well as 
global supply chains, making Viet Nam’s exports largely dependent on resilience to climate hazards 
both domestically and in nations that produce the other components upon which Viet Nam 
manufacturing relies. 
Figure 28: Proportion of Viet Nam’s manufacturing facilities exposed to each climate hazard 
 
Source: Compiled with data from Four Twenty Seven. 
Viet Nam’s exports have increased consistently over the past several years, but disruption to 
manufacturing of its key export products could adversely affect its trade balance. Circuits and other 
electrical equipment are typically components in long supply chains with both downstream and 
upstream manufacturing operations across Southeast Asia. Meanwhile these products’ end 
destinations are consumer markets across the globe. Viet Nam’s top export destination is the United 
States, followed by the PRC, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Germany. These trade partners may 
begin to seek products elsewhere if Viet Nam’s manufacturing is consistently disrupted due frequent 
storms. Likewise, if companies need to increase their products’ prices to respond to an increase in 
operating cost due to consistently warmer temperatures, countries that do not have this exposure 
will likely have a competitive advantage. For example, one of the PRC’s top exports is also telephones. 
As a larger nation with more financial resources and more diverse climate risk exposure, the PRC may 
continue to produce telephones with similar prices even when Viet Nam manufacturers may have to 
consider increasing prices. The exposure of other key industries such as agriculture, may also reduce 
the nation’s exports or increase its import demands. With a relatively small trade balance, Viet Nam 
could see its trade balance become negative if its key industries are constantly affected by climate 
hazards and its export partners have to look elsewhere for a stable supply of products. 
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Risks to agricultural exports and tourism 
Manufacturing is not the only export sector across Southeast Asia that is being affected by the 
physical impacts of climate change. Figure 29 displays the composition of ASEAN countries’ total 
exports for 2018. The agricultural and fisheries sectors of Southeast Asian countries have become 
increasingly involved in international agro-food trade (OECD and FAO 2017). For most ASEAN 
countries, agricultural exports—displayed in yellow—are of great importance, accounting for 23.6% of 
exports in Indonesia, 17.2% in Myanmar, 16.8% in the Lao PDR, 12.3% in Thailand, 10.9% in Viet Nam, 
10.2% in Cambodia, 8.9% in Malaysia, and 6.2% in the Philippines. Thailand and Viet Nam are among 
the largest exporters of rice globally, and Myanmar and Cambodia have also ranked among the top 10 
exporters. The only two ASEAN countries for which agricultural exports are not substantial are 
Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, with shares of 3.0% and 0.3%, respectively. As was discussed 
earlier, the agricultural and fisheries sectors are among the sectors most exposed to the physical 
impacts of climate change. Agricultural production and hence export capacity will be severely affected 
in several parts of Southeast Asia. Simulations by Le (2016) suggest that under a low-emissions 
scenario and without interventions, Viet Nam’s rice production would drop by as much as 18% by 
2030 relative to the 1980–1999 average. Although (export) prices would rise by about 7%, export 
quantity would fall by 55%, with an overall loss of export sales of 48%. Modeling by Chen, McCarl, and 
Chang (2012) indicate that along with Myanmar and Egypt, Viet Nam would be one of the three rice 
exporters globally that would turn from a rice exporter to an importer in the case of extreme sea level 
rise. Besides the socioeconomic implications, this would also impact on food supply and security 
across the region.  
In services exports (colored red in Figure 29), the tourism sector plays an important or very important 
role for most ASEAN countries. Travel and tourism account for 21.8% of total exports in Thailand, 
20.1% in Cambodia, 11.0% in the Lao PDR, 10.4% in Myanmar, 8.3% in Malaysia, 6.8% in Indonesia, 
6.3% in the Philippines, 4.1% in Singapore, and 2.7% in Brunei Darussalam (no data for Viet Nam). 
International tourism across ASEAN relies to a large degree on pleasant nature and safe climatic 
environments. While sea level rise will hurt coastal tourism (Marks 2011), heat stress and other 
natural hazards may diminish the attractiveness of Southeast Asia as a tourist destination. The ADB 
(2009) raised concerns that an increase in coastal erosion and deterioration of natural resources may 
cause losses for the tourism industry in Thailand. With more than 10% of Thailand’s workforce 
employed in the tourism sector before the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis, adverse effects of climate 
change could have a significant impact on the Thai economy, and the same may be true for 
Cambodia, and, to a lesser extent, for the Lao PDR. 
Transition impacts on international trade 
A decarbonization of the global economy would have profound impact on most Southeast Asian 
economies and their international trade. ASEAN comprises both importers and exporters of fossil 
fuels, and some ASEAN countries are both. While importers of fossil fuel energy would benefit from 
reduced energy import bills (Dowling and Russ 2012), the impending decline in global demand for 
fossil fuels will hurt major exporters if they fail to anticipate it (Holz et al. 2018). 
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Figure 29: Composition of ASEAN countries’ exports, 2018 
Brunei Darussalam ($7.07 billion) 
 
Cambodia ($22.4 billion) 
 
Indonesia ($208 billion) 
 
Lao PDR ($6.8 billion) 
 
Malaysia ($310 billion) 
 
Myanmar ($20.2 billion) 
 
Philippines ($118 billion) 
 
Singapore ($496 billion) 
 
Thailand ($336 billion) 
 
Viet Nam ($280 billion) 
 
Note: Standard International Trade Classification categories disaggregate to 4-digit detail level. 
Source: Compiled by authors with Harvard Growth Lab’s Atlas of Economic Complexity, based on UN Comtrade data. 
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Among the fossil fuel exporters, Brunei Darussalam stands out: 45.4% of its total exports are in 
petroleum gases and another 38.6% in petroleum oils and crude (colored copper in Figure 29). It is no 
exaggeration to say that a drying up of fossil fuel exports would cause severe trouble to the economy 
and public finances. The effects would be less severe in other ASEAN countries but could still be 
problematic for some. With petroleum gases constituting 16.7% of Myanmar’s total exports, and coal 
constituting 9.9% and petroleum gases 4.9% of Indonesia’s total exports, a rapid transition of 
Myanmar’s and Indonesia’s trading partners to a low-carbon economy would have significant impact 
of these countries’ trade balances. As pointed out by Holz et al. (2018, 5), along with other major coal 
exporters to the PRC (such as Australia), Indonesia could find itself “in a very vulnerable position quite 
quickly” if the PRC was to reduce its coal consumption soon. The effects of dwindling fossil fuel trade 
would be less severe for Singapore, where refined petroleum oils account for 9.7% of total exports, 
and Malaysia, where refined and crude petroleum oils constitute 5.7% and 3.7% of total exports, 
respectively. 
Figure 30 plots fuel exports as share of merchandise exports of ASEAN countries as well as the OECD 
average against merchandise exports as share of GDP. Figure 31 shows the same for imports. Brunei 
Darussalam’s merchandise exports, which amount to 40% of GDP, constitute almost entirely (96%) of 
fossil fuels. With 23.2%, Indonesia has also a significant share of fossil fuels in its total merchandise 
exports, as has Myanmar with 21.6%, Malaysia with 15.3%, and Singapore with 13.5%. For these 
countries, a sudden drop in fossil fuel exports would likely pose problems. For Thailand, the share is a 
mere 3.9%, and for all others it is lower. The countries with the largest share of fossil fuel imports in 
total merchandise imports are Singapore with 24.7%, Thailand with 17.8%, Indonesia with 16.7%, the 
Lao PDR with 15.3%, Malaysia with 14.6%, and Philippines with 12.0%. Among the fossil fuel 
importers, Singapore, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and the Lao PDR have the highest share of fossil 
fuel imports as share of merchandise imports. A switch to non-fossil fuels would reduce the import 
bill. Indeed, the Lao PDR is not only seeking to reduce energy imports; it envisages to boost exports of 
hydroelectricity generated at the Mekong river, becoming the “battery” of Southeast Asia. 
Figure 30: Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) vs merchandise exports as share of GDP 
 
Note: Fuel exports for Cambodia and the Lao PDR from 2016, for Viet Nam from 2017. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from WDI. 
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Figure 31: Fuel imports (% of merchandise imports) vs merchandise imports as share of GDP 
 
Note: Fuel imports for Cambodia and the Lao PDR from 2016, for Viet Nam from 2017. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from WDI. 
Figure 32 shows the balance of trade in goods for all ASEAN countries. The straight lines show the 
actual values, while the dotted lines show values excluding mineral fuel imports and exports. 
Unsurprisingly, countries with large net imports or exports of mineral fuels see significant changes to 
their balance of trade when mineral fuels are excluded. In such a scenario, Brunei Darussalam would 
have seen its trade balance for goods turn into a deficit. For instance, in 2018, Brunei Darussalam 
would have recorded a deficit of US$3.3 billion—the equivalent of 24.3% of its US$13.6 billion  
GDP—in its goods trade, instead of a US$2.4 billion (or 17.8% of GDP) surplus. In 2012, the difference 
in the balance of trade in goods would have been a whopping US$12.1 billion (or 49.5% of GDP). 
Between 1989 and 2018, Indonesia would have recorded a deficit in its balance of trade in goods in 
13 years, instead of the 4 years it actually did. The US$ 8.5 billion deficit in its goods trade—0.8% of 
GDP—that Indonesia recorded in 2018, would have been US$10.4 billion larger in the absence of 
mineral fuel trade, so that the goods trade balance would have stood at –1.8% of GDP. Malaysia’s 
accumulated trade surplus in goods over the same period of US$530 billion would have been reduced 
to almost half in the absence of mineral fuel trade, to US$277 billion. In contrast, the Lao PDR’s 
accumulated goods trade deficit over the period 2010–2016 would have been only US$1.6 billion, 
instead of the actual US$5.8 billion—a significant amount for an economy of US$15.1 billion in 2016. 
Thailand would have accumulated a goods trade surplus of US$399 billion over the period 1988 to 
2018, instead of a deficit of US$24 billion.  
One should be careful not to take the results of such simplistic simulations literally, but they illustrate 
an important point: a rapid replacement of fossil fuel-based energy and transport systems would have 
a significant impact—positive or negative—on the trade balance of most ASEAN countries. A 
significant worsening of the balance of payments could have material impact on macroeconomic 
stability and sovereign credit risk. 
It should be noted, however, that also new export opportunities may open up. For instance, Indonesia 
may benefit from growing demand for industrial metal such as nickel, the demand for which is 
projected to rise significantly due to its role in electrical vehicle batteries. The government of 
Indonesia is seeking to develop nickel processing and battery production in Indonesia to capitalize on 
expected strong global demand (Sanderson 2020). 
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Figure 32: ASEAN countries’ trade balance for goods (in US$ billion), including (straight line)  
and excluding (dotted line) mineral fuels 
 
Note: The definition of mineral fuels follows the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS), where HS27 
comprises mineral fuels, mineral oils, and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; and mineral waxes. 
Source: Compiled by authors based on calculations with UN Comtrade data. 
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A decarbonization of the world economy would inexorably also affect Southeast Asian countries’ 
external trade beyond imports and exports of fossil fuels. Figure 33 shows the carbon footprint of 
exports (t CO2/US$) plotted against the exports of goods and services as share of GDP for ASEAN 
countries as well as the OECD average for the year 2015. It clearly shows that the carbon intensity of 
exports of ASEAN countries is much larger for all ASEAN countries, compared to the OECD average. 
The exports of Viet Nam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have a particularly large carbon footprint. 
Moreover, Figure 33 also shows that most ASEAN economies are export-dependent, as discussed 
before. This implies that they are facing large transition risks. For instance, carbon border taxes, as 
they are currently being discussed in the European Union, could have a significant impact on external 
revenue and domestic employment, and by implication also on public finances. 
Figure 33: Carbon footprint of exports (tCO2e/US$) vs exports of goods and services  
as share of GDP (%) for ASEAN countries and OECD in 2015 
 
Note: Data on carbon footprint of exports were not available for Myanmar and the Lao PDR. tCO2e = tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent. 
Sources: Compiled by authors with data from World Development Indicators and OECD Statistics. 
While more granular analysis is certainly needed, several ASEAN countries show vulnerabilities in their 
external balance to climate-related physical and transition risk. ASEAN economies with a high 
dependency on carbon-intensive exports and little diversified export sectors—most notably Brunei 
Darussalam—are particularly at risk. All of them face an increase in heat and water stress, along with 
an increase in other climate hazards, which may have severely adverse effects on manufacturing 
exports and participation in regional and global value chains. 
4.2.7  Impacts of climate change on political stability 
According to S&P (2016, 2), “political developments have the most potential to shape sovereign rating 
trends in parts of Southeast Asia”. Figure 34 displays the scores of ASEAN countries for an indicator of 
political stability and absence of violence and/or terrorism from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. This indicator is based on perceptions and should be interpreted with caution, 
but it does reflect that several ASEAN countries—Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia 
in particular—have been dealing with issues of political instability and/or intrastate violence or 
terrorism. One should be cautious with making any predictions about future trends regarding political 
stability as a consequence of climate change, but the literature reviewed in Section 3.7 indicates that 
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environmental change can accentuate existing social tensions and resource conflicts and cause 
greater intra- and inter-state migration movements which may contribute to political instability or, in 
the worst case, even intra- and inter-state conflicts. As highlighted before, climate change is 
worsening heat and water stress in large parts of Southeast Asia. Not only will a more frequent 
occurrence of drought cause water shortages, sea level rise will cause an intrusion of saltwater into 
coastal and groundwater resources, threatening supplies of fresh water for drinking and irrigation. 
Figure 34: Political stability and absence of violence and/or terrorism, 2018 
 
Note: The indicator measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including 
terrorism. Estimate gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from 
approximately –2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank 2019). 
There are already numerous examples of prolonged droughts that had devastating effects on 
livelihoods in Southeast Asia. A severe drought in 2010 saw the water level of the Mekong River falling 
to its lowest level in 50 years and affected at least 7.6 million people in 59 of Thailand’s 76 provinces 
(Marks 2011). A prolonged drought from early 2015 to mid-2016 caused “an increased level of food 
insecurity” that affected around 2.5 million people in 18 out of 25 provinces in Cambodia (FAO 2016). 
Over the last decades, Indonesia also experienced several severe droughts that reduced harvests and 
threatened food security, including extreme droughts in 1998 (which worsened the socioeconomic 
situation at a time when Indonesia was facing the economic fallout from the Asian financial crisis) and 
in 2015 (which caused food shortages in 16 of Indonesia’s 34 provinces) (FAO 1998, Dagur 2015). In 
2019, Indonesia’s Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics Agency warned that a longer and more 
intensive dry season that year could threaten food security (Jakarta Post 2019). Rising food prices and 
food shortages can fuel social tensions and unrest.  
Environmental change has already exacerbated social tensions in some areas. For instance, water 
shortages in Viet Nam gave rise to local conflicts between farmers and other stakeholders (Van Huynh 
et al. 2019). Examining the case of northern Myanmar, Borras, Franco, and Nam (2020) highlight that 
climate change and land are linked politically, and show how land rush can incite old and new 
conflicts both between states and within societies. In an analysis of climate impacts on Thailand, 
Marks (2011) asserts that climate change will exacerbate the socioeconomic gap between the capital 
and underdeveloped rural regions, particularly the northeast, and heighten class-related tensions. 
Social tensions in Thailand may be compounded by internal migration to urban centers and the influx 
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of climate refugees from poorer neighboring countries (ADB 2012).33 In Viet Nam, between 2008 and 
2015 more than 2 million people were internally displaced by natural hazards (Anh, Leonardelli, and 
Dipierri 2016). 
Climate change is worsening competition over shared water resources, both within countries and 
across borders. Singapore, for one, is dependent on and vulnerable to Malaysia for its water supplies. 
Malaysia has several times threatened to cut off Singapore’s water supplies. There is also a complex 
situation around shared water resources involving many nations in the Mekong Delta region 
(European Parliament 2018), with some even worrying of a rising risk of a “water war” on the Mekong 
(Hutt 2019). The Mekong River flows from the PRC through Myanmar, the Lao PDR, Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Viet Nam and provides water, food, and livelihood to more than 60 million people 
along its banks (Shkara 2018). It has also become a source of tension between neighboring countries. 
For example, Thailand’s plans to divert water from the Mekong to irrigate agriculture in northeast 
Thailand has caused concerns in Viet Nam about resulting water shortages in the Mekong Delta. 
To reduce dependency on fossil energy, countries have been turning to generating hydropower, 
which can give rise to water conflicts (Klöpper 2008). The PRC has already built several hydroelectric 
dams along the Mekong, and more are being planned. The Lao PDR has also constructed numerous 
dams in its quest to export hydroelectricity. The construction of dams often requires large-scale 
displacement of people, which can cause friction and new land and resource conflicts elsewhere. 
Moreover, dams have downstream effects as they disrupt the natural cycle and reduce variations 
between wet and dry seasons, with adverse effects on agricultural production along the riverbanks 
(European Parliament 2018). Dams also disrupt migration of fish along the river, with potentially 
adverse effects for fishery. A report by US intelligence agencies has raised concerns that water 
conflicts along the Mekong would be aggravated by climate change, reducing regional food security, 
and negatively impacting livelihoods, thereby fueling instability and regional tensions (NIC 2012). The 
same report also highlighted the potential to use water as a leverage over neighboring countries or 
even as a weapon, “with more powerful upstream nations impeding or cutting off downstream flow” 
or governments using water “to pressure populations and suppress separatist elements”  
(NIC 2012, 4). 
Marginalized people are more vulnerable to climate disasters. Regions that face high levels of disaster 
risk and high economic losses due to disaster tend to cope also with high inequalities of income and 
opportunity, which can incite social and political tensions. According to UNESCAP (2020), on average 
the richest quintile of populations in Southeast Asia are 49% less likely to live in high multi-hazard risk 
areas than the poorest quintile. UNESCAP (2020) highlights that disaster risk can perpetuate 
inequality and poverty and estimates that 13 million people across ASEAN will remain in extreme 
poverty by 2030 because of vulnerability to disasters. 
Jasparro and Taylor (2008, 232) highlight that climate change could enlarge potential vulnerability to 
transnational security threats across Southeast Asia as “livelihood and social systems will be 
pressured, while state and civil society capacity will be strained.” (see also Moran 2011). This could 
strengthen substate networks and enhance violence, crime, smuggling, trafficking, and terrorism, 
among others. Climate change can also alter the causes and dynamics of violent conflict in Southeast 
Asia (Nordqvist and Krampe 2018). Increased poverty and reduced state capacity as outcomes of 
climate-related impacts may provide functional space for terrorist groups to flourish (Smith 2007). A 
loss of livelihood in coastal areas could also give rise to piracy and threaten maritime security 
(Germond and Mazaris 2019). 
 
33  In Indonesia, flood risk in Jakarta led to the government’s decision (now postponed) to relocate the capital city to Borneo. 
This has been described as “one of the first examples of systematic, mass migration expected to occur linked to the 
climate change crisis” (Van de Vuurst and Escobar 2020, 1). 
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Overall, this review suggests that potential impacts of unmitigated climate change could indeed 
destabilize societies by diminishing economic progress in parts of Southeast Asia. The likelihood that 
this could affect sovereign risk are higher for countries which are already facing issues of political 
instability and/or intrastate violence or cross-border tensions of resources. 
Governments across ASEAN need to work toward climate-proofing their economies and public 
finances. In addition, scalable social safety nets should be promoted further in Southeast Asia to 
enable a rapid transmission of financial support to targeted populations following climate-related 
disasters. At the level of the corporate sector, more efforts need to be made in ASEAN to incorporate 
science-based targets into business models. ASEAN may consider launching its own regional initiative, 
similar to the global ‘Climate Action 100+’ initiative, targeting regional corporate greenhouse gas 
emitters. Related to this, given the interconnectedness of supply chains in Southeast Asia, the 
corporate sector in the region should be encouraged to clean up their supply chains though the 
adoption of regional, industry carbon emission standards, as well as financial instruments such as 
transition bonds. In addition, pension funds in ASEAN should be encouraged to champion the 
promotion of climate change adjusted investment into their portfolios for the region, such as 
currently takes places with major pension funds in the US and Europe. 
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5. Climate Risk and Sovereign Bond Yields: 
An Econometric Analysis 
 
While there is a rich body of literature analyzing the drivers of the price of sovereign risk, studies have 
focused on macroeconomic fundamentals as well as international financial contagion. Only recently, a 
new strand of the literature has emerged that tries to empirically assess the link between climate 
change and sovereign risk. The first study to systematically analyze the impact of climate change on 
the cost of sovereign capital is Kling et al. (2018) who show that countries particularly vulnerable to 
climate change incur a risk premium on their sovereign debt, reducing their fiscal capacity for 
investments in climate adaptation and resilience.34 In this chapter, we present new research that 
investigates the relationship between climate vulnerability, resilience and the sovereign cost of capital 
further, using improved data. 
5.1  Overview and main findings 
Using a sample of 40 developed and emerging economies—many of which are particularly vulnerable 
to climate risks due to their geographical location and exposure to climate hazards—econometric 
evidence is provided to show that climate risks and resilience to these risks have significant effects on 
the cost of sovereign borrowing. In particular, higher climate risk vulnerability leads to significant rises 
in the cost of sovereign borrowing. Premia on sovereign bond yields amount to around 275 basis 
points for economies highly exposed to climate risk, compared to 155 basis points for ASEAN, and 
113 basis points for EMEs overall. In contrast, exposure to climate risk is not statistically significant for 
advanced economies overall. As regards resilience to climate risk, this is statistically significant in 
reducing bond yields across all country groups, although with magnitudes of less than 10 basis points. 
Our analysis confirms that climate vulnerability has significant implications for sovereign borrowing 
costs, and that the direct effects of climate change matter substantially more than climate risk 
resilience. Furthermore, our results confirm and quantify the magnitude of the much larger effect on 
bond yields for countries deemed highly vulnerable to climate change. Finally, impulse response 
analysis suggests that the reaction of bond yields to shocks imposed on climate vulnerability and 
resilience become permanent after around 12 quarters, and that high-risk economies experience 
larger permanent effects on yields than other country groups. 
5.2  Climate risk vulnerability, resilience to climate risk,  
and the cost of sovereign borrowing  
Across the sample of 40 developed and emerging economies used in our econometric work,35 
Figure 35 and Figure 36 demonstrate the relationship between sovereign bond yields and two 
measure climate risk: climate risk vulnerability and climate risk resilience. To measure climate 
vulnerability, we use a refined measure of the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) 
vulnerability index developed by Kling et al. (2020). The refined vulnerability measure comprises all of 
the components from the ND-GAIN vulnerability index that are not highly related to economic 
variables in order to mitigate against endogeneity concerns.36 Data for climate resilience were kindly 
 
34  See also Buhr et al. (2018). In a related study, Kling et al. (2020) use firm-level data and find that climate vulnerability also 
affects the cost of corporate financing and access to finance, controlling for various firm-specific and macroeconomic 
factors. 
35  Please refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for the list of countries. 
36  The original ND-GAIN vulnerability index (Chen et al. 2015) comprises three core measures: (i) the extent to which an 
economy is exposed to significant climate change from a biophysical perspective; (ii) the degree to which an economy is 
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provided by FTSE Russell. This indicator refers to the extent to which an economy has measures in 
place to address exposure to climate risks. 
Figure 35: Cost of sovereign debt and climate risk vulnerability, 2002–2017 
 
RoW = rest of the world. 
Note: High risk countries denote those countries that are in the highest quartile for exposure to climate risk. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Bloomberg, FTSE Russell, ND-GAIN (2020), and Kling et al. (2020). 
 Figure 36: Cost of sovereign debt and climate risk resilience, 2002–2018 
 
RoW = rest of the world. 
Note: High-risk countries denote those countries that are in the highest quartile for exposure to climate risk. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Bloomberg, FTSE Russell, ND-GAIN (2020), and Kling et al. (2020). 
 
dependent upon sectors that are particularly sensitive to climate change; and (iii) the extent of an economy’s adaptive 
capacity to climate change. This measure can therefore be interpreted as an overall measure reflecting both physical and 
transition climate-related risks. We use the refined measure by Kling et al. (2020) which strips out measures that are 
highly correlated with macroeconomic variables, so that the new vulnerability index is less correlated with countries’ 
financial or economic conditions, which might cause endogeneity. 
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Figure 37 shows that vulnerability to climate risk is positively related to sovereign bond yields. This 
appears to be particularly the case for emerging economies (EMEs) in the high-risk category, i.e. 
countries in the top quartile for climate risk exposure. In Figure 37 also displays a negative 
relationship between yields and resilience. Economies that have in place measures that enable them 
to combat the negative effects of climate change tend to have lower sovereign bond yields. The 
positive relationship between bond yields and climate risk vulnerability, and the negative relationship 
between bond yields and climate risk resilience, also holds across our sample of countries grouped 
according to region and high risk. 
Figure 37: Sovereign bond yields, climate risk, and resilience by country grouping 
 
Note: Red line refers to the government bond yield in percent. Blue dashed line refers to the vulnerability. Dark Green dashed line 
refers to the resilience. 
Source: Compiled by authors with data from Bloomberg, FTSE Russell, ND-GAIN (2020), and Kling et al (2020). 
Having established the directional priors for the relationship between sovereign bond yields and 
climate risk vulnerability, and climate risk resilience, we then conduct a formal econometric analysis, 
based on the methodology described in Box 3. 
5.3  Empirical results 
The results from our empirical analysis provide evidence that the cost of sovereign borrowing is 
particularly exposed to climate risk vulnerability, while resilience to climate risk has only a very small 
(but statistically significant) effect on sovereign bond yields. Figure 38 plots, for the full sample of 
40 countries as well as sub-groups, the coefficients of the two climate risk measures from the panel 
model estimation described in the methodology.37 
  
 
37  For purposes of exposition, we present only the coefficients of the climate risk measures. Please refer to Table A.2 in the 
Appendix for the full set of coefficients across all regressors. 
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Figure 38: The impact of climate risk vulnerability and climate risk resilience  
on the cost of sovereign borrowing 
 
EME = emerging economies. 
Note: The y-axis refers to the climate risk coefficients from the estimation of the panel model on sovereign 
bond yields, expressed in basis points. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Box 3: Methodology and data 
In order to empirically test the relationship between the cost of sovereign borrowing and climate risk, we 
employ two econometric approaches. First, using a quarterly data frequency, we use a fixed effects panel 
model over the period from 2002Q1 to 2018Q4 across 40 developed and emerging economies. As well as a 
subpanel for the member countries of ASEAN, we also examine a subpanel based on economies 
characterized as having high climate-related risks, defined as being in the top quartile for risk exposure. The 
panel model estimated enables us to assess the effect of climate risk vulnerability and resilience to climate 
risk on sovereign bond yields, controlling for a large set of domestic macroeconomic factors and two global 
factors. Second, a structural panel vector autoregression (VAR)_ is used to examine the response of 
sovereign bond yields to shocks to climate vulnerability and resilience. Crucially, these shocks also control 
for a range of macroeconomic fundamentals and global factors. The panel SVAR is implemented across the 
same 40 countries as in stage one, but over the period from 2007Q1 to 2017Q4 in a balanced setup. 
Drawing on the literature that examines the drivers of sovereign bond yields and the price of sovereign risk, 
the domestic macroeconomic controls include the current account balance/GDP, public debt/GDP, the fiscal 
balance/GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, and a domestic crisis dummy. The global factors comprise the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index (VIX) as a measure of global financial market uncertainty 
and US sovereign bond yields. These variables have been attained from Bloomberg, the IMF International 
Financial Statistics, the OECD, and China Economic Database (CEIC). Regarding the climate vulnerability 
indicator, data for vulnerability to climate risk are taken from a refined version of the ND-GAIN vulnerability 
index developed by Kling et al. (2020). The refined vulnerability measure comprises all of the components 
from the ND-GAIN vulnerability index that are not highly related to economic variables in order to mitigate 
against endogeneity concerns.  Data for climate resilience are from FTSE Russell. This indicator refers to the 
extent to which an economy has measures in place to address exposure to climate risks.  
For further details on the methodology employed and data used, please refer to the Appendix. In addition, a 
technical background paper upon which the analysis is based is available (Beirne, Renzhi, and Volz 2020a). 
For country-specific analysis for ASEAN countries see Beirne, Renzhi, and Volz (2020b). 
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Across all countries as a whole, controlling for domestic and global factors, it is clear that vulnerability 
and resilience to climate risks have significant effects on sovereign bond yields. Increases in 
vulnerability and lower resilience to climate risks lead to rises in bond yields. As shown in Figure 38, 
the premium on sovereign bond yields from rising climate risk vulnerability is highest for the high-risk 
group at 275 basis points, compared to 155 basis points for ASEAN and 113 basis points for other 
EMEs. The effect of vulnerability on bond yields for developed economies is not statistically 
significant. As regards climate risk resilience, the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is 
substantially lower than that of climate risk vulnerability, with higher resilience associated with 
declines in bond yields by fewer than 10 basis points across all country groups.  
The results are striking in two main ways. First, it is apparent that vulnerability to climate risk matters 
substantially more for the cost of sovereign borrowing than resilience to climate risk. In other words, 
exposure to the direct effects of climate change remains key, with a sizable and significant impact on 
the cost of sovereign debt for developing and emerging economies. Improving resilience efforts 
further may help to combat exposure to these direct effects and hence bring down the cost of 
sovereign financing. Second, it is clear that the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is notably 
higher for economies that are more exposed to climate risks. In particular, the effect on bond yields 
for the high risk group is higher than for EMEs as a whole by a factor of about three, and higher than 
for ASEAN by a factor of around two. Our findings therefore suggest that those economies that are 
particularly exposed to climate change and have the greatest need for resilience investment face the 
highest climate risk premium on their sovereign borrowing costs. Given that a significant share of the 
financing of adaptation and vulnerability reduction measures would have to be borne by the public 
sector, a higher cost of borrowing could severely hamper these crucial investments. The results from 
our empirical analysis are also robust to alternative measures of climate risk vulnerability, namely the 
FTSE Russell measures for physical and transition climate risks. 
As regard to the results from the impulse response analysis, we find that across the sample of 
40 countries, sovereign bond yields respond positively to a positive shock imposed on climate risk 
vulnerability, and negatively to a positive shock on resilience, in line with economic intuition. The 
shock becomes permanent after around 12 quarters. The direction of the effect of the shocks on 
bond yields is consistent across each of our sub-panels. Moreover, and in line with our stage one 
analysis, the magnitude of the effect on bond yields is notably larger for economies in the high 
risk category.38  
For the high-risk economies, the upward effect on yields of the vulnerability shock peaks at around  
six quarters, while for ASEAN and other EMEs, the peak is reached at a longer duration of around  
15–18 quarters, albeit with lower magnitudes. The upward reaction of developed economy bond 
yields also peaks after around six quarters. For shocks to climate risk resilience, the downward 
response of yields is most pronounced after around six quarters for EMEs, ASEAN, and the high risk 
group, with developed economy bond yields peaking downward much more quickly after around two 
quarters. Given that the effect of climate risk vulnerability and resilience to climate risk on sovereign 
bond yields is not transitory and does not subside over time, this underscores the importance for 
policy makers to ramp up efforts aimed at mitigating the effects of physical climate risks. Without 
such action, the negative ramifications for fiscal sustainability and, as a result, economic growth could 
be substantial. 
 
38  Please refer to Figure A.1 in the Appendix for further details on the SVAR impulse response results. 
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6. What Are the Implications for  
Macrofinancial Governance? 
 
From the preceding analysis it should be clear that climate change can have a material impact on 
sovereign risk. However, both the analysis of the various transmission channels in Chapter 3 and the 
illustration of these risk channels for the countries of Southeast Asia in Chapter 4 have shown the 
complexity of the nexus between climate change and sovereign risk. Just as it is impossible to capture 
these medium- to long-term risks adequately in a handful of indicators or develop a comprehensive 
model that will reliably forecast sovereign risk, there are no easy policy fixes. Appropriate public 
policy responses will have to comprise a broad range of measures to minimize macrofinancial risk, 
while at the same time building capacities to better manage risk and developing contingency plans. 
Efforts have to involve all parts of government, including monetary and financial authorities. 
The five areas in which climate-related financial risks should be addressed in a coordinated 
manner are: 
1. conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and develop a national adaptation plan; 
2. mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management; 
3. adjust monetary and prudential frameworks to account for climate risks; 
4. implement financial sector policies to scale-up investment in climate adaptation and 
resilience and develop insurance solutions; and 
5. provide international support to mitigate and manage climate-related sovereign risk. 
6.1  Conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and develop  
a national adaptation plan 
The starting point ought to be a comprehensive vulnerability assessment, where all sources of 
vulnerability for the macroeconomy, the financial system, and public finances are systematically 
assessed and possible actions are considered. A vulnerability assessment should comprise a scenario 
analysis of climate and socioeconomic change and address both physical and transition risks. 
Importantly, it needs to consider short-term and long-term risks, including those usually beyond the 
horizon of policy makers. Such an assessment could be conducted by a dedicated national climate risk 
board that should include the central bank and supervisor along with key government departments 
responsible for finance, economy, planning, agriculture, among others. It should also seek input from 
science and civil society. The vulnerability assessment should form the basis for a number of 
subsequent, coordinated actions aimed at mitigating and managing climate-related sovereign risks. 
Vulnerability to climate change is defined by the IPCC as “[t]he degree to which a system is 
susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability 
and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to 
which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity.” (McCarthy et al. 2001, 995). 
Vulnerability is dynamic and depends on adaptation strategies taken in response to the exposure. A 
vulnerability assessment shall help to recognize the degree to which a system is subject to potential 
risks, the likely impacts, and how capably it can cope with these. A vulnerability assessment needs to 
identify the major macrofinancial risks discussed in Chapter 3, their likelihood under different 
scenarios, and the priority with which they should be dealt. Vulnerability assessments ought to be a 
continuous process that will get refined over time as methodologies and data availability improve. 
Indeed, trying to improve the availability and accuracy of various climate vulnerability indicators 
needs to be a key component of the vulnerability assessment process. Based on an assessment of the 
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level of exposure to the various risks, it needs to consider possible responses that will help to 
minimize or avoid risk. These will form an adaptation strategy.  
Many countries have already established a national climate change commission or committee on 
climate change policy that has developed or is working toward a national adaptation plan (NAP). The 
NAP process was established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) under the Cancun Adaptation Framework to feed into nationally determined contribution 
(NDC) adaptation goals. NAPs are meant “as a means of identifying medium- and long-term 
adaptation needs and developing and implementing strategies and programmes to address those 
needs” (UNFCCC 2020b). Adaptation processes are continuous, progressive, and iterative (Figure 39). 
The bodies developing NAPs usually include finance ministries, given the fiscal implications, but in 
most cases central banks and supervisors are not involved as climate change was until recently 
considered to be outside their remit. However, it is crucial that monetary and financial authorities 
contribute to the development of NAPs to make sure that macrofinancial risks are properly accounted 
for in vulnerability assessments and also that appropriate strategies to reduce and manage 
macrofinancial risks are adequately included in the NAPs.  
Figure 39: Adaptation cycle under the United Nations climate change regime 
 
Source: Compiled by authors based on UNFCCC (2020a). 
6.2  Mainstream climate risk analysis in public financial management 
Climate change requires extending time horizons in public administration. To this end, it is of  
crucial importance that financial planning extends beyond the annual budgeting cycle, and that 
administrations consider the potential impacts of climate change on the medium- to long-term quality 
and sustainability of public finances. To mitigate climate-related sovereign risks, climate risks need to 
be considered at all levels of public financial management. 
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Vulnerability assessments should feed into macroeconomic impact analysis and forecasting, which are 
an integral part of the annual budget process. However, it is important that the analysis and the 
budget planning goes beyond the short term and includes also medium- and long-term risks to the 
budget, so that potential risks on both the expenditure and revenue side are identified. As in the 
vulnerability assessment, both physical and transition risks should be considered. Moreover, finance 
ministries need to enhance transparency, develop their budgetary instruments, enhance public sector 
funding and debt management strategies, and diversify government revenue streams away from 
high-risk sectors. 
Disclose and analyze climate risks 
As part of its recommendations for fiscal risk analysis and management, the IMF’s (2019b, 3) Fiscal 
Transparency Code recommends that “governments should disclose, analyze, and manage risks to the 
public finances and ensure effective coordination of fiscal decision-making across the public sector”. 
Among the specific risks to public finances that “should be regularly monitored, disclosed, and 
managed”, the IMF lists “the volume and value of major natural resource assets under different price 
and extraction scenarios”, as well as “the main fiscal risks from natural disasters” (IMF 2019b, 14–15). 
Regarding the former, it will be important to include stranded asset risk facing resource rich 
countries. More broadly, all of the risk channels discussed earlier need to be considered. 
The IMF recommends the systematic incorporation of natural disaster risks into the budget process 
with a medium-term perspective (Cevik and Huang 2018). It also recommends the analysis of disaster 
risks in the context of a fiscal risk statement as part of the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (Cevik and 
Huang 2018).39 The IMF’s Fiscal Transparency Code also recommends that governments regularly 
publish “multiple scenarios for the sustainability of the main fiscal aggregates and any health and 
social security funds over at least the next 30 years using a range of macroeconomic, demographic, 
natural resource, or other assumptions” as part of a Long-term Fiscal Sustainability Analysis (IMF 
2019b, 13). Going forward, all major climate risks should become a central part of such a long-term 
fiscal sustainability analysis, which should become standard procedure for all countries. For the time 
being, only a few countries conduct meaningful long-term fiscal sustainability analysis, and many 
countries lack the capacity and expertise to do so. Hence, it will be important that the IMF and other 
international financial institutions contribute to the development of such capacities. 
Develop budgetary instruments to account for climate risk 
Building on fiscal risk analysis, budget planning should build in fiscal buffers for climate-related risks. 
The most commonly used budgetary instruments for ex ante disaster financing are contingency lines 
and disaster, reserve or contingency savings funds (Cevik and Huang 2018, Schuler et al. 2019). 
Contingent credit lines are offered by international financial institutions to support relief, recovery, 
and reconstruction efforts after natural disasters. Contingency savings funds have been created in 
countries facing high risk of natural disasters. Countries may also seek insurance and risk transfer 
solutions, for example through parametric insurance for weather-related risks or catastrophe 
insurance schemes that spread risks across countries.40 
  
 
39  The World Bank also recommends incorporating forward-looking assessments of future climate shocks into the scenario 
analysis that provides the basis of fiscal risks statements (Schuler et al. 2019). 
40  Parametric insurance pays a fixed amount when a qualifying event occurs. A prominent example of a multi-country 
catastrophe insurance scheme is the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility. However, a weakness of such regional 
schemes is that countries tend to face the same risks, which make it important to broaden risk pools (Schuler et al. 2019). 
What Are the Implications for Macrofinancial Governance? 
93 
Mainstream and integrate climate framework, policies, and laws into national  
and sectoral budgets 
Going further, long-term budget planning needs to account for the estimated costs of NAPs and 
climate policies more broadly, including for mitigation, as laid out in country NDCs. Public financial 
management should mainstream and integrate national climate policies and legislation in the 
budgetary process (EFI, CPI, and UNDP 2019). In particular, it needs to ensure that spending is 
redirected from activities that are not aligned with the national climate finance strategy to activities 
that are consistent. Two tools that can support the mainstreaming of climate policies in budgets are 
climate budget tagging, where all climate-relevant budget expenditures are marked, and climate 
public expenditure and institutional reviews, which are a systematic qualitative and quantitative 
assessments of a government’s public expenditures, policies, and institutional frameworks regarding 
climate change (EFI, CPI, and UNDP 2019). 
Develop public sector funding and debt management strategies 
Climate risks should also be integrated in public sector funding and debt management strategies. For 
developing countries, international climate finance is an important source of funding for adaptation 
and mitigation investment. In countries that are vulnerable to climate hazards or other natural 
shocks, governments can issue debt instruments with risk-sharing features that would help them to 
better manage risks. For instance, governments can include natural disaster or “hurricane” clauses in 
new public debt instruments. These stipulate that capital and/or interest payments are deferred in 
the event of a pre-defined disaster. During a debt restructuring in 2015, Grenada was the first country 
to pioneer a hurricane clause in its bonds. Barbados has also included a natural disaster clause in 
most of its new public debt to increase financial resilience (Anthony, Impavido, and van Selm 2020; 
Shutter 2020). Together with the IMF and the World Bank, the International Capital Market 
Association, a trade association for participants in the capital markets, has developed indicative terms 
and conditions for sovereign hurricane-linked bonds and loans (IMF 2020, ICMA 2020). Disaster 
clauses could be promoted as the new standard in sovereign debt. Governments could also issue 
GDP-linked bonds (Benford, Ostry, and Shiller 2018), a risk-sharing debt instrument that extends 
beyond disaster risks. 
Diversify government revenue streams away from high-risk sectors 
Last but not least, public finance needs to fund, support, and incentivize investment in adaptation and 
resilience that will help to reduce a country’s exposure and vulnerability to climate risks (Forni, 
Catalano, and Pezzolla 2019). An important area are public investments in climate-resilient 
infrastructure (OECD, World Bank, and UN Environment 2018). Moreover, fiscal policy should help to 
advance structural change to diversify the economy out of climate-sensitive activities (Schuler et al. 
2019). This is particularly relevant for economies whose prosperity depends to a large extent on fossil 
fuels that are likely to be stranded (Cust, Manley, and Cecchinato 2017). Governments also need to 
develop effective social safety nets to cushion adverse physical and transition impacts on the 
population, especially more vulnerable groups. Governments should also seek to climate-proof public 
assets to reduce the direct exposure to possible future losses (Bonen et al. 2016) and lessen the 
dependency of their own revenue streams on climate-sensitive activities. 
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For the time being, most governments are in early stages of climate-proofing public finances. But 
awareness is rising, as shown by the formation of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate 
Action, which was launched in April 2019 and which now comprises 52 countries that represent 30% 
of global GDP and that are responsible for 16% of global CO2 emissions. In the Helsinki Principles, the 
Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action (2019) has committed to “[t]ake climate change into 
account in macroeconomic policy, fiscal planning, budgeting, public investment management, and 
procurement practices”.41 Likewise, the finance ministries of the Climate Vulnerable Forum—a group 
of 48 countries vulnerable to climate change—work together to address climate-related challenges 
and mobilize support from the international community. 
6.3  Adjust monetary and prudential frameworks to account for climate risks 
Central banks and financial supervisors need to play an important role in supporting governments in 
analyzing macrofinancial risks arising from climate change. But they also need to address climate-
related risks in their monetary and prudential frameworks and operations. Mainstreaming climate-
financial risk assessment in financial contracts is crucial for aligning finance flows with a pathway 
toward low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, as stipulated in Article 2.1c 
of the Paris Agreement. Financing the global energy transition and low-carbon, sustainable 
development requires the mainstreaming of climate-financial risk assessment in financial contracts 
and substantial changes in financial governance (UNEP Inquiry 2016; Volz 2017; Battiston, Mandel, 
and Monasterolo 2019; Dikau and Volz 2020). Importantly, monetary and financial authorities need to 
fully integrate climate risks into their prudential and monetary frameworks. 
Central banks and supervisors need to implement a comprehensive agenda for addressing climate-
related risks (Monasterolo and Volz 2020). Such an agenda should include the mandatory disclosure 
of climate and other sustainability risks across the financial sector to help with better risk analysis, 
require financial institutions to conduct regular climate stress-testing that considers multiple 
transition scenarios, and the integration of climate-related financial risks into prudential supervision. 
The implementation of prudential instruments that account for climate risks is imperative to minimize 
the potential build-up of additional risks in portfolios. 
Table 22 shows a toolbox with three broad categories of measures—monetary, prudential, and 
other—covering nine types of tools that central banks and supervisors could employ to minimize 
climate-related risks for individual financial institutions and the financial system at large and to 
support the scaling-up of investment in climate adaptation and mitigation (Dikau, Robins, and Volz 
2020). Not all instruments will be adequate for all countries, but a discussion is needed among central 
banks and supervisors on how their operational frameworks and policy tools can be adapted to 
mitigate climate risks and support a low-carbon transition of the economies they serve. 
  
 
41  The shared Principles of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action were drafted in Helsinki in February 2019. 
The six Helsinki Principles are: 1. Align our policies and practices with the Paris Agreement commitments; 2. Share our 
experience and expertise with each other in order to provide mutual encouragement and promote collective 
understanding of policies and practices for climate action; 3. Work towards measures that result in effective carbon 
pricing; 4. Take climate change into account in macroeconomic policy, fiscal planning, budgeting, public investment 
management, and procurement practices; 5. Mobilize private sources of climate finance by facilitating investments and 
the development of a financial sector which supports climate mitigation and adaptation; and 6. Engage actively in the 
domestic preparation and implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris 
Agreement (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action 2019). 
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Table 22: Toolbox of sustainable monetary policy, prudential, and other measures  
for central banks and supervisors 
 Conventional (sustainability-blind) 
calibration Sustainability-enhanced calibration 
1. Monetary policy 
(1) Collateral 
frameworks 
• Collateral credit quality is assessed based 
on conventional methods, perpetuating 
exposure to and market mispricing of 
climate risks and carbon bias and 
maintaining financing conditions for 
industries not aligned with the Paris 
Agreement. 
• Collateral frameworks become carbon-neutral, take 
climate- and other sustainability-related financial risks 
into account and apply haircuts to account for these 
risks. 
• Collateral frameworks exclude asset classes that are 
not aligned with sustainability goals such as the Paris 
Agreement. 
(2) Implement 
monetary policy: 
indirect instruments 
(open market 
operations, standing 
facilities, reserve 
requirements) 
• Standard instruments such as refinancing 
operations and programs are calibrated 
without sustainability considerations, 
leading to a potential carbon bias. 
• Align refinancing operations with sustainability goals 
such as the Paris Agreement. 
• Differentiated reserve requirements, risk weights, 
accounting for carbon footprint, climate-related 
financial risk (particularly transition risks), or other 
sustainability factors. 
• Interest rates based on sustainability criteria. 
(3) Nonstandard 
instruments 
• Asset purchase programs ignore climate- 
and other sustainability-related financial 
risks, perpetuating financial markets’ 
exposure to climate risks and carbon 
bias. 
• Direct (short-term) credit to the 
government to support standard fiscal 
spending. 
• Helicopter money without conditionality. 
• Asset purchase programs exclude carbon-intensive 
assets. 
• Direct (short-term) credit to the government to 
support sustainable and/or Paris Agreement-aligned 
fiscal policies. 
• Purchase of green sovereign bonds. 
• Helicopter money conditioned on sustainable and/or 
Paris Agreement-aligned spending. 
(4) Direct credit 
allocation 
instruments* 
• Direct controls on interest rates (e.g. 
minimum and maximum interest rates, 
preferential rates for certain loan 
categories). 
• Credit ceilings (at aggregate level or on 
individual banks). 
• Directed lending policies (e.g. 
preferential central bank refinance 
facilities to direct credit to priority 
sectors). 
• Window guidance and/or moral suasion 
to promote priority sectors. 
• Credit interest rate ceilings for sustainable priority 
sectors, asset classes, and firms. 
• Minimum and/or maximum allocation of credit 
through credit ceilings or quotas to restrict and/or 
promote lending to carbon-intensive and/or 
sustainable sectors 
• Targeted refinancing lines to promote credit for 
sustainable sectors. 
• Window guidance and/or moral suasion to promote 
lending to sustainable sectors. 
2. Financial stability: Regulation and supervision 
(5) Microprudential 
instruments 
• Conventional stress testing and/or 
excessive delay of climate-stress testing. 
• No disclosure requirements for climate-
related financial risks. 
• Standard supervisory review process. 
• Conventional calibration of other Basel III 
instruments. 
• Stress testing frameworks that acknowledge climate 
and other sustainability risks and help firms take into 
account longer-term risks. 
• Mandatory disclosure requirements for climate-related 
financial risks or other sustainability risks. 
• Supervisory review process that highlights 
management of climate-related financial risks or other 
sustainability risks. 
• Climate risk-sensitive calibration of other Basel III 
instruments, distinguishing between low-carbon and 
carbon-intensive and/or high-exposure assets to 
create buffers against climate-related losses (e.g. 
differential risk-based capital requirements, lower 
required stable funding factor for green loans). 
continued on next page 
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Table 22 continued 
 Conventional (sustainability-blind) 
calibration Sustainability-enhanced calibration 
(6) Macroprudential 
instruments 
• Conventional system-wide stress testing. 
• Calibration of instruments along the 
cyclical dimension without explicit 
acknowledgment of climate-related 
financial risks.  
• Calibration of instruments along the 
cross-sectional dimension without 
explicit acknowledgment of climate-
related financial risks. 
• System-wide stress testing that acknowledges and 
assesses systemic climate-related financial risks. 
• Cyclical instruments calibrated to account for and 
mitigate systemic risk implications of climate change 
and restrain the build-up of risk-taking during the 
recovery and/or expansion phase (e.g. countercyclical 
and higher capital buffer in order to protect the 
financial sector from periods of excessive carbon-
intensive credit growth, loan-to-value ratios and loan-
to-income ratios to limit the extension of credit by 
banks to carbon-intensive industries and investment in 
non-sustainable asset classes).  
• Cross-sectional instruments calibrated to account for 
and mitigate systemic risk implications of climate 
change and to mitigate individual institutions’ 
contribution to systemic risk (e.g. large exposure 
restrictions to limit financial institutions’ exposure to 
high carbon-intensive assets, capital surcharges for 
systemically important financial institutions and 
institutions with high exposure to carbon-intensive 
assets). 
3. Other policies 
(7) Further financing 
schemes and other 
initiatives 
• Corporate financing facilities or loan 
guarantees without climate or 
sustainability conditionality. 
• Financial sector bailouts without climate 
or sustainability conditionality. 
• Corporate financing facilities or loan guarantees 
subject to reduction of CO2 emissions or sustainability 
enhancing activities. 
• Incorporation of sustainability considerations into 
bailout packages in case of partial or full 
nationalization of financial institutions. 
• Funding sustainable lending and/or investment 
schemes by public banks and development finance 
institutions (e.g. for renewable energy or retrofitting of 
buildings) through refinancing credit lines or purchase 
of bonds under asset purchase programs in secondary 
market or direct refinancing operations. 
• Tailoring of supervisory frameworks for development 
banks to enhance their public policy capacity to bear 
risk, promote economic transformation. 
(8) Management of 
central bank 
portfolios 
• Management of central bank portfolios 
without consideration of climate change 
and other sustainability risks. 
• Disclosure of climate-related financial risks in own 
portfolios. 
• Adopting sustainable and responsible investment 
principles for portfolio management. 
(9) Supporting 
sustainable finance 
 • Sustainable finance roadmaps and/or guidance for 
financial institutions. 
• Advice and dialogue with other parts of the 
government. 
• Research and publication of handbooks and resources 
(e.g. reference scenarios, risk assessment 
methodologies). 
• Capacity building programs in sustainable finance for 
the financial sector, convening role of central banks. 
Note * Direct instruments, which are mostly relevant in the emerging market and developing economy context where 
underdeveloped financial markets permit the effective employment of indirect instruments, operate by setting or limiting either 
prices or quantities through regulations and may also be used to allocate credit. Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
calibration of many central banking and supervisory instruments can have intended or unintended consequences for the allocation 
of credit. 
Source: Dikau, Robins, and Volz (2020). 
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Reconsider the prudential treatment of sovereign exposures in financial regulation 
With respect to the prudential treatment of climate-related sovereign risks, it is important to highlight 
the relevance of sovereign assets for systemic financial stability. In many countries, a significant share 
of banking assets is invested in domestic sovereign debt, and exposures are twice as large when 
lending to subnational governments, loans and receivables, and sovereign guarantees are considered 
(Jobst and Oura 2020). Sovereign exposures of banks tend to be higher in developing and emerging 
economies (Jobst and Oura 2020)—where climate risks tend to be higher too. As previously discussed, 
sovereign risk can directly affect financial stability, and a worsening of sovereign risk can lead to a 
doom loop between worsening sovereign risk and banking risk, as seen during the euro crisis. It is 
therefore important to integrate sovereign risk into macroprudential solvency stress testing (Jobst 
and Oura 2020). For the reasons discussed throughout this report, such stress testing needs to 
integrate various climate scenarios. 
What is more, supervisors need to reconsider the treatment of sovereign exposures. As noted by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, under the current Basel regulatory framework for banks 
(Table 23), “[i]n most cases, the existing treatment of sovereign exposures is more favourable than 
[of] other asset classes” (BCBS 2017, 18). In particular, the risk-weighted framework allows 
supervisors to exert discretion “to apply a preferential risk weight for sovereign exposures 
denominated and funded in domestic currency” (BCBS 2017, 18). Moreover, the large exposures 
framework exempts banks’ exposures to sovereigns and central banks. Last but not least, no limits or 
haircuts are applied to domestic sovereign exposures that are deemed high-quality liquid assets as 
part of the liquidity standards. In other words, sovereign debt is in most cases treated as a safe asset, 
which in many cases is not a reflection of actual risk. 
Table 23: Summary of current regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures  
under the Basel regulatory framework 
Credit risk: standardized approach 
Ratings-based look-up table. 
National discretion to apply a preferential default risk weight for sovereign exposures denominated and funded in domestic 
currency. 
Credit risk: internal ratings-based approach 
Exemption of 0.03% probability of default floor for sovereign exposures.  
Credit risk: credit risk mitigation framework  
National discretion to apply a zero haircut for repo-style sovereign transactions with core market participants.  
Revised market risk framework 
Standardized approach: national discretion to apply a preferential default risk charge for sovereign exposures denominated 
and funded in domestic currency. 
Internal models approach: sovereign exposures included in models, including default risk models.  
Large exposures framework  
Exemption of sovereign exposures. 
Leverage ratio framework 
Inclusion of sovereign exposures. 
Liquidity standards 
No limits on amount of domestic sovereign debt eligible as high-quality liquid assets, with no haircuts applied.  
Source: BCBS (2017). 
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Even in the absence of climate risk, the treatment of sovereign debt as risk free assets is highly 
problematic. Climate change is making this even more perilous. The high-level Task Force on Climate-
related Financial Risks, which was established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 
October 2019, should consider how climate-related risks could be adequately reflected in the Basel 
framework. Likewise, regulation for the treatment of sovereign exposure for institutional investors 
should adequately reflect climate risks. 
6.4  Implement financial sector policies to scale-up investment in climate 
adaptation and resilience and develop insurance solutions 
As discussed, to minimize exposure to climate-related risks and to support the mobilization of private 
capital for adaptation and mitigation finance, financial sector activities need to be aligned with 
climate goals. Financial authorities need not only to play a role in incorporating climate risks in 
prudential and monetary policy, they also need to support the scaling-up of sustainable finance and, 
especially in developing economies, the mobilization of domestic resources for financing sustainable 
infrastructure and adaptation. 
While foreign aid and foreign private capital can be an important source of finance for development, 
it is important to acknowledge the limits to the role of foreign capital in financing infrastructure and 
the financial vulnerability risks associated with foreign private financial flows (Chen and Volz 2020). It 
is also important to make better use of domestic savings in developing and emerging economies, 
many of which invest significant amounts of their savings in low-yielding assets in the financial centers 
of developed economies. Strengthening domestic resource mobilization is therefore crucial, and 
concerted efforts to this effect are need. 
Since the emerging market crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s, progress has been made in 
developing local currency bond markets (Burger, Warnock, and Cacdac Warnock 2012; Berensmann, 
Dafe, and Volz 2015; Dafe, Essers, and Volz 2018). Yet, these are in part still very dependent on 
foreign investors. The large-scale withdrawal of international capital from emerging economies’ bond 
markets in March 2020 has once again highlighted the vulnerabilities associated with a shallow 
domestic investor base and a heavy reliance on international portfolio investors (Hofmann, Shim, and 
Shin 2020; Beirne et al. 2020). There clearly is a need to further develop local currency capital 
markets with a strong domestic investor base. Monetary and financial authorities can play an 
important role in building these markets, and make sure that these can be used for long-term 
financing of sustainable infrastructure. They can also support the development of fintech in mobilizing 
domestic savings and channeling these into sustainable investments (Chen and Volz 2020; Task Force 
on Digital Financing of the Sustainable Development Goals 2020). 
Monetary and financial authorities can play a supportive role in developing insurance markets. The 
need for governments to provide support for recovery and reconstruction will be greater if large parts 
of the economy lack insurance. Greater insurance coverage will enhance the financial resilience of 
households and businesses. As pointed out by Mechler (2014, 185), awareness has been growing that 
“there is a need for more holistically tackling commercial insurance as part of disaster risk 
management in order to address some of the primary barriers and gaps: inadequate insurance 
infrastructure, limited risk awareness, lack of solid risk management techniques, lack of insurance 
regulation and disaster laws, and a scarcity of solid information on losses as well as risks.” In the 
absence of significant public intervention, market-based insurance mechanisms are unlikely to meet 
the aspirations of loss reduction and equitable compensation as set out in the Warsaw International 
Mechanism for Loss and Damage (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2019). Financial authorities can help build 
the infrastructure for insurance services and make them affordable to poorer clients. This will help 
recovery when disasters strike—and take a burden off public finances. Financial authorities can also 
provide an enabling environment for fintech based insurance solutions. It should be emphasized, 
however, that not all risks can be insured. 
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6.5  Provide international support to mitigate and manage climate-related 
sovereign risk 
International financial institutions—including the IMF, multilateral development banks, and regional 
financing arrangements—have a special role to play in supporting member countries to address 
climate-related sovereign risks and strengthen adaptive capacity and macrofinancial resilience. 
Support is needed in technical assistance and training, surveillance and risk monitoring, financing 
adaptation and resilience, the development of insurance solutions, emergency lending and crisis 
support, and the development of an international debt resolution mechanism. 
Technical assistance and training 
International financial institutions, along with other international bodies and development agencies, 
can help develop approaches for the various policy responses discussed in this chapter, and support 
their implementation through technical assistance and training. To this end, the IMF and others need 
to strengthen their own capacity in analyzing the macrofinancial risks of climate change and lead  
by example in developing best practices for integrating climate risks in all aspects of their own 
operations. The IMF, in particular, could support its member countries’ financial and monetary 
authorities, where needed, in developing capacity to better assess climate risks, e.g. via climate stress 
testing to inform the design of prudential policies, and in mainstreaming climate risk analysis in public 
financial management. The IMF and others could also provide support to member countries in 
strengthening public debt management to enable them to better account for climate risks in public 
budgets. Importantly, governments should be supported in developing contingency plans and 
securing pre-arranged contingent financing facilities from different sources, as well as insurance-
based solutions. 
Surveillance and risk monitoring 
Conducting assessments of macrofinancial risk is at the core of the IMF’s work. In its surveillance and 
monitoring operations, which are carried out at the global, regional, and country levels, the IMF seeks 
to identify potential risks to macroeconomic and financial stability and puts forward policy 
adjustments that should support economic growth, promote financial and economic stability, and 
prevent the buildup of financial risks. At the country level, surveillance centers around the annual 
Article IV consultations. The IMF has only recently started to address climate change in some of its 
Article IV consultations with its member countries (Volz 2020a). Since the early 2010s, when climate 
change was still virtually absent from Article IV consultations, a small number of Article IV reports 
each year included substantial references to climate change. A large increase was recorded in 2019. 
However, in the vast majority of Article IV consultations, climate change and climate-related 
macroeconomic and fiscal risks still play no role. The IMF needs to make climate risk a core part of its 
surveillance and monitoring operations, and a mandatory component of all Article IV consultations. 
Moreover, the IMF could add a mandatory section on climate-related financial risks to the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program assessments it conducts together with the World Bank. Likewise, the 
joint World Bank–IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries could be enhanced by 
an analysis of the impact of climate-related risks on debt sustainability. The IMF should also include 
climate risk in its stress testing exercises (Adrian, Morsink, and Schumacher 2020). 
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Financing adaptation and resilience and developing insurance solutions 
International financial institutions need to ramp up support to climate-vulnerable countries. A rapid 
scaling-up of investment in climate resilience is a matter of urgency for the most climate vulnerable 
countries, which are also those struggling the most to finance adaptation and resilience. As shown in 
Chapter 5, the governments of climate vulnerable countries are already facing a climate risk premium 
on the cost of capital. To avoid a vicious circle in which greater climate vulnerability raises the cost of 
debt and diminishes fiscal space for investment in climate resilience, climate-vulnerable developing 
countries will need more external support for investment in climate resilience, mostly in the form of 
grants instead of loans. Moreover, international financial institutions and other development agencies 
should continue to support climate vulnerable developing countries through initiatives such as the 
InsuResilience Global Partnership for Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance in developing 
insurance and risk transfer solutions (Jarzabkowski et al. 2019). 
Emergency lending and crisis support 
The IMF and regional financing arrangements should consider how to develop their emergency 
financing facilities for supporting member countries facing balance of payment difficulties or needing 
temporary financing because of a climate-related, adverse shock to their economy. For the IMF, one 
option is to raise access under the Rapid Credit Facility and a Rapid Financing Instrument, the two IMF 
facilities meant for catastrophe situations including climate disasters. Moreover, options should be 
explored to converting these facilities into grants, particularly for low-income countries eligible to 
concessional financial support through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. A further option 
would be to establish an entirely new climate disaster emergency facility. The IMF could also explore 
ways to link a climate disaster facility to an issuance of special drawing rights, which could then 
benefit only countries hit by climate disasters. Multilateral development banks as well as national 
development banks can also assume an important role by providing countercyclical emergency 
support in times of distress. 
Develop an international debt resolution mechanism 
Last but not least, a discussion is needed around the treatment of climate debt, i.e. public debt that 
has been incurred as a direct result of climate disasters or necessary adaptation measures (Volz 
2020b). Such a discussion should consider options for adding natural disaster clauses to sovereign 
debt contracts, developing instruments such as GDP-linked bonds, and developing a new framework 
for dealing with climate debt, including a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism and debt-for-
climate swaps (Akhtar et al. 2020). 
6.6  Summary 
A multitude of actions is needed to climate proof the economies and public finances of countries 
vulnerable to climate change. Importantly, these actions need to be coordinated. Monetary and 
financial authorities will have to play a key role, working with other parts of the government and with 
international organizations in safeguarding macrofinancial stability and the sustainability of public 
finances. Table 24 provides an overview over the actions discussed in this chapter. 
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Table 24: Overview of policies to mitigate and manage climate-related sovereign risk 
1. Conduct a comprehensive vulnerability 
assessment and develop a national adaptation 
plan 
Systematic assessment of all sources of vulnerability for the 
macroeconomy, the financial system, and public finances 
Scenario analysis of climatic and socioeconomic change, addressing 
both physical and transition risks 
2. Mainstream climate risk analysis in public 
financial management 
Disclose and analyze climate risks  
Develop budgetary instruments to account for climate risk 
Mainstream and integrate climate framework, policies, and laws into 
national and sectoral budgets 
Develop public sector funding and debt management strategies, 
including debt instruments with risk-sharing features 
Diversify government revenue streams away from high-risk sectors 
3. Adjust monetary and prudential frameworks to 
account for climate risks 
Mandatory disclosure of climate and other sustainability risks 
Regular climate stress testing of financial institutions 
Integrate climate-related financial risks into prudential supervision 
Align monetary and prudential measures with climate goals 
Reconsider the prudential treatment of sovereign exposures in 
financial regulation 
4. Implement financial sector policies to scale-up 
investment in climate adaptation and resilience 
and develop insurance solutions 
Support the development of local currency bond markets for long-
term financing of climate-resilient infrastructure 
Support the development of insurance markets 
5. Provide international support to mitigate and 
manage climate-related sovereign risk 
Technical assistance and training 
Surveillance and risk monitoring 
Financing adaptation and resilience and develop insurance solutions 
Emergency lending and crisis support 
Develop an international debt resolution mechanism 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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7. Summary and Recommendations 
 
Climate change can have a material impact on sovereign risk. Global environmental change is eroding 
natural capital and natural services, undermining the foundation of economic prosperity and the 
development prospects of countries. In particular, climate change can have direct and indirect effects 
on public finances and threaten debt sustainability. This study has identified and scrutinized six 
different transmission channels through which climate change can amplify sovereign risk and worsen 
a sovereign’s standing: the fiscal impacts of climate-related disasters; the fiscal consequences of 
adaptation and mitigation policies; the macroeconomic impacts of climate change; climate-related 
risks and financial sector stability; the impacts of climate change on international trade and capital 
flows; and the impacts of climate change on political stability. 
The nexus between climate change and sovereign risk is complex. The various transmission channels 
are not independent from each other. A worsening of climate impacts in one area can magnify the 
transmission of risk through other channels. Just as the physical effects of global environmental 
change are highly complex, with tipping points and feedback loops, the socioeconomic and fiscal 
effects of climate change are multifaceted and depend on the policies taken or not taken to mitigate 
and adapt to these risks. 
This report has illustrated the relevance of the six transmission channels for sovereign risk in 
Southeast Asia, one of the most climate-vulnerable regions of the world. Southeast Asian countries 
will not only be exposed to an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, 
large parts of the region will also suffer from chronic physical impacts such as worsening heat and 
water stress and sea level rise, which are expected to significantly impact economic activity. Some 
countries, including Myanmar, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Thailand and Cambodia, are heavily exposed 
to the physical impacts of climate change and the implications these have for international 
commerce, output, employment, and public finances. Others face lower physical risk but are exposed 
to high transition risk as their exports and economies will be affected by international climate policies, 
technological change, and changing consumption patterns worldwide. Among Southeast Asian 
countries, Brunei Darussalam faces the greatest transition risk, given its reliance on fossil fuels 
exports. For sure, much more granular analysis of the macrofinancial risk resulting from climate 
change is required, but even the high-level analysis for ASEAN countries conducted in this report 
shows that the implications of climate change for macrofinancial stability and sovereign risk are likely 
to be material for most if not all of them. 
The report also presents new empirical evidence on the relationship between climate vulnerability, 
resilience, and the sovereign cost of capital. Using a sample of 40 developed and emerging 
economies, our econometric analysis shows that climate risks and resilience to these risks have 
significant effects on the cost of sovereign borrowing. In particular, higher climate risk vulnerability 
leads to significant rises in the cost of sovereign borrowing. Premia on sovereign bond yields amount 
to around 275 basis points for economies highly exposed to climate risk, compared to 155 basis 
points for ASEAN, and 113 basis points for EMEs overall. In contrast, exposure to climate risk is not 
statistically significant for the group of advanced economies. Resilience to climate risk is statistically 
significant in reducing bond yields across all country groups, but with smaller magnitudes. Overall, our 
analysis confirms that climate vulnerability has significant implications for sovereign borrowing costs, 
and that the magnitude of the effect is much larger for countries highly vulnerable to climate change. 
Impulse response analysis suggests that shocks imposed on climate vulnerability and resilience have 
permanent effects on bond yields, and that economies highly exposed to climate risks experience 
larger permanent effects on yields than economies with lower exposure. 
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All branches of government will have to address climate-related risks. Monetary and financial 
authorities will have to play crucial roles in analyzing and mitigating macrofinancial risks. We 
recommend five broad policy actions to mitigate and manage climate-related sovereign risk in a 
coordinated manner. 
First, governments need to conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and develop national 
adaptation plans. To address and mitigate climate-related sovereign risk properly, it is important to 
understand the ways in which climate change can amplify sovereign risk. To this end, a systematic 
assessment of all sources of vulnerability for the macroeconomy, the financial system, and public 
finances is needed. Along with vulnerability to climate risks, this assessment should include the 
projected change in the country’s risk exposure. This should include scenario analysis of climatic and 
socioeconomic change, addressing both physical and transition risks. Such an assessment could be 
conducted by a dedicated national climate risk board that should include the central bank and 
supervisor along with key the government departments responsible for finance, economy, planning, 
agriculture, among others. Regional bodies such as ASEAN can play an important role in facilitating 
the exchange of best practice among member countries, as they seek to understand the scale of their 
relative climate risk exposure. 
Second, and based on the vulnerability assessment, governments need to mainstream climate risk 
analysis in public financial management. This should include appropriate analysis, disclosure, and 
management of risks to public finances as well as coordination of fiscal decision-making across the 
public sector. Furthermore, governments need to develop budgetary instruments to account for 
climate risk, and mainstream and integrate climate framework, policies, and laws into national and 
sectoral budgets. Finance ministries also need to develop public sector funding and debt 
management strategies, including debt instruments with risk-sharing features, and diversify 
government revenue streams away from high-risk sectors. 
Third, central banks and financial supervisors need not only play an important role in supporting 
governments in analyzing macrofinancial risks arising from climate change. They also need to address 
climate-related risks in their monetary and prudential frameworks and operations. In particular,  
they should make disclosure of climate and other sustainability risks mandatory and conduct  
regular climate stress tests of financial institutions, fully integrate climate-related financial risks  
into prudential supervision, and align monetary and prudential measures with climate goals. 
Mainstreaming climate-financial risk assessment in financial contracts is crucial for aligning finance 
flows with a pathway toward low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. 
Importantly, supervisors should reconsider the prudential treatment of sovereign exposures in 
financial regulation. 
Fourth, governments and financial authorities should implement financial sector policies to scale-up 
investment in climate adaptation and resilience and develop insurance solutions. Especially in 
developing economies, financial authorities should seek to facilitate the mobilization of domestic 
resources for financing climate-resilient, sustainable infrastructure and other adaptation measures. 
For instance, monetary and financial authorities can play an important role in supporting the 
development of local currency bond markets for long-term financing of climate-resilient 
infrastructure. They can also support the development of fintech in mobilizing domestic savings and 
channeling these into sustainable investments. Financial authorities can also help build the 
infrastructure for insurance services—including fintech based insurance solutions—and make them 
affordable to poorer clients. Developing insurance markets and broadening insurance coverage  
can help to enhance the financial resilience of households and businesses and take the burden off 
public finances. 
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Fifth, international financial institutions—including the IMF, multilateral development banks, and 
regional financing arrangements—have a special role to play in supporting vulnerable countries to 
address climate-related sovereign risks and strengthen adaptive capacity and macrofinancial 
resilience. Building on their respective strengths, they can provide technical assistance and training, 
support surveillance and risk monitoring, provide finance for adaptation and resilience investment, 
support the development of insurance solutions, and provide emergency lending and crisis support.  
For the most climate vulnerable countries, a rapid scaling-up of investment in climate resilience is a 
matter of survival. Sadly, those who have the greatest need for investment in adaptation and 
resilience are also those who are struggling the most to finance it. As shown in this report, climate 
vulnerable developing countries are already facing a climate risk premium on the cost of capital. 
There is a risk that these countries enter a vicious circle, in which greater climate vulnerability raises 
the cost of debt and diminishes fiscal space for investment in climate resilience. As financial markets 
increasingly price climate risks, and global environmental change accelerates, the risk premia of 
climate vulnerable countries, already high, are likely to increase further. International support for 
increased investments in climate resilience and mechanisms to transfer financial risks is urgently 
needed and could help these countries to enter a virtuous circle. Greater resilience investments could 
reduce both vulnerability and the cost of debt, providing these countries with extra room to scale up 
investments to tackle the climate challenge. 
As the COVID-19 crisis is worsening public finances and as debt sustainability is threatened in 
countries around the world, it will be even more important for governments to analyze and mitigate 
climate-related sovereign risks. The pandemic has hit at a time when we have about a decade left to 
achieve a low-carbon transition and bring the world economy onto a 1.5°C trajectory (IPCC 2018). The 
next years are the last chance to avoid catastrophic global warming. Regardless, most countries also 
face a great urgency in preparing for the effects of climate change that are already underway. The 
COVID-19 crisis has revealed the vulnerability of our economies and societies—with dire 
consequences for public finances. It is imperative that the various crisis responses aimed at protecting 
jobs and boosting a recovery are coupled with longer-term, strategic goals of mitigating climate 
change and shoring up climate change adaptation and resilience (Volz 2020b). As much as possible, 
economic stimulus and recovery measures should be used to strengthen the resilience of economies 
and support a just transition. 
In many countries, climate change threatens to undermine the sustainability of public finances. 
Governments need to take urgent action to climate-proof their economies and public finances. If they 
don’t succeed in this, they will be left helpless in an ever-worsening spiral of climate vulnerability and 
unsustainable debt burdens. 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
Sample of countries 
Our analysis comprises 40 developed and emerging economies, as outlined below. 
Table A1: List of countries by grouping 
Developed Emerging ASEAN High Risk 
Australia 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Columbia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
India 
Israel 
Mexico 
Nigeria 
People’s Republic of China 
Peru 
Poland 
Republic of Korea 
Russian Federation 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
Indonesia 
India 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Philippines 
Republic of Korea 
Singapore 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Econometric approach and data 
Firstly, we estimate a fixed effects panel model with the following baseline specification: yi,t	=	βxi,t-1	+	γZi,t-1	+	χVIXt-1	+	τUSYt-1	+	CRISISi,t-1	+	δi	+	εi,t	i=1,…,N,	t=1,…,T	
where yi,t represents the government bond yield; xi,t represents a set of domestic macroeconomic 
fundamentals (current account/GDP, GDP per capita, public debt/GDP, fiscal balance/GDP, GDP 
growth); Zj denotes our climate vulnerability and resilience indicators; VIX stands for the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, a measure of global risk aversion; USY are US long-
term government bond yields; CRISIS represents the Laeven and Valencia (2018) indicator for the 
incidence of a crisis event for each country in the sample; δi are country fixed effects; and εi,t is the 
error term. The variables are lagged by one period to mitigate against endogeneity concerns.  
Secondly, a structural panel VAR is used to examine the response of sovereign bond yields to shocks 
to climate vulnerability and resilience. Crucially, these shocks control for a range of macroeconomic 
fundamentals and global factors. The panel SVAR is implemented across the same 40 countries as in 
stage one, but over the period from 2007Q1 to 2017Q4 in a balanced set-up. The panel SVAR can be 
denoted as follows in its general specification, with structural shocks identified by a recursive 
restriction: 𝐴(𝐿)𝛥𝑌D,E = 𝜀D,E	
where A(L) is the matrix of lag polynomial; Yi,t refers to the demeaned value of Xt of country i to 
accommodate country-specific fixed effects; and εi,t is a vector of structural disturbances. Following 
the setting of the previous SVAR model, we take a first-differencing form of Yi,t as ΔYi,t. The ordering of 
the variables imposed in the recursive form is the same as the previous SVAR model. The panel VAR 
includes two lags selected by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
Our identification strategy is based on a block recursive restriction (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Evans 1999), which results in the following matrix A to fit a just-identified model: 
𝐴 = ⎣⎢⎢
⎡ 𝑎K,K 0 … 0𝑎M,K ⋱ ⋱ ⋮⋮ ⋱ ⋱ 0𝑎KK,K … 𝑎KK,KP 𝑎KK,KK⎦⎥⎥
⎤
 
The ordering of the variables imposed in the recursive form implies that the variables at the top (such 
as a1,1) will not be affected by contemporaneous shocks to the lower variables (such as a2,1, a11,1, ...), 
while the lower variables will be affected by contemporaneous shocks to the upper variables. Usually, 
slower moving variables are better candidates to be ordered before fast-moving variables (Bruno and 
Shin 2015). It follows therefore that we place the climate vulnerability variable at the top in the 
ordering, which implies that it will only be affected by contemporaneous shock to itself. Following the 
vulnerability variable, we place the climate resilience variable second in the ordering, which implies 
that resilience will be affected by contemporaneous shocks to vulnerability and itself, but not by 
contemporaneous shocks to macroeconomic fundamentals or sovereign bond yields. Importantly, we 
put the sovereign yields in last place in the ordering, which is not only based on the assumption that 
climate risk will affect bond yields, but also on the consideration of our first-stage empirical results 
that imply the macroeconomic fundamentals that are driving bond yields. Last, we place our 
macroeconomic fundamentals in the middle of the ordering. The lag selection of the SVAR model is 
based on the AIC, which suggests that our model should be with two lags. 
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Baseline empirical results 
Table A2: The determinants of sovereign bond yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All ADV EME ASEAN HRSK 
Climate risk vulnerability and resilience 
Vulnerability 0.634*** –0.001 1.134*** 1.549*** 2.753*** 
 (0.150) (0.164) (0.434) (0.328) (0.388) 
Resilience –0.067*** –0.084*** –0.070*** –0.057*** –0.057*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Domestic factors 
Current account/GDP –0.051*** –0.019 –0.127*** –0.0650*** –0.106*** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.029) (0.013) (0.015) 
GDP per capita -0.748* –9.181*** –0.265 –4.587*** 1.049 
 (0.385) (0.992) (0.571) (0.868) (0.666) 
Public debt/GDP 0.016*** 0.013*** –0.0133* 0.0294*** 0.00991*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.008 -0.014 0.172*** –0.015 –0.023 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.035) (0.022) (0.020) 
GDP growth –0.180*** –0.142*** –0.242*** –0.042 –0.042* 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) 
Crisis 0.673*** 1.325*** -0.129 n/a 0.605 
 (0.203) (0.226) (0.377)  (0.743) 
Global factors 
US bond yield 0.803*** 0.832*** 0.587*** 0.282** 0.861*** 
 (0.052) (0.072) (0.092) (0.129) (0.101) 
VIX 0.049*** 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.006 0.038*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Constant –14.94** 102.3*** –36.96** –30.90* –142.3*** 
 (7.242) (13.16) (17.67) (17.54) (20.95) 
Observations 2,399 1,088 949 362 600 
R-squared 0.296 0.430 0.236 0.573 0.411 
Number of countries 40 17 17 6 10 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects No No No No No 
Note: Standard are errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ estimations, for explanations see the technical background paper (Beirne, Rhenzi, and Volz 2020a). 
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Figure A1: Response of sovereign bond yields to climate risk vulnerability  
and climate risk resilience shocks 
All countries 
 
Developed economies 
 
Emerging economies 
 
ASEAN 
 
High-risk economies 
 
Note: The pink line represents the 95% confidence interval. The blue line represents the impulse response of government bond 
yields to shocks. 
Source: Authors’ estimations, for explanations see the technical background paper (Beirne, Rhenzi, and Volz 2020a). 
